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CROSS BORDER M&A: WHO BUYS WHOM WHEN MARKET SIZE AND TECHNOLOGY LEVELS DIFFER?¹

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Abstract:

Global FDI activities are dominated by cross border acquisitions, especially between industrialized countries. In small industrialized countries, there is a growing concern of losing leading technological firms to large foreign companies through acquisitions. In this paper, we identify under what conditions a technology leader from a small country acquires a laggard from a large country, and vice versa. We answer this question using a two-firm two-country Cournot model, where firms in both countries can enter the foreign market, either through greenfield FDI or acquisition. We consider the roles of technological and market size asymmetries, technology transfer costs and M&A transaction costs; like merger integration costs and fees charged by legal and financial advisors. To become the acquirer, a firm from a small country needs not only a strong technological lead but also the ability to exploit it on a global scale, which requires low international technology transfer costs. Moreover, we find that a multilateral liberalization of greenfield investments may actually increase the incentives for foreign acquisitions. The effect of such liberalization on the nationality of the acquirer depends largely on the extent of the technology gap.

JEL classifications: L13, F23, O31, O38 Keywords: Multinational firms, FDI, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), technology transfer.

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1. Introduction

Firms increasingly enter foreign markets by acquiring a local producer rather than through greenfield FDI. The pattern is particularly pronounced in industrialized countries. M&As accounted for 85% of inward FDI in the industrialized countries² in 2006 (UNCTAD (2007)). Notice that most of these investments are directed towards the service sectors, not manufacturing, as in the past. In fact, while in the early 1970s services accounted for only one quarter of the world FDI stock, this share rose to more than 70% in 2006 (UNCTAD (2007)). Out of 35.000 M&As registered by Thomson Financial during the period 1995 to 2005, more than half were found in the service sectors.

The theoretical literature in economics has not devoted much focus to these important trends. Most of the formal modelling of the internationalization of firms is still devoted to explain the drivers and effects of greenfield FDI and exports in the manufacturing sector (Horstmann and Markusen (1992); Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000); Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004); Grünfeld (2006)). Since most services are non-tradable, these models cannot be applied to the internationalization of service. Moreover, while greenfield FDI is considered, foreign entry via acquisition is not. Lately, a small but growing number of theoretical studies focus on the choice between different modes of FDI (see e.g. Müller 2007, Mugele and Schnitzer 2008, Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi 2004, Bertrand and Zitouna 2006). Our paper adds to this literature, by allowing for two-way FDI in the same industry. We also take into account important M&A transaction costs, and we endogenously identify who buys whom.

Foreign acquisitions are often subject to intense public debate, especially if the takeover is directed towards service sectors, implying direct interaction between producer and consumer, (e.g local transportation and health services). During the last decades, a large number of technologically advanced firms in smaller industrialized countries have been acquired by firms with larger home markets like the US and UK. Many of these acquired firms were technology leaders which, under the right conditions, could have expanded internationally on their own through greenfield investment or acquisitions abroad. Yet, there is also a noticeable but much smaller number of examples of advanced service sector firms from small markets expanding in larger foreign markets through acquisitions.³

In this paper, we present a two firm two country Cournot model that allows for acquisitions and greenfield investments running both ways across borders.⁴ This is a desirable property in the case of

 $^{^2}$ The figure refers to M&A, however according to (UNCTAD (2000) p. 99) ,less than 3% of cross-border M&As are mergers.

³ E.g. Belgian KBC bank acquired the relatively large UK based financial firm Peel Hunt in 2001, the Austrian based advertising firm Lowe Lintas GGK bought the British advertising firm Broadway Group one year earlier, while Danish Group 4 Falch acquired French based Euroguard. According to Thomson Financial M&A database, more than 350 acquisitions in the service sectors involved a small country acquirer and a large country target during 2000-05.

⁴ Notice that the model does not include exports as a strategic option. Thus, it is best suited for studies of foreign entry into service sectors or manufacturing sectors where there are high fixed and low variable export costs.

industrialised countries, where multinationals often compete in each other's home markets. We allow markets (countries) to differ in terms of size, and firms to differ in terms of technological levels. The model also considers two core elements relating to FDI; international technology transfer costs and transaction costs relating to international acquisitions. We argue that transaction costs, relating to the MNE integration process, legal fees, financial advisory fees etc are substantial and play a pivotal role for the choice of entry mode. In this way, the model can be viewed as combining perspectives from international economics and financial economics.

We specifically ask in which setting a technological leader from a small country finds it optimal to buy a technologically inferior firm from a large country and vice-versa. The model endogenously identifies the acquirer and the target firm. Müller (2007) introduces a model with endogenous acquisition price when only one firm can be the acquirer. To our knowledge, no previous models combine a non-cooperative game relating to the greenfield FDI decision, with a cooperative bargaining game where the potential cross border acquisition and the identity of the equilibrium acquirer is established.

If an acquisition takes place, the model provides a global monopolist that gains from three effects: a larger monopoly rent, a best practice effect as better technology can be utilized in both countries, and finally saving fixed plant costs associated with greenfield FDI. The model shows that the acquiring firm is always the firm with the highest profits if an acquisition was not possible. If national markets are highly protected and thus the alternative to an acquisition is represented by two national monopolies, we show that market size asymmetry alone does not generate an incentive for a cross border acquisition. However, technological asymmetry alone may create such incentives.

When both types of asymmetries exist, the model must be studied using simulations. If the technology leader comes from a large country, it will be the acquirer (except for some extreme configurations). If the technology leader is based in the small country, the results are more complex. With prohibitively high barriers to greenfield FDI an acquisition will be made by the technology laggard from the large country buying the leader from the small country. This is because market size differences tend to outcompete the effect of technological asymmetry in such a scenario. If the barriers to greenfield FDI are non-prohibitive, the technology leader from the small country will be the acquirer only if the technology lead is large and the ability to utilise the lead in foreign markets is high. This ability is reached if international technology transfer costs are low.

We also show that a greenfield FDI liberalisation increases the likelihood of observing an acquisition as the equilibrium outcome. In other words, if the globalization process leads to e.g. lower fixed greenfield investment costs, it does not necessarily mean that we will see more greenfield investment, but rather more acquisitions. This prediction fits a pattern of increasing international M&A activities between countries where fixed investment costs have fallen due to policy harmonization and economic integration. The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we briefly survey the relevant literature on this subject and clarify what distinguishes our model from previous studies. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 analyzes the non-cooperative constrained game with a strategy space that excludes acquisition. Section 5 analyses the acquisition decision in a cooperative game framework, by applying the Nash fixed threat bargaining model. In Section 6, we analyse the equilibrium outcomes in the full model, partly based on analytical results and partly on numerical simulations. Finally, Section 7 presents the main conclusions.

2. Earlier empirical and theoretical contributions

Several empirical studies, mainly conducted in the 1990s, have analyzed the MNEs choice between greenfield FDI and acquisition. The technological characteristics of the foreign investor emerge as an important determinant of the entry mode. The R&D intensity of the investing firm appears to be negatively related to the probability of an acquisition relative to a greenfield FDI (Andersson and Svensson (1994); Brouthers and Brouthers (2000); Harzing (2002)). This finding is explained as the result of two factors. First, greenfield entry reduces the chance of technology dissemination in the foreign country. Second, it may be more difficult to exploit abroad a superior technology implanting it in an existing organisation than by creating a new one. The results are more mixed with respect to the impact of the relative technological capability of the investor, versus the target firm.⁵

As to the effect of home and host country characteristics, there is substantial agreement that the cultural distance between home and host country decreases the probability of entry via acquisition as it increases the cost of integrating the two company cultures (Kogut and Singh (1988); Barkema and Vermeulen (1998); Harzing (2002)). However, when allowing for joint ventures, mergers with a local partner may solve problems of agency costs and integration problems (see Mugele and Schnitzer, 2008). Mixed evidence is obtained on the influence of the level of GDP per capita in the host economy⁶, the size of the host country⁷ and factors such as foreign experience and the degree of product diversification of the

⁵ Kogut and Chang (1991) analysed Japanese investments in the US at the industry level and found that Japanese acquisitions in the US are insensitive to the difference in R&D expenditure in Japan and the US. On the other hand, Anand and Delios (2002), considering 2175 entries by British, German and Japanese investors in the US, found that the probability of entry via acquisition was positively affected by the difference in R&D expenditure in the host and home country, indicating acquisitions motivated by technology sourcing.

⁶ The level of GDP per capita in the host economy is found to be positively and significantly related to the probability of acquisition by Andersson and Svensson (1994), but has a negative (although not significant) effect in Barkema and Vermeulen (1998).

⁷ Bertrand and Zitouna (2006) show that host country market size has a positive effect on the probability of observing a foreign acquisition.

investor.⁸The economic mechanisms associated with international acquisitions are clearly not yet fully explained by the empirical literature, thus theoretical work may help to stimulate new directions for empirical research.

