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Seneca's Reception of Cleanthes' Poetology in *Epistulae Morales* 107 and 108 in the Light of a New Edition of Philodemus' *On Music 4*

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Abstract – Based on the 2007 edition of Philodemus' *On Music 4* by Daniel Delattre, this paper presents a close reading of the Epicurean's polemic against Stoic views on poetry, notably a fragment of Cleanthes (*SVF* 1.486), in order to show how Seneca positions himself within that debate and how he enriches it when discussing the function of aesthetically shaped philosophical discourse in *Ep.* 108. He adapts the Epicurean critique by adding the factor of audience intention but, like Cleanthes, conceives of aesthetically shaped language as a tool to direct attention to what is evidently good and thus motivate right action. This pragmatic function of poetry, to cause both strong impulse generating impressions and assent to them, is illustrated with the example of two prayers by Cleanthes (*SVF* 1.527 and 537), which Seneca incorporates in *Ep.* 107, the letter preceding the reception of Cleanthes' poetological remark at *Ep.* 108.10 (*SVF* 1.487).[1]

Introduction

No one interested in the philosophy of Cleanthes can ignore the idiosyncratic fact that, unlike his fellow Stoics, he wrote poetry. What motivated him make that extra effort?[2] There is excellent scholarship

[1] I am grateful to an anonymous peer reviewer for their careful reading and valuable comments. They have helped me improve this paper significantly.

[2] There are signs that, unlike contemporaries such as Timon of Phlious or Cercidas, for whom poetry was the natural medium of expression, Cleanthes had to make a deliberate effort to produce verses. Hopkinson (1988) 132: "rather rough-hewn

on this question,[3] but essential work about Cleanthes' poetology still remains to be done. The fragments need to be read within their respective source context, and it is only with the appearance of Daniel Delattre's (2007) complete reconstruction of Philodemus' *On Music 4* that we have sufficient information to assess the context of the most important fragment on the subject, Cleanthes' remarks about poetry as a medium for the divine preserved in that work (*SVF* 1.486). We must delimit the extent of the fragment itself and assess the import of Philodemus' commentary for reconstructing the meaning of the few lines of literal, or near-literal quotation. As it is now, the two most recent editors – Delattre and Annemarie Neubecker (1986) – disagree about the limits of the fragment itself, and neither of them, or so I hope to demonstrate, has yet fully understood the role that Philodemus assigns to Cleanthes when he quotes him in his polemic. As a result, Philodemus' comments following the quote have so far remained more obscure than necessary, and valuable evidence contained in them has been overlooked.

A proper understanding of *SVF* 1.486 leads to a fuller appreciation of Seneca's engagement with Cleanthes in the *Epistulae morales* and beyond. Delattre's edition outlines the argument of the whole of *On Music* 4 for the first time and thus improves our grasp of the Stoic-Epicurean debate. We can place Seneca more securely within a matrix of positions held and arrive at an even more precise understanding of the passage (*Ep.* 108.10) in which Seneca adduces Cleanthes' views on the effects of poetry (*SVF* 1.487).[4] It becomes possible to identify more clearly Seneca's own concerns as well as those of the older Stoic he quotes in support of his views. Cleanthes applied his ideas in his *Hymn* and another prayer (*SVF* 1.527 and 537), both of which Seneca adapts in the preceding letter, *Ep.* 107.11.

Scholars have suggested that Cleanthes used poetry as a propaganda tool for advertising his ideas to non-experts[5] and as a mnemotechnic

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verse"; Thom (2005) 9. We may also note, e.g., the high frequency of resolutions in the iambs. Cleanthes adapts phrases and whole passages, and this may have not only been motivated by a desire for alluding to hallowed models or "correcting" a famous line; for the latter see Georgantzoglou (2003).

[3] The work of reference is Thom's (2005) thorough and well documented commentary. For philosophical poetry in the Hellenistic age, see Gutzwiller (2007) 131-144. Further discussion, in particular of the *Hymn to Zeus*, in Zuntz (2005), Asmis (2007), Schwabl (2009), and Thom (2009).

[4] See in particular the thorough discussion by Armisen-Marchetti (2002 = 2020).