Recently, a few theoretical papers have addressed the issue of FDI via cross border acquisition, but in these studies the identity of the acquirer is exogenously determined. In most of these studies, the interplay between asymmetries in the technology level of firms and the relative size of markets (countries) is not accounted for. Moreover, acquisition has no effect on the profitability of the foreign investor in its home country, and technology only flows from the foreign firm to the local ones, thus excluding the possibility of technology sourcing FDI. Interesting insights may nevertheless be drawn from this literature.⁹

Müller (2007) is a study closely related to this paper, but FDI is only allowed to run one way. It allows for both technology and market size differences, where a technologically advanced MNE enters a less developed market (CEE countries) through greenfield FDI or acquisition. He shows that if there is no transfer of technology along with an acquisition, a larger host market size gives incentives to acquire, since monopoly rents are increased (this finding confirms Eicher and Kang, 2005). Furthermore, acquisition is preferred if technology differences are small, since competition through greenfield FDI is strong.

Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi (2004) also present a North-South model which highlights how the foreign firm's choice between greenfield FDI or acquisition and the local government's ranking of the two modes are affected by the cost of technology transfer within the MNE. Focusing on developed countries, Bjorvatn (2004) studies the effect of lower trade and greenfield investment costs on the profitability of international merger with two countries and three firms. The model shows that in some settings economic integration may trigger cross-border acquisitions. The impact of lowering trade and greenfield FDI barriers is also analyzed by Norbäck and Persson (2002, 2007). They consider the case in which a state-owned firm is privatized and sold in an auction in which a local privately owned firm and a foreign MNE compete as buyers.¹⁰ Bertrand and Zitouna (2006) also focus on the effects of trade liberalization on M&A activity. They explicitly focus on technology differences and also consider greenfield investment as an entry mode. The technology gap is shown to impact on how trade liberalization affects the incentive to merge.¹¹ Mugele

⁸ As to the effect of foreign experience on the probability of foreign entry via acquisition or greenfield, Andersson and Svensson (1994) found a positive effect; Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) and Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) found a negative effect, while in Kogut and Singh (1988) this variable was not significant.

⁹ Recently, models based on new trade theory and firm heterogeneity have advanced further to explain the choice between export, Greenfield FDI and acquisition in foreign markets. See Nocke and Yeaple (2007) for more on this. See also Das and Sengupta (2001) for asymmetric information models applied on international M&As.

¹⁰ Norbäck and Persson (2007) analyze the effect of FDI liberalisation when several foreign MNEs compete in bidding over the domestic firm.

¹¹ See also Görg (2000). He analyses whether a technologically advantaged firm, which has decided to undertake an FDI in a foreign market, will enter via greenfield investment or acquisition, and in the latter case whether to acquire the local low technology or the high technology firm. The analysis shows that under most conditions the take-over of the existing indigenous high technology firm is the preferred market entry mode.

and Schnitzer (2008) and Müller and Schnitzer (2006) model FDI in terms of international joint ventures where the agency problem is reduced as local partners are able to follow up the management closer. Notice though that the vast majority of international M&As are acquisitions of 100 percent of shares.

Only a few studies allowing for cross-border acquisition consider two-way FDI, and these studies are framed in a symmetric context, where the identity of the acquirer is undetermined. Horn and Persson (2001) analyze how the incentive to form either domestic or international mergers is influenced by trade costs. They consider the choice whether to export abroad or to acquire a foreign firm in a symmetric model with four firms. Greenfield FDI is not allowed for. They find that high trade barriers induce domestic rather than international mergers contrary to the tariff jumping argument.¹²

The role of both market size and technological asymmetries has been analysed by Fosfuri and Motta (1999), yet they do not include acquisition as a strategy. The paper shows that the technology gap and the relative size of the markets in the two countries play a central role for foreign entry mode. We bring this model one step further, by allowing firms to enter the foreign market through an acquisition.

Three important questions thus remain to be answered: how to determine endogenously the identity of the acquirer; what are the roles of technological and country size asymmetries in cross-border acquisitions and what is the effect of greenfield FDI liberalisation and ICT improvements on the equilibrium mode of entry.

3. The model

The model consists of two countries (I and II) and two firms, (1 and 2), that produce a homogeneous service or good in country I and II respectively. Countries may vary in size and firms may differ as to cost reducing exogenous technology as in Fosfuri and Motta (1999). Firms determine the mode of foreign entry, choosing among three possible strategies: no expansion abroad (*N*), greenfield FDI (*G*) or full acquisition¹³ of the foreign firm (*Ai*), *i*=1,2 where *i* represents the acquirer.

We assume that the total technology pool is divided between the two firms in proportion σ for firm 1 and $(1 - \sigma)$ for firm 2 with $\sigma \in [0,1]$. Unit variable costs in the <u>home market</u> for firm 1 and 2, respectively under the strategies *N* and *G*, are simply:

$$c_{1,I} = c_0 - \sigma \tag{1}$$

$$c_{2,II} = c_0 - (1 - \sigma) \tag{2}$$

¹² Ferret (2003) analyses cross border acquisitions in an international duopoly with a third potential player deciding on entry. The model shows that acquisitions are more likely in medium sized markets where entry does not occur (thus implying that with the growth of the world economy acquisitions will tend to slow).

¹³ Here we do not allow firms to involve in a merger where the parties own a percentage share of the firm. Such a possibility will complicate the model since we both will have to specify merger price and a sharing rate of profits between parties. Mattoo et al. (2004) also show that the equilibrium M&A always is a 100% acquisition.

where $c_0 \ge 1$ guarantees non-negative costs.¹⁴ Unit variable costs of production <u>abroad</u> under G are given by:

$$C_{1,II} = C_0 - \tau \sigma \tag{3}$$

$$c_{2,I} = c_0 - \tau (1 - \sigma) \tag{4}$$

showing that cross border internal know how transfer from parent to subsidiary is costly. The costs of internal knowledge transfer are inversely related to the parameter $\tau \in [0,1]$. It follows that if $\tau < 1$, the subsidiary is always less efficient than its parent. If a firm chooses *G*, it also faces a fixed set up cost *F* in the foreign market.

If firm 1 makes the acquisition, unit variable production cost in country I and II respectively are:

$$c_{1,1} = c_0 - \left[\max \left\{ \sigma, \tau(1 - \sigma) \right\} \right] \tag{5}$$

$$c_{1,II} = c_0 - \left[\max \left\{ \tau \sigma, (1 - \sigma) \right\} \right] \tag{6}$$

while if firm 2 makes the acquisition we have:

$$c_{2,II} = c_0 - \left[\max \left\{ (1 - \sigma), \tau \sigma \right\} \right] \tag{7}$$

$$c_{2,I} = c_0 - \left[\max \left\{ \sigma, \tau(1 - \sigma) \right\} \right]$$
(8)

Equations (5)-(8) rest on the assumption of a *best practise effect* (the term in the square brackets). The new company adopts in each market what is the most efficient technology of the in-house and that available in the target company. If foreign technology is implemented in a firm, there will be a loss due to technology transfer costs. An acquisition also requires acquisition transaction costs which we discuss in section 5.1.

We assume linear (inverse) demand functions:

$$p_{I}(q_{1,I} + q_{2,I}) = as - Q_{I}$$
(9)

$$p_{II}(q_{1,II} + q_{2,II}) = a(1-s) - Q_{II}$$
(10)

where $Q_J = q_{1,J} + q_{2,J}$ for J=I,II. The parameter *a* represents the joint size of the two markets while the parameter $s \in (0,1)$ indicates the share of *a* accounted for by country I, and (1-*s*) the share by country II.

The profits of the two firms differ depending on the strategy combinations (λ_1, λ_2) with $\lambda_i \in \Lambda_i = \{N, G, Ai\}$. Six equilibrium strategies may arise: (*NN*) where each firm produce and sell only in the home market; (*GN*) ((*NG*)) where firm 1 (2) conducts a greenfield FDI while the rival operates only in the domestic market; (*GG*) where we have a MNE duopoly; (*A*1,0) where firm 1 acquires firm 2, and finally (0, *A*2) where firm 2 acquires firm 1. The profit functions are reported in Appendix I.

 $\langle \mathbf{n} \rangle$

¹⁴ We assume that there is no involuntary dissemination of knowledge (no external spillovers) when the two firms are under separate ownership. This is a strong assumption that simplifies the model vastly. Yet since we operate with technology transfer when acquisition is the strategy, allowing for no transfer under G, can simply be viewed as a relative benchmarking of the technology transfer under different entry modes.

We identify the optimal foreign entry mode by solving a two stage game. In the first stage, firms decide upon the mode of entry. This is done in two steps. We first find the non-cooperative solution to a constrained game with strategy space $\tilde{\Lambda}_i = \{N, G\}$ ignoring acquisition as a strategy. We call this the *status quo game*. The status quo equilibrium $\tilde{\Lambda}^*$ provides the payoffs (π_i^d, π_j^d) if acquisition is no option or the players fail to agree on an acquisition price.

The solution to this game defines the threat point (alternative profits if no agreement) in the cooperative acquisition game, where we identify whether there will be an acquisition and who buys whom. The cooperative game is solved using the Nash fixed-threat bargaining equilibrium concept. In the second stage, firms set their profit maximizing level of output. As usual, the game is solved by backwards induction.

4. The status quo game

We first describe the non-cooperative status quo game with the constrained strategy space $\tilde{\Lambda}_i = \{N, G\}$. By comparing equilibrium profits¹⁵ under alternative strategy combinations, we can identify the condition for a dominant strategy:

$$\frac{\left[(1-s)a - c_0 + 2\tau\sigma - (1-\sigma)\right]^2}{9} > F$$
(11)

$$\frac{\left[sa-c_0+2\tau(1-\sigma)-\sigma\right]^2}{9} > F \tag{12}$$

If (11) is satisfied, *G* is the dominant strategy for firm 1. Otherwise, N will be the dominant strategy.¹⁶ Similarly, if (12) holds, *G* will be the dominant strategy for firm $2.^{17}$ The probability that (11) (alternatively(12)) holds is decreasing (increasing) in *s* (the relative size of market I):

$$\frac{\partial LHS(11)}{\partial s} = -a \frac{2[(1-s)a - c_0 + 2\tau\sigma - (1-\sigma)]}{9} < 0$$
(13)

$$\frac{\partial LHS(12)}{\partial s} = a \frac{2[sa - c_0 + 2\tau(1 - \sigma) - \sigma]}{9} > 0$$

$$\tag{14}$$

¹⁵ The equilibrium profits for each market configuration in the non-cooperative game with $\tilde{\Lambda}_i = \{N, G\}$ are obtained by substituting in the profit functions the optimal sales we get by solving the second stage games. ¹⁶ If (11) holds, we have that: $\hat{\pi}_1^{GG} > \hat{\pi}_1^{NG}$ and $\hat{\pi}_1^{GN} > \hat{\pi}_1^{NN}$

¹⁷ If (12) holds, we have that: $\hat{\pi}_2^{NG} > \hat{\pi}_2^{NN}$ and $\hat{\pi}_2^{GG} > \hat{\pi}_2^{GN}$

This finding reminds us that a large host market (ceteris paribus) is an important attractor for inward greenfield FDI since it implies higher variable profits, to compensate for the additional fixed plant costs (F). Similarly, a larger total market (*a*) gives stronger incentives for greenfield FDI.

The probability that (11) (alternatively (12)) holds is increasing (decreasing) in σ (the relative technology level of firm 1):

$$\frac{\partial LHS(11)}{\partial \sigma} = (2\tau + 1) \frac{2[(1-s)a - c_0 + 2\tau\sigma - (1-\sigma)]}{9} > 0$$
(15)

$$\frac{\partial LHS(12)}{\partial \sigma} = -(2\tau+1)\frac{2[sa-c_0+2\tau(1-\sigma)-\sigma]}{9} < 0$$
(16)

So the technologically leading firm is more likely to expand abroad than the weaker competitor. Its variable cost advantage implies that by producing abroad it will enjoy –ceteris paribus- higher variable profits than its competitor. The advantage of the leading firm is greater the lower the cost of cross border technology transfer (the higher τ) since low internal technology transfer costs imply that the leading firm will benefit more in the foreign market from its technological leadership.

The Nash equilibrium strategy configuration in the status quo game $(\tilde{\Lambda}^*)$ clearly depends on the value of the parameters. Fig 1a and 1b illustrates how $\tilde{\Lambda}^*$ depends on the value of *s* and σ , where the fixed investment cost (*F*) is set to 1.5 and 0.5 in Fig 1a and 1b respectively.¹⁸

Insert Figure 1a and 1b here

The thick line in figures 1a and 1b represents condition $(11)^{19}$ with strict equality, whereas the thin line represents condition $(12)^{20}$. In the case where firm 1 has a technology advantage and its foreign market is relatively large (south-east in the diagrams), it will chose G, while firm 2 will chose N. By symmetry, the opposite strategies are chosen in the north-west corner of the diagrams. When F is reduced, these two indifference lines shift upwards and downwards respectively, and when they shift positions, the equilibrium changes from NN in Figure 1a to GG in Figure 1b. Since the two indifference lines are always parallel, no

¹⁸ In these figures,
$$a=3, \tau=0.5$$
 and $c_0 = 1$.

¹⁹ Eq.(11) can be rearranged as:
$$s < \frac{a - c_0 - 1 - 3\sqrt{F}}{a} + \frac{(2\tau + 1)}{a}\sigma$$

²⁰ Eq.(12) can be rearranged as: $s > \frac{c_0 - 2\tau + 3\sqrt{F}}{a} + \frac{(2\tau + 1)}{a}\sigma$

parameter combination allows both GG and NN to be equilibrium within the feasible (s, σ) space. If we reduce knowledge transfer costs (increase τ), the indifference lines become steeper, as illustrated in Figure 2. Hence, an increase in τ contributes to a larger area where $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = GG$.

Insert Figure 2 here

5. Bargaining for an acquisition

5.1 M&A transaction costs

Transaction costs associated with an acquisition by firm *i* (T_i) arise due to fees charged by transaction service providers, as well as costs related to the integration of the two firms. Previous theoretical works in economics on foreign entry mode have largely ignored this crucial aspect, ²¹ although it has received a great deal of attention in the finance and strategic management literature. Fees for the services of legal, financial, strategic and organizational advisors and consultants, represent a significant share of such transaction costs (normally 1-10 percent of the acquisition price). Hunter and Walker (1990), examining various US merger fee contracts, find that the most commonly used contract involved a combination of a fixed fee and a fee based on the acquisition price (often named deal value). This pattern is empirically confirmed in Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) who also survey the literature. Consequently, we model these transaction costs as a function of the size of the deal. Below we show that this size depends on the target firm capitalisation. (i.e. the status quo profits of the target firm π_j^d). Hence this form of transaction costs can be modelled as a function of π_i^d .

The costs of integrating two firms due to an acquisition, is often found to be high (see Picot, 2002 for a collection of articles on integration costs in merging firms). Cultural and managerial differences tend to enlarge integration costs (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2002). Also, the larger the acquisition, the higher are the expected firm integration costs, since the size of staff, equipment as well as firm cultural rigidity tends to increase with the size of both firms (see Bruner, 2004). In other words, such integration costs are both fixed and variable. Notice though that it is only the variable cost component that yields interesting results in the model. In oligopoly models, equilibrium profits is increasing in equilibrium output or size. Hence, to simplify, we model integration costs related to the acquisition as an increasing function of the target firm status quo profits. That is, the same way as we model the transaction costs. Consequently, transaction and integration costs are modelled as

$$T_i = \gamma \pi_i^d \quad \text{where} \qquad 1 > \gamma > 0 \tag{17}$$

5.2 The equilibrium bid

We first identify the equilibrium offer (B_i) when firm *i* wants to acquire firm *j*. The problem can be solve as a cooperative game²², using the Nash fixed – threat bargaining model (see Friedman 1990; Petit, 1990). The players bargain on how to divide the profits associated with the acquisition. The status quo equilibrium $\tilde{\Lambda}^*$ provides the payoffs obtained by the players if they fail to make an agreement, called the disagreement outcomes or *status quo profits* (π_i^d, π_i^d) .

The profit of the acquirer (firm *i*) is given by:

$$\Pi_i^{Ai} = V_i^{Ai} - T_i - B_i \tag{18}$$

where V_i^{Ai} represents the gross profits of the global monopolist (see Appendix I). Due to the *best practise effect*, unit cost in each market does not depend on which firm makes the acquisition. Consequently, from here on we drop the firm specific notation for V^A . To calculate the net profit of the acquirer, we must subtract T_i which represents transaction costs associated with the deal, as well as the acquisition price *B* paid to *j*.

<u>The profits of the target firm</u> are equal to the acquisition price B_i :

$$\Pi_j^{Ai} = B_i \tag{19}$$

The *equilibrium bid* B_i is given by the Nash bargaining solution of the cooperative game described in Appendix II. With constant marginal utility of profits, the bargaining solution provides the standard result that excess profits from the acquisition (i.e. the overall gain from cooperation) is *evenly divided* between the two players. Thus, profits for the target firm becomes

$$B_{i} = \prod_{j}^{Ai} = \pi_{j}^{d} + \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \left(V^{A} - \gamma \pi_{j}^{d} \right) - \left(\pi_{i}^{d} + \pi_{j}^{d} \right) \right\} = \frac{1}{2} \left[V^{A} + (1 - \gamma) \pi_{j}^{d} - \pi_{i}^{d} \right]$$
(20)

where the term in curly brackets represents the overall gain from cooperation. The acquisition price paid for the target firm reflects what firm *j* profits could have become if the acquisition did not take place.

As to the acquirer, firm *i* will earn the following profits:

$$\Pi_{i}^{Ai} = \pi_{i}^{d} + \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \left(V^{A} - \gamma \pi_{j}^{d} \right) - \left(\pi_{i}^{d} + \pi_{j}^{d} \right) \right\} = \frac{1}{2} \left[V^{A} - (1 + \gamma) \pi_{j}^{d} + \pi_{i}^{d} \right]$$
(21)

which represents the status quo profit plus the bargaining share of firm *i*. The profits from acquisition for both firms are increasing in the global monopolist profits, increasing in own status quo profits, but decreasing in the rival's status quo profits.

²¹ Bertrand and Zitoune (2006) are an exception, but consider only integration costs, modelling them as a fixed cost. We instead highlight the importance of the variable component of transaction costs.

²² This way of dealing with the problem is in line with the empirical finding that the overwhelming number of M&A both domestic and international are friendly rather than hostile takeovers.