[5] Festa (1935), vol. 2: 75-77; Sier (1990) 93; Asmis (2007).

device or teaching aid.[6] Particularly successful was the idea that poetry played a role in his relation to the divine, for expressing religious exaltation,[7] as the adequately dignified form of worship, or as a means to denote the most sublime objects of discourse.[8] Even though there is a lot of truth in such remarks, a reassessment of the fragments in the context of their respective sources will show that he assigned a more specific function to poetry, which is closely aligned with his ideas about the physiology of human cognition. In a nutshell: poetic form provides language with a force that Cleanthes seems to have conceptualized as some kind of physical striking. The effect of such poetic nudges was not only to communicate the sense of the verbal account itself. Cleanthes also hoped to trigger and support *action-relevant* cognition by causing the audience to attend to action-guiding information at their disposal. Poetry does this by provoking *direct* perception of good objects, the referents of the poetic account. There is some evidence that he also thought that poetry reinforced the natural concepts that enable rational beings to react to perceptions with the right kind of impulse. Seneca attributes similar functions to rhythmically shaped language, whether poetry or striking *sententiae*.[9] A better understanding of Cleanthes' views as reported by Philodemus thus also sheds light on Seneca's poetology and use of aesthetic form.

SVF 1.486

In *Epistulae Morales* 108, Seneca discusses three factors that determine the success of a philosopher's teaching. Two of the three success factors are the objectives pursued by the persons involved: that the speaker intends to make his audience better men and that the audience wants to improve with the speaker's help (108.3). The third factor is the aesthetic form of what is being said, and this is an ambivalent tool. If the recipient focuses

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6 Thom (2005) 9; for the same function in Seneca, see Bouton-Touboulic (2020) 93.

7 Gordley (2011) 85-86, following Sandbach (1975) 110; Pohlenz (1940): an expression of Cleanthes' theism. Further references in Glei (1990) 589 and Thom (2005) 9 n. 70, Thom's objections: 24.

8 De Lacy (1948) 271; Steinmetz (1986) 25, who also sees a connection to the allegorical interpretation of poetry practiced by the Stoics; Glei (1990) 579-580; Thom (2005) 5-6.

9 Armisen-Marchetti (2002 = 2020); van Wassehove (2021). Bouton-Touboulic (2020) highlights the process of physical striking but only implies that this striking may be used to trigger action and not cognition in general.

only on the expression, aesthetic features become a distraction. Then λέξις loses is function of conveying λόγος and becomes mere sound. It tickles the acoustic sense in a pleasurable way, and that is all. On the other hand, if the recipent's intention does not counteract the speaker's purpose, the aesthetic form can have beneficial effects.[10]

The nuance and originality of Seneca's distinctions becomes evident when we read them against the debate in Philodemus' *On Music 4*.[11] Seneca incorporates elements of both positions defended in that debate, but adds a further factor and thus arrives at a new and intermediary view, a view aligned more closely with Cleanthes than Diogenes of Babylon.

Diogenes of Babylon claimed that music serves an important function in education toward virtue, that it contributes in various ways to the acquisition of that blessed state, and that it is therefore worthwhile to acquire this art. Music is valuable, according to Diogenes, because of its motivational and motive force. Against this Philodemus asserts that music in itself is meaningless, that it is a-rational and not signifying and that, therefore, it can neither teach humans anything nor affect them as rational agents. In Philodemus' view, the proper function of music is to evoke a natural but unnecessary pleasure.[12] There is no reason why anyone should spend much time and effort on it.

By introducing audience intention as a third factor, in addition to aesthetic form and signified content, Seneca occupies a middle ground. The didactic purpose of the most well-meaning and eloquent philosopher may be thwarted by the recipient's attitude.[13] If his motivation is directed only at the form of what is being said, the aesthetically attractive shape of philosophical discourse will have the entertaining function that Philodemus assigns to music in general and thus become a distraction. Otherwise the aesthetic form supports the speaker's didactic purpose, even

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10 Sen. *Ep*. 108.5-7. Further discussion and bibliography in Wildberger (2006), ch. 2.4.6.3; Bouton-Touboulic (2020) 96-97. For a more comprehensive recent discussion of *Ep*. 108, see Van Wassehove (2021).

11 In addition