5.3 Condition for a cross border acquisition to take place

An acquisition equilibrium requires that both firms gain from it as compared to the status quo equilibrium profit, that is $\Pi_i^{Ai} > \pi_i^d$ and $\Pi_j^{Ai} > \pi_j^d$. We find, using (20) and (21), that both these conditions are satisfied iff:

$$V^{A} > (1 + \gamma)\pi_{i}^{d} + \pi_{i}^{d}$$
⁽²²⁾

If there are excess profits from the acquisition made by firm *i*, the acquisition will take place since both firms will benefit from it.²³ This leads us to the following proposition:

Proposition 1:

An acquisition will take place if (V^A) is larger than the sum of the two firms' status quo profits <u>plus</u> the transaction costs.

5.4 Condition for being the acquirer

We know that firm *i* would like to be the acquirer if its profit is higher than the profit it receives from being the target, that is if $\Pi_i^{Ai} > \Pi_i^{Aj}$, which implies from (20) and (21) that:

$$\frac{1}{2} \left[V^{A} - (1+\gamma)\pi_{j}^{d} + \pi_{i}^{d} \right] > \frac{1}{2} \left[V^{A} + (1-\gamma)\pi_{i}^{d} - \pi_{j}^{d} \right]$$
(23)

which can be reduced to:

$$\pi_i^d > \pi_j^d \tag{24}$$

The same condition applies to $\prod_{j}^{Ai} > \prod_{j}^{Aj}$, so we have that Ai is the optimal entry mode ($\Lambda^* = Ai$)

iff $\pi_i^d > \pi_i^d$. We can thus state:

Proposition 2:

It is always the firm with the highest status quo profit that becomes the acquirer, regardless of the size of $1 > \gamma > 0$.

To sum up, an acquisition brings the following benefits and costs compared to greenfield entry:

- (i) Market power effect
- (ii) Best practice effect (providing lower unit variable cost.)
- (iii) Savings on fixed costs, if the status quo equilibrium implies greenfield FDI.
- However a cross border acquisition does also imply
- (iv) additional transaction costs.

²³ This is the traditional criterion for merger incentive in the IO literature, which however overlooks transaction costs. See e.g. Horn and Persson (2001).

The strength of these effects will depend on the extent of market size asymmetries (*s*), technological asymmetries (σ) and on the status quo equilibrium (as summarized in Table 1).

Insert Table 1 here

6. Equilibrium solution to the full game

We initially present analytical results and then revert to simulations. In Figures 4-7, simulation results are presented for the different combinations of firm characteristics in the (s,σ) space. In the upper (lower) half of each matrix, country I is the largest (smallest). We focus our attention to the range $\sigma \in [0.5,1)$ where firm 1 is a technological leader, since this region represents all relevant combinations of technologies and market sizes. In the figures, the left hand matrix contains simulation results for the status quo game, while the right hand matrix provides the solution to the full game. In the following discussion, we start out with the simplest case where firms and countries are symmetric, and then add asymmetries as we go along.

6.1 Full symmetry (s=0.5, σ =0.5)

In the case of both market size and technology symmetry, the left hand side of conditions (11) and (12) become identical, thus $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$ and $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$ are the only feasible solutions. It is not possible to identify a potential acquirer since $\pi_i^d = \pi_j^d$. An acquisition generates a monopoly in both countries and since the best practice technology will always be $\sigma = 0.5$ we have that:

$$V^A = 2\pi_i^{NN} \tag{25}$$

If $\widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$, the profit of the acquirer is given by:

$$\Pi_{i}^{Ai} = \frac{1}{2} \Big[(V^{A} - (1+\gamma)\pi_{j}^{NN} + \pi_{i}^{NN}) \Big] = (1 - 0.5\gamma)\pi_{i}^{NN} < \pi_{i}^{NN}$$
(26)

Thus under full symmetry, profits from the acquisition will always be lower than profits from the status-quo *NN* equilibrium. In such scenario foreign entry by acquisition is not feasible as none of the potential benefits from an acquisition (best practise, increased market power, saving on fixed cost) will be at work to compensate for transaction costs (see Table 1). However, this does not have to be the case if $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$, due to technology transfer costs, stronger competition, and *F* (plant fixed cost). If $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$, the condition for a cross border acquisition to take place (Eq. (22)) becomes:

$$\gamma < \frac{2(\pi_i^{NN} - \pi_i^{GG})}{\pi_i^{GG}}$$
(27)

implying that an acquisition is feasible in equilibrium under full symmetry since $\pi_i^{NN} > \pi_i^{GG}$ for all parameter values. Note that $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$ may materialize even though both firms get higher profits if $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$, as we may face a prisoner's dilemma situation. It follows that:

Proposition 3:

With full symmetry, an acquisition will never be the optimal entry mode if $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$. However, if $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$ an acquisition may arise as the solution of the full game.

In figure 3, we have depicted the combinations of τ and F, for which $\widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$ or $\widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$ in the fully symmetric case.

Insert Figure 3 here

Clearly, if τ is large and *F* is small, *GG* will be preferred to *NN*, and the larger *a* is, the wider is the range of (τ, F) combinations supporting $\widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$, since a larger overall market size reduces the share of fixed costs *(F)* for each unit produced abroad. Thus, the indifference line shifts towards southeast as *a* increases.

6.2 Market size asymmetry (s>0.5, $\sigma = 0.5$)

Here, the incentive to invest abroad is greater for firm 2 which is based in the small country $(LHS \ Eq.(11) < LHS \ Eq.(12))$. Thus both $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN) \ \tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$ and $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NG)$ are feasible. But $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GN)$ can be ruled out, as the smaller size of country II discourages firm 1 from entering it. If $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$, Firm 2 from the small country has the lowest profit as s > 0.5. This will also be the case if $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$ when $\tau < 1$, since firm 2 will have a cost disadvantage in the large market due to the cost of

internal technology transfer.²⁴ Simulation results show that if $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NG)$ firm 1 will generally have the highest profit (see Figures 4a-5a, the upper part of the first column identified with a thick frame).²⁵

Insert Figure 4 and 5 here

Turning to the solution of the full game, as in the completely symmetric case, if $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$ no acquisition will take place because there will be no best practice, market power, or fixed cost saving effects²⁶. If $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$, an acquisition may take place, but only $\Lambda^* = (A1)$ is feasible since we know from above that $\pi_1^{GG} > \pi_2^{GG}$. The results are confirmed by simulations in table 4-5. It follows that:

Proposition 4:

Market asymmetry alone (i.e. when $\sigma = 0.5$) is not sufficient to stimulate a cross border acquisition when $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$. If $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$, $\Lambda^* = (A1)$ is feasible, hence the acquirer will be the firm from the large country.

6.3 Technological asymmetry (s=0.5, $\sigma > 0.5$)

Here, we must consider the best practice effect under acquisition. Firm 1(the technology leader), has a larger incentive to invest abroad due to lower variable costs. The feasible status quo equilibria are thus $\widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN), \quad \widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG) \quad \text{and} \quad \widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (GN), \quad \text{while} \quad \widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (NG) \quad \text{can}$ ruled be out since LHS Eq.(11) > LHS Eq.(12). Here, acquisition gross profit can be defined as the sum of the national monopoly profits plus the gains through adoption of the best practice (k).

$$V^{A} = \hat{\pi}_{1}^{NN} + \hat{\pi}_{2}^{NN} + k \quad \text{where}$$

$$k = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{iff} & \tau\sigma < (1 - \sigma) \\ \frac{1}{4} \left\{ 2 [(1 - s)a - c_{0}] [\tau\sigma - (1 - \sigma)] + (\tau\sigma)^{2} - (1 - \sigma)^{2} \right\} > 0 & \text{iff} & \tau\sigma > (1 - \sigma) \end{cases}$$
(29)

Thus, due to the best practice effect, technology asymmetry alone (i.e. with s = 0.5) provides incentives for an acquisition, also when $\widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$. Notice that in the previous section, we found that market size

²⁴ Note that the market size asymmetry influences the relative profitability of the two producers in GG only when internal technology transfer is costly. With s>0.5 and $\sigma=0.5$, with $\tau=1$ $\pi_1^{GG} = \pi_2^{GG}$

 $^{^{25}}$ In a few cases (that is if the difference between the size of the two markets is rather small and τ is high), we may have $\hat{\pi}_{2}^{NG} > \hat{\pi}_{1}^{NG}$. The range of (s, σ) combinations for which $\pi_{2}^{NG} - \pi_{1}^{NG} > 0$ is increasing in τ and decreasing in s (see Appendix III). ²⁶ Due to $\sigma=0.5 V^{A} = \pi_{1}^{NN} + \pi_{2}^{NN}$ and condition (22) does not hold.

asymmetry alone is not sufficient to trigger an acquisition when $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$, but technology asymmetry is. An acquisition equilibrium will arise if the best practice effect fully compensates for the acquisition transaction costs, which requires from Eq. (22) that $k > \gamma \hat{\pi}_2^{NN}$. Notice that an acquisition becomes more likely if the technological asymmetry increases, since $\frac{\partial k}{\partial \sigma} > 0$ (consult the central row with a thick frame in Figures 4b for illustrations).²⁷ We can thus state:

Proposition 5: In the case of technological asymmetry and market size symmetry, an acquisition may take place also when $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$.

As to the identity of the acquirer, we can state the following²⁸ (proof in Appendix IV):

Proposition 6:

In the case of technological asymmetry and market size symmetry, the acquirer will always be the technology leader.

6.4 Technology and market size asymmetry I: ($s < 0.5, \sigma > 0.5$ - leader from the small country)

We now allow for both market size and technology asymmetries. Since there are no explicit solutions to the equilibrium strategy configurations, we relate our discussion to numerical simulations. When *s*<0.5 and σ >0.5, we restrict ourselves to the lower half of the simulation tables. Since firm 1 now is the technological leader based in the small country, its incentive to choose greenfield FDI is larger than for firm 2 (*LHS Eq.*(11) > *LHS Eq.*(12)), both due to the large foreign market size and the technological advantage. It follows that $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$, $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$ and $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GN)$ are feasible, while $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NG)$ can be ruled out.

Insert Figure 6a, 6b and 6c here

We first concentrate on the case where $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$, illustrated in Figures 6a-c. An acquisition can be profitable even though $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$, due to the best practise effect.²⁹ Note from Eq. (29) that the best practice

²⁷ Figure 5 shows that an acquisition may take place also when $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$ or $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GN)$.

²⁸ This finding is also illustrated by the results in Figures 4-6.

²⁹ Eqs. (28) and (29) hold also for the ($s < 0.5, \sigma > 0.5$) case. We are assuming that $\tau \sigma > (1 - \sigma)$.

benefits increase in the extent of the technological leadership of firm 1, in the transferability of the technology and in the size of the laggard home country (country II). In Figure 6a, we see that if technology asymmetry is small and the difference in country size is moderate, there is no scope for significant best practice benefits, hence an acquisition will not take place. Notice that for any given technology asymmetry, a smaller *s* increases the attractiveness of an acquisition, since larger market asymmetries boosts the best practice effect.

What is the identity of the acquirer? In Appendix V it is shown that if $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$, we have that $\hat{\pi}_2^{NN} > \hat{\pi}_1^{NN}$ iff:

$$[(1-s)-s]a > \sigma - (1-\sigma) \tag{30}$$

that is if the market size asymmetry effect is strong relative to the technological asymmetry effect. We also show that $\hat{\pi}_2^{NN} > \hat{\pi}_1^{NN}$ is satisfied for all $s \le 0.33$ and $0.5 > \sigma < 1$ In other words, with $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$ and a *large market size asymmetry* (defined as $s \le 0.33$), the laggard from the large country will have higher profits. Thus, if an acquisition takes place, $\Lambda^* = (A2)$, and the technology leader from the small country will be acquired. In Figure 6a, where $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$ for all (s, σ) combinations – it is shown that we have $\Lambda^* = (A2)$ for a rather broad range of (s, σ) within the $(s < 0.5, \sigma > 0.5)$ scenario. Only a limited set of configurations allow $\Lambda^* = (A1)$. To illustrate this, concentrate on the area in Figure 6a with a small market size asymmetry (s=0.45). As we increase σ , we move from $\Lambda^* = (NN)$, to $\Lambda^* = (A2)$ and finally to $\Lambda^* = (A1)$. The first change in equilibrium entry strategy is driven by the stronger best practice effect. But since the technological advantage for firm 1 is relatively small, the market size asymmetry effect dominates. Thus, we have $\hat{\pi}_2^{NN} > \hat{\pi}_1^{NN}$ and $A^* = (A2)$. This is illustrated with the negative values in the left matrix in Figure 6a. The second shift in equilibrium is driven by the stronger technology asymmetry, generating higher status quo profits for firm 1. This is illustrated by the growing positive values in the left hand matrix in Figure 6a.

Result 1: If the technological leader is based in the small country and $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$, for a wide range of (s, σ) combinations, the leader will be acquired by the laggard from the large country if there is a cross-border takeover. This is always the case, if there is a large market size asymmetry.

We simulate the effect of a reduction in F, which is equivalent to a multilateral liberalization of greenfield FDI (like the MAI-treaty reform), by moving from Figure 6a through 6b and further to 6c. One would expect that such a liberalization increases the incentive to choose greenfield FDI, yet our model show

that it may just as well raise the incentives to engage in an acquisition, reducing the likelihood of greenfield FDI. When $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GN)$, the profitability of an acquisition is higher as compared to $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$. In addition to the best practice effect, which in the scenario $(s < 0.5, \sigma > 0.5)$ is relevant independently of $\tilde{\Lambda}^*$, an acquisition now profits from reduced competition and saving on fixed costs (see Table 1). Consequently, if a fall in *F* leads to a strategy shift from $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$ to $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GN)$, we have that an acquisition is the optimal mode of entry for a wider range of parameter values (the white area in the right hand matrixes in Figure 6 progressively shrinks as we move from 6a to 6b and then to 6c). With $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GN)$ the leader from the small country will enjoy monopoly profits in its home market, and if $\tau \sigma > (1 - \sigma)$ the leader will also obtain higher operating profits in the host country compared to its rival. On the other hand, firm 1 by becoming a MNE will faces additional fixed costs due to the new plant abroad. Thus, there is no analytical solution that identifies which producer will have the larger profits in general, and thus, who is the potential acquirer.

Simulation results indicate that a fall in *F*, leading to a strategy shift, has an effect on the identity of the acquirer, which depends on whether the technology leader from the small country is a *strong* or a *weak* leader.³⁰ Let us look at the strong leader first (large σ). In Figure 6b the technology leader from the small country benefits significantly more from its technological advantage as compared to the situation in Figure 6a. Due to the fall in *F*, firm 1 is now able to exploit its advantage in the world market via greenfield FDI, and the benefits from investing abroad increase in τ (lower the technology transfer costs). Thus, when $\tilde{\Lambda}^*$ shifts from NN to GN, we have that $\hat{\pi}_1^d > \hat{\pi}_2^d$ for a larger range of the (s, σ) combinations. And thus the range of situations for which $\Lambda^* = (A1)$ widens, as shown by a comparison of Figure 6a with 6b and 6c. If the leader is weak (σ is close to 0.5), the range of (s, σ) combinations for which we have $\Lambda^* = (A2)$ increases, indicating that the weak leader is more likely to be the target of a cross border acquisition when F falls.

To illustrate this, let us start out with a market asymmetry of s=0.3. If F is high as in Figure 6a, we have $\Lambda^* = (NN)$ for $0.6 \ge \sigma > 0.5$ and $\Lambda^* = (A2)$ for $\sigma > 0.6$. The technology leader will be taken over by the follower only if its technological advantage generates sufficient best practise benefits to compensate for acquisition transaction costs. If F is low as in Figure 6c, we have $\Lambda^* = (A1)$ for $\sigma \ge 0.7$, due to the large benefits associated with one way multinational expansion for the strong leader. So the strong leader from the small country will be the acquirer. In the case of the weak leader, the probability of been a target increases, as we have $\Lambda^* = (A2)$ also for values of σ for which in 6a we have $\Lambda^* = (NN)$. In this case the fall in F makes multinational expansion profitable, but the strategy shift does not generate sufficient benefits for firm

 $^{^{30}}$ The threshold value of σ for strong leadership depends on other parameters values.

1 to become the most profitable of the two firms. At the same time, the threat from firm 1 (the leader) to enter country II via greenfield FDI creates an additional incentive for the laggard to make an acquisition (as it lowers its status quo profits). So for firm 2, being the acquirer creates both best practise benefits and market power benefits. Consequently, if small country governments are concerned about technologically advanced national firms being acquired by firms from larger countries, they should be aware of the effect of reducing F in the case where their technology leaders are weak leaders.

Result 2:

Multilateral greenfield FDI liberalization (i.e. a reduction in F) increases the likelihood of an acquisition, as compared to the case of segmented markets (i.e. $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$)³¹.

Result 3:

If the technological leader is based in the small country, the effect of multilateral greenfield FDI liberalization on the identity of the acquirer depends on the extent of the technological gap. If firm 1 is a weak technology leader (σ close to 0,5), its probability of being acquired by the laggard increases. If it is a strong technology leader, its probability of acquiring the laggard from the large market increases.

If the threat is cross-greenfield FDI ($\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$), the gains from an acquisition are further enlarged as saving on fixed costs is doubled and the gains from reduced competition relates to both markets (see Table 1). Hence, only if acquisition costs are large, the firms will decide not to merge (consult the simulations in Figure 5 where $\Lambda^* = (Ai)$ for most parameter combinations even though γ is as large as 0.35). Furthermore, if $\tau \sigma > (1 - \sigma)$, the leader from the small country will always be the acquirer ($\Lambda^* = (A1)$), since it will have higher operating profits due to a better technology in both markets, while facing the same fixed costs.

Insert table 7 here

In Figure 7 we simulate a reduction in technology transfer costs (higher τ), for instance due to technological development in ICT or to greater attention devoted by firms to know-how management. The effects are similar to those driven by a fall in *F*. Moving from Figure 7a to 7b, we see that when τ increases, the white area (i.e. the non acquisition area) shrinks. It becomes relatively more profitable for the technology leader to go multinational, and the smaller the transfer costs are, the higher will its profit be relative to the opponent. Furthermore, the effect on the identity of the acquirer is also similar to the effect from a fall in *F*.

If you start out from s=0.3 in Figure 7a and cut transfer costs (see 7b), you will move from $\Lambda^* = (NN)$ to $\Lambda^* = (A2)$ if the firm 1 is a weak technology leader, while you move from $\Lambda^* = (A2)$ to $\Lambda^* = (A1)$ if firm 1 is a strong technology leader.

6.5 Technology and market size asymmetry II: $(s > 0.5, \sigma > 0.5 - 1)$ leader from the large country

Firm 1 is the technological leader and is based in the large country. Market size and technological effects run in the opposite direction. All the four status quo outcomes are possible (NN, GG, GN, GG). If $\widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$, firm 1 will have a larger profits. That is also the case if $\widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$ or $\widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (GN)$ (see Figures 4 - 7 for illustrations).³² However, if the incentive from a large host market size prevail (and $\tilde{\Lambda}^* = (NG)$), due to the contrasting effect from technology and market size difference, we cannot have a clear reply on which firm will have the largest status quo size and thus may become the acquirer.

Result 4:

In the case of a technology leader from a large country, under rather general conditions³³, this firm will be the acquirer in case of a cross border take-over.

7. Conclusions

In the theoretical industrial organisation literature, the study of why firms decide to enter a foreign market through greenfield investment or M&As is in an infant stage. So far, no study has succeeded in identifying what kind of firms chooses to make a cross border acquisition and what kind of firms chooses instead to be acquired by foreign firms. In this paper we apply a simple bargaining model to determine the identity of the acquirer, in a setting where firms differ with respect to technological level and countries vary with respect to market size. We are thus able to analyse whether technology leaders from small countries may find it optimal to acquire technology laggards from large countries, or vice versa.

Our model contains important features that seem to play a pivotal role in the choice between conducting an acquisition or establishing a new subsidiary abroad through greenfield investment. We consider the gains from implementing a best practice technology, and take into account knowledge transfer

³¹ This result holds also for the other scenarios considered.

³² We have $\pi_1^{NV} > \pi_2^{NV}$ which implies $\pi_1^{GN} > \pi_2^{GN}$. We have $\pi_1^{GN} > \pi_1^{NV}$ if the status quo is GN, while $\pi_2^{GN} < \pi_2^{NV}$. ³³ That is in three out of four possible status quo outcomes. Only if the alternative to an acquisition is (NG), the identity of the acquirer is not determined.

costs and transaction costs associated with a merger due to legal fees, consulting fees and costs of integrating the two company cultures. Empirical studies show that such acquisition costs can be surprisingly high, leading to low profits from cross border acquisitions.

Our model shows that the acquiring firm is always the one that would have gained the highest profits if an acquisition was not possible. In fact we find that the equilibrium acquisition price reflects the target firm potential for growth. We also find that changes in the market size and technology asymmetries affect the choice between cross border acquisition and other entry modes, both directly and indirectly via strategy shifts, that is by inducing a change in what would be the equilibrium in the no acquisition situation.

When only one type of asymmetry is considered, we find that if national markets are highly protected and thus the alternative to an acquisition is represented by two national monopolies, market size asymmetry alone does not generate an incentive for a cross border acquisition. However, technological asymmetry alone may create such incentives. Furthermore, if we have technological asymmetry but market size symmetry, when an acquisition takes place, the technological leader is always the acquirer.

When both types of asymmetries play a role, we find that if the technology leader comes from a large country, it will – except for some extreme configurations - be the acquirer if there is any cross border take over at all. In the case of a technology leader based in the small country, the results are more complex. With prohibitively high barriers to greenfield FDI (thus with. national monopolies in the non acquisition case), for most (s, σ) combinations³⁴, if there is an acquisition that is made by the laggard based in the large country. Market size asymmetry tends to prevail on technological asymmetry in such scenario, and a large home market emerges as a key factor for determining who will be the acquirer in an international deal. Only if market size asymmetry is rather small, an acquisition made by the technology leader may emerge as the optimal entry mode within the segmented markets setting.

We also show that greenfield FDI liberalisation increases the likelihood of observing an acquisition as the equilibrium outcome. In other words, if the globalization process leads to e.g. lower fixed investment costs under greenfield, it does not necessarily mean that we will see more greenfield investment, but rather more acquisitions. This prediction seems to fit the developments mentioned in Section 1. As to the identity of the acquirer, we find that the effect of multilateral greenfield FDI liberalization depends on the *extent of the technology gap*. If the small country producer enjoys a strong technological lead and is able to exploit it internationally, FDI liberalization increases the range of parameters for which such firm may become the acquirer. In order to fully benefit from its advantage in the global market, the technology leader should be able not only to become an MNE but also to transfer its technology at low costs across borders. However the same liberalisation in the FDI regime increases the likelihood that a weak technology leader will become a target in a cross border deal. Thus globalization seems to create the preconditions for world leadership in the case of

strong technology leaders based in small countries, but at the same time it increases weak leaders' vulnerability to foreign take-over.

The size of the home market – as expected- emerges as a more crucial factor in international M&As when national markets are highly protected, in other words it is more important with segmented markets than in a globalized world. In a liberalized FDI regime instead, a strong technological lead becomes a crucial determinant of who will buy whom, if technologies are transferable.

Our future research will continue analysing the consequences of imposing both technology and market size asymmetries. One extension will be to incorporate the financial determinants of M&As, capturing different access to the capital market via firm specific parameters. Furthermore, we will investigate possible policy implications. Here, it is natural to ask whether governments can find it optimal to block acquisitions in order to avoid the establishment of monopolies, even though acquisitions may improve production technology through knowledge transfer.

³⁴ We have shown that always to be the case for large market asymmetry.

Appendix 1

The profit functions of the two firms in selected market configurations (GN, A1, A2) are:

$$\pi_1^{GN} = (sa - q_{1,I})q_{1,I} - (c_0 - \sigma)q_{1,I} + ((1 - s)a - (q_{1,II} + q_{2,II}))q_{1,II} - (c_0 - \tau\sigma)q_{1,II} - F$$
A.I.1
$$\pi^{GN} = ((1 - s)a - (q_0 - \tau\sigma)q_{1,I} - (c_0 - (1 - \sigma))q_{1,II} - F$$
A.I.2

$$\pi_{2} = ((1-s)a - (q_{1,ll} + q_{2,ll}))q_{2,ll} - (c_{0} - (1-\sigma))q_{2,ll}$$

$$\Pi^{A1} = (V^{A1} - T) - R$$
A I 3

$$\Pi_{1} = (V_{1} - T_{1}) - B_{1}$$

$$\Pi_{2}^{22} = (V_{2}^{22} - T_{2}) - B_{2}$$
where
A.I.4

$$V_{1}^{AI} = (sa - q_{1,I})q_{1,I} - (c_{0} - [\max \{\sigma, \tau(1 - \sigma)\}]q_{1,I} + ((1 - s)a - q_{1,II})q_{1,II} - (c_{0} - [\max \{\tau\sigma, (1 - \sigma)\}]q_{1,II} - (c_{0} - [\max \{\tau\sigma, (1 - \sigma)]q_{1,II} - (c_{0} - [\max \{\tau\sigma, (1 - \sigma)\}]q_{1,II} - (c_{0} - [\max \{\tau\sigma, (1 - \sigma)]q_{1,II} - (c_{0} - [\max \{\tau\sigma, (1 - \sigma)]q_$$

$$V_{2}^{A2} = (sa - q_{2,l})q_{2,l} - (c_{0} - \left[\max\left\{\sigma, \tau(1 - \sigma)\right\}\right]q_{2,l} + ((1 - s)a - q_{2,l}))q_{2,l} - (c_{0} - \left[\max\left\{\tau\sigma, (1 - \sigma)\right\}\right]q_{2,l} - (c_{0} - \left[\max\left\{\tau\sigma, (1 - \sigma)\right]q_{2,l} - (c_{0}$$

Appendix II

Let us consider the case in which firm 1 makes an offer. Firms bargain over $(V^A - \gamma \pi_2^d)$. The equilibrium bid is given by the Nash bargaining solution of the cooperative game (Petit, 1990). This is point N on the negotiation set (segment AD), such that the products of the gains obtained from the agreement (with reference to the threat point d) is maximised (Figure AII.1). The Nash solution N can also be interpreted as the point on the AD segment which yields the largest rectangle for d. Note that dD = dA. Since the triangle AdD is equilateral and symmetric, N has coordinates $(\pi_1^d + \frac{1}{2}dD; \pi_2^d + \frac{1}{2}dD)$ where dD= $\{(V^d - \gamma \pi_2^d) - (\pi_1^d + \pi_2^d)\}$ represents the overall gain from cooperation, that is the

excess profits from the acquisition when firm 1 is the acquirer.




Figure AII.1: Nash cooperative solution (i.e. equilibrium bid) in the case of firm 1 acquiring firm 2

Appendix III (s>0.5, σ =0.5)

$$\hat{\pi}_{2}^{NG} - \hat{\pi}_{1}^{NG} = \frac{\left((1-s)a - c_{0} + 0.5\right)^{2}}{4} + \frac{\left(sa - c_{0} + \tau - 0.5\right)^{2}}{9} - \frac{\left(sa - c_{0} + 1 - \tau 0.5\right)^{2}}{9} - F$$
A.III.1

from which:

$$\frac{\partial \hat{\pi}_{2}^{NG} - \hat{\pi}_{1}^{NG}}{\partial \tau} = \frac{2(sa - c_{0} + \tau - 0.5)}{9} + \frac{(sa - c_{0} + 1 - \tau 0.5)}{9} > 0,$$

$$\frac{\partial \hat{\pi}_{2}^{NG} - \hat{\pi}_{1}^{NG}}{\partial s} = -\frac{2((1 - s)a - c_{0} + 0.5)}{4} + \frac{2a(sa - c_{0} + \tau - 0.5)}{9} - \frac{2a(sa - c_{0} + 1 - \tau 0.5)}{9} < 0 \text{ since}$$

$$\frac{\partial \hat{\pi}_{2}^{NG} - \hat{\pi}_{1}^{NG}}{\partial F} = -1 < 0$$

Appendix IV $(s=0.5, \sigma>0.5)$

If $\widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (NN)$ or $\widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (GG)$, firm 1 (the technology leader) will have higher profits than firm 2 due to lower unit costs. If $\widetilde{\Lambda}^* = (GN)$ equilibrium profits are given by:

$$\hat{\pi}_{1}^{GN} = \frac{(0.5a - c_{0} + \sigma)^{2}}{4} + \frac{(0.5a - c_{0} + 2\tau\sigma - (1 - \sigma))^{2}}{9} - F$$

A.IV.1

$$\hat{\pi}_{2}^{GN} = \frac{(0.5a - c_{0} + 2(1 - \sigma) - \tau\sigma)^{2}}{9}$$
A.IV.2

from which we have $\hat{\pi}_1^{GN} > \hat{\pi}_2^{GN}$ (given that $\hat{\pi}_{1,I}^{GN} > \hat{\pi}_2^{GN}$ and $\frac{(0.5a - c_0 + 2\tau\sigma - (1 - \sigma))^2}{9} - F > 0$ necessary for GN to be the status quo).

Appendix V (s<0.5,
$$\sigma$$
>0.5)
 $\hat{\pi}_{1}^{NN} = \frac{(sa - c_{0} + \sigma)^{2}}{4} = \frac{A^{2}}{4}$
A.V.1
 $\hat{\pi}_{2}^{NN} = \frac{((1 - s)a - c_{0} + (1 - \sigma))^{2}}{4} = \frac{B^{2}}{4}$
A.V.2

Since A > 0 and B > 0, $B^2 > A^2$ requires B > A, from which $\hat{\pi}_2^{NN} > \hat{\pi}_1^{NN}$ iff $[(1-s)-s]a > \sigma - (1-\sigma)$

Let us consider s = 0.33 (upper bound of the large market size asymmetry, defined for $s \le 0.33$) and $\sigma = 0.99$ (upper bound of the technological asymmetry). The model require that $sa - c_0 > 0$ which, implies a > 3.0303. It follows that $(1-s)a - as > \sigma - (1-\sigma)$ is verified and that $\hat{\pi}_2^{NN} > \hat{\pi}_1^{NN}$ for all admissible parameters in the case of a large market size asymmetry.

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


Figure 1a: Regions defining equilibrium outcomes in the (s, σ) plane with F=1.5




Figure 1b: Regions defining equilibrium outcomes in the (s, σ) plane with F=0.5




Figure 2: Changes in the regions defining equilibrium outcomes in the (s, σ) plane with an increase in τ




Figure 3: Changes in the regions defining equilibrium outcomes in the (τ, F) plane with an increase in *a*




Figure 4a: The status quo game

Figure 4b: The full game


	Positive values: Acquisition equilibrium										
		Equli	brium	strate	egies:			A1	A2	NO	
	0.0	4 40	4 55	4.04	4 74	4 70	4.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	
	0.9	1.46		1.64	1.71	1.78	1.85	0.00	0.00	0.00	
	0.85	1.44	1.52	1.60	1.68	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04	
	0.8	1.40		0.00	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.10	
	0.75	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.16	
	0.7	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03	0.01	0.05	0.09	0.13	0.17	0.21	
	0.65	-0.08	-0.07	-0.05	0.00	0.05	0.11	0.16	0.21	0.26	
	0.6	-0.11	-0.11	-0.08	-0.02	0.05	0.11	0.18	0.24	0.30	
	0.55	-0.15	-0.14	-0.12	-0.04	0.04	0.11	0.19	0.26	0.34	
5	0.5	-0.20	-0.19	-0.16	-0.07	0.02	0.11	0.19	0.28	0.37	
	0.45	-0.15	-0.16	-0.15	-0.07	0.01	0.09	0.19	0.29	0.39	
	0.4	-0.11	-0.12	-0.10	-0.01	0.08	0.18	0.27	1.27	1.29	
	0.35	-0.08	-0.08	-0.06	0.04	0.15	1.23	1.28	1.31	1.34	
	0.3	-0.05	-0.06	-0.03	1.23	1.26	1.28	1.31	1.35	1.39	
	0.25	-0.03	1.29	1.23	1.27	1.30	1.33	1.35	1.40	1.44	
	0.2	1.40	1.32	1.26	1.30	1.34	1.37	1.39	1.44	1.49	
	0.15	1.44	1.34	1.28	1.33	1.37	1.41	1.43	1.49	1.54	
	0.1	1.46	1.36	1.30	1.35	1.40	1.44	1.47	1.53	1.59	
		0.5	0.55	0.6	0.65	0.7	0.75	0.8	0.85	0.9	
						σ					

Figure 5a: The status quo game

	Positive values: $\pi_1 > \pi_2$									
		Equili	brium	:	NG	NN	GN	GG		
	0.9	0.88	1.37	1.86	2.35	2.84	3.33	3.82	4.33	4.84
	0.85	0.64	1.12	1.59	2.21	2.71	3.22	3.72	4.22	4.72
	0.8	0.60	1.10	1.61	2.11	2.61	3.12	3.62	4.12	4.62
	0.75	0.50	1.00	1.51	2.01	2.51	3.02	3.52	4.02	4.52
	0.7	0.40	0.90	1.41	1.91	2.41	2.92	3.42	3.92	4.42
	0.65	0.30	0.80	1.31	1.81	2.31	2.82	3.32	3.82	4.32
	0.6	0.20	0.70	1.21	1.71	2.21	2.72	3.22	3.72	4.22
	0.55	0.10	0.60	1.11	1.61	2.11	2.62	3.12	3.62	4.12
s	0.5	0.00	0.50	1.01	1.51	2.01	2.52	3.02	3.52	4.02
	0.45	-0.10	0.40	0.91	1.41	1.91	2.42	2.92	3.42	3.92
	0.4	-0.20	0.30	0.81	1.31	1.81	2.32	2.82	3.32	3.82
	0.35	-0.30	0.20	0.71	1.21	1.71	2.22	2.72	3.22	3.72
	0.3	-0.40	0.10	0.61	1.11	1.61	2.12	2.62	3.12	3.62
	0.25	-0.50	0.00	0.51	1.01	1.51	2.02	2.52	3.32	3.77
	0.2	-0.60	-0.10	0.41	1.10	1.56	2.02	2.48	2.94	3.40
	0.15	-0.64	-0.17	0.31	0.78	1.26	1.74	2.21	2.69	3.17
	0.1	-0.88	-0.39	0.10	0.59	1.09	1.58	2.07	2.56	3.06
	•	0.5	0.55	0.6	0.65	0.7	0.75	0.8	0.85	0.9
				σ						
		Parar	neter	a=10		F=0.1	l	τ=0.7		

Figure 5b: The full game

γ=0.2






Figure 6a: Equilibrium strategies when F=2.5

The full game Positive values: Acquisition equilibrium Equlibrium strategies: A2 NO 0.9 0.0 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.8 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 80.0 0.75 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.7 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 -0.11 -0.08 -0.02 0.65 -0.08 -0.11 -0.14 -0.12 -0.04 -0.15


0.6 0.55 0.5 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.07 0.11 0.45 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.07 0.01 0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 0.08 0.27 0.36 0.45 0.4 -0.01 0.18 -0.08 -0.08 0.35 0.46 0.56 -0.06 0.04 0.15 0.25 0.35 -0.05 -0.06 0.3 -0.03 0.09 0.20 0.32 0.43 0.55 0.66 0.25 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.38 0.51 0.63 0.76 0.2 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.16 0.30 0.44 0.58 0.71 0.85 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.34 0.49 0.64 0.79 0.94 0.1 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.20 0.37 0.53 0.69 0.86 1.02 0.55 0.6 0.5 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9

σ

γ=0.2

 $\gamma = 0.2$

Figure 6b: Equilibrium strategies when F=1



	_								-		
	0.9	1.46	1.55	1.64	1.71	1.78	1.85	0.00	0.00	0.00	
	0.85	1.44	1.52	1.60	1.68	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.04	
	0.8	1.40	1.48	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.10	
	0.75	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.16	
	0.7	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03	0.01	0.05	0.09	0.13	0.17	0.21	
	0.65	-0.08	-0.07	-0.05	0.00	0.05	0.11	0.16	0.21	0.26	
	0.6	-0.11	-0.11	-0.08	-0.02	0.05	0.11	0.18	0.24	0.30	
	0.55	-0.15	-0.14	-0.12	-0.04	0.04	0.11	0.19	0.26	0.34	
s	0.5	-0.20	-0.19	-0.16	-0.07	0.02	0.11	0.19	0.28	0.37	
	0.45	-0.15	-0.16	-0.15	-0.07	0.01	0.09	0.19	0.29	0.39	
	0.4	-0.11	-0.12	-0.10	-0.01	0.08	0.18	0.27	1.27	1.29	
	0.35	-0.08	-0.08	-0.06	0.04	0.15	1.23	1.28	1.31	1.34	
	0.3	-0.05	-0.06	-0.03	1.23	1.26	1.28	1.31	1.35	1.39	
	0.25	-0.03	1.29	1.23	1.27	1.30	1.33	1.35	1.40	1.44	
	0.2	1.40	1.32	1.26	1.30	1.34	1.37	1.39	1.44	1.49	
	0.15	1.44	1.34	1.28	1.33	1.37	1.41	1.43	1.49	1.54	
	0.1	1.46	1.36	1.30	1.35	1.40	1.44	1.47	1.53	1.59	
	-	0.5	0.55	0.6	0.65	0.7	0.75	0.8	0.85	0.9	
	σ										

0.01

0.94

0.98

1.01

1.04


0.7 0.75

σ

0.8 0.85

0.9

Figure 6c: Equilibrium strategies when F=0.7






Figure 7a: Equilibrium strategies when $\tau = 0.7$

The full game

Positive values: Acquisition equilibrium Equilibrium strategies: A1 A2

NO

_	_					-				
0,9	1,46	1,55	1,64	1,71	1,78	1,85	0,00	0,00	0,00	
0,85	1,44	1,52	1,60	1,68	0,01	0,02	0,02	0,03	0,04	
0,8	1,40	1,48	0,00	0,02	0,03	0,05	0,07	0,08	0,10	
0,75	-0,03	-0,02	-0,01	0,02	0,05	0,08	0,10	0,13	0,16	
0,7	-0,05	-0,05	-0,03	0,01	0,05	0,09	0,13	0,17	0,21	
0,65	-0,08	-0,07	-0,05	0,00	0,05	0,11	0,16	0,21	0,26	
0,6	-0,11	-0,11	-0,08	-0,02	0,05	0,11	0,18	0,24	0,30	
0,55	-0,15	-0,14	-0,12	-0,04	0,04	0,11	0,19	0,26	0,34	
0,5	-0,20	-0,19	-0,16	-0,07	0,02	0,11	0,19	0,28	0,37	
0,45	-0,15	-0,16	-0,15	-0,07	0,01	0,09	0,19	0,29	0,39	
0,4	-0,11	-0,12	-0,10	-0,01	0,08	0,18	0,27	1,27	1,29	
0,35	-0,08	-0,08	-0,06	0,04	0,15	1,23	1,28	1,31	1,34	
0,3	-0,05	-0,06	-0,03	1,23	1,26	1,28	1,31	1,35	1,39	
0,25	-0,03	1,29	1,23	1,27	1,30	1,33	1,35	1,40	1,44	
0,2	1,40	1,32	1,26	1,30	1,34	1,37	1,39	1,44	1,49	
0,15	1,44	1,34	1,28	1,33	1,37	1,41	1,43	1,49	1,54	
0,1	1,46	1,36	1,30	1,35	1,40	1,44	1,47	1,53	1,59	
-	0,5	0,55	0,6	0,65	0,7	0,75	0,8	0,85	0,9	
σ										
<i>γ=0.2</i>										

Figure 7b: Equilibrium strategies when $\tau = 1$

	ļ	Positi	ve va	lues:	$\pi_1 > 2$	π ₂							Positi	ve va	lues:	Acqui	sition	equil	ibriun	n	
	I	Equili	brium	n strat	egies	s:	NG	NN	GN	GG			Equlil	orium	strate	egies:			A1	A2	NO
												-									
	0,9	1,00	1,27	1,53		2,07	2,33	2,60	4,73	4,84		0,9	1 - C	1,41	1,53	1,63	1,73	1,82	1,90	0,03	0,04
	0,85	0,98		1,49		2,00		4,10	4,20	4,31		0,85	1 - C	1,40	1,52	1,63	1,73	0,06	0,08	0,09	0,11
	0,8	0,94	1,18	1,43	1,67	3,40	3,50	3,60	3,70	3,80		0,8	1,26	1,39	1,51	1,63	0,10	0,12	0,15	0,17	0,20
	0,75	0,86	1,09	2,70	2,80	2,90	3,00	3,10	3,20	3,30		0,75	1,23	1,37	0,05	0,09	0,13	0,18	0,21	0,25	0,29
	0,7	2,00	2,10	2,20	2,30	2,40	2,50	2,60	2,70	2,80		0,7	-0,05	0,00	0,06	0,11	0,17	0,22	0,28	0,33	0,38
	0,65	1,50	1,60	1,70	1,80	1,90	2,00	2,10	2,20	2,30		0,65	-0,08	-0,01	0,06	0,13	0,19	0,26	0,33	0,40	0,46
	0,6	1,00	1,10	1,20	1,30	1,40	1,50	1,60	1,70	1,80		0,6	-0,11	-0,03	0,05	0,13	0,22	0,30	0,38	0,46	0,54
	0,55	0,50	0,60	0,70	0,80	0,90	1,00	1,10	1,20	1,30		0,55	-0,15	-0,06	0,04	0,13	0,23	0,33	0,42	0,51	0,61
S	0,5	-0,00	0,10	0,20	0,30	0,40	0,50	0,60	1,31	1,51	S	0,5	-0,20	-0,09	0,02	0,13	0,24	0,35	0,46	1,23	1,22
	0,45	-0,50	-0,40	-0,30	-0,20	-0,10	-0,00	0,95	1,15	1,36		0,45	-0,15	-0,05	0,05	0,16	0,26	0,36	1,28	1,29	1,29
	0,4	-1,00	-0,90	-0,80	-0,70	0,39	0,60	0,81	1,02	1,24		0,4	-0,11	0,00	0,12	0,24	1,27	1,31	1,33	1,35	1,36
	0,35	-1,50	-1,40	-0,18	0,04	0,26	0,48	0,70	0,92	1,15		0,35	-0,08	0,05	1,23	1,26	1,31	1,36	1,39	1,41	1,43
	0,3	-2,00	-0,52	-0,30	-0,07	0,16	0,39	0,62	0,86	1,09		0,3	-0,05	1,25	1,28	1,31	1,35	1,40	1,44	1,48	1,50
	0,25	-0,86	-0,62	-0,39	-0,15	0,09	0,33	0,58	0,82	1,06		0,25	1,23	1,28	1,32	1,35	1,39	1,45	1,50	1,54	1,57
	0,2	-0,94	-0,69	-0,44	-0,19	0,06	0,31	0,56	0,81	1,07		0,2	1,26	1,31	1,36	1,40	1,43	1,50	1,56	1,61	1,64
	0,15	-0,98	-0,73	-0,47	-0,21	0,05	0,31	0,58	0,84	1,11		0,15	1,28	1,34	1,39	1,43	1,48	1,55	1,62	1,67	1,72
	0,1	-1,00	-0,73	-0,46	-0,19	0,08	0,35	0,62	0,90	1,17		0,1	1,29	1,36	1,42	1,46	1,52	1,60	1,67	1,74	1,79
	-	0,5	0,55	0,6	0,65	0,7	0,75	0,8	0,85	0,9			0,5	0,55	0,6	0,65	0,7	0,75	0,8	0,85	0,9
						σ											σ				
Parameter values: <i>a=5</i>						F=1		τ =1		γ=0.2	?										

Table 1Benefits from an acquisition in different scenarios (a)

·	STATUS QUO EQUILIBRIUM $(\widetilde{\Lambda}^*)$								
	NN	NG (GN) (b)	GG						
BEST PRACTICE EFFECT									
1 . $(s=0.5, \sigma=0.5)$	0		+						
2. $(s>0.5, \sigma=0.5)$	0	+	++						
3 . (s=0.5, σ >0.5)	++ (c)	+ (d)	++						
4 . $(s < 0.5, \sigma > 0.5)$ (e)	++ (c)	+ (d)	++						
MARKET POWER EFFECT									
1 . (s=0.5, σ =0.5)	0		+						
2. ($s > 0.5$, $\sigma = 0.5$)	0	+	++						
3. (<i>s</i> =0.5, <i>σ</i> >0.5)	0	+	++						
4. (<i>s</i> <0.5, <i>σ</i> >0.5 (e)	0	+	++						
SAVINGS ON FIXED COSTS									
1. $(s=0.5, \sigma=0.5)$	0		+						
2. (s>0.5, σ=0.5)	0	+	++						
3. (s=0.5, σ >0.5)	0	+	++						
4. $(s < 0.5, \sigma > 0.5)$ (e)	0	+	++						

STATUS QUO EQUILIBRIUM ($\widetilde{\Lambda}^*$)

Note: (a) ++ indicates stronger positive effect than +. The strength of the effect is comparable only within the same row.

- (b) NG in case 2; GN in case 3 and 4.
- (c) Iff $\tau \sigma > (1 \sigma)$. Otherwise: 0
- (d) Iff $\tau \sigma \neq (1 \sigma)$. Otherwise: 0

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(e) For (s>0.5, σ >0.5) same results as 4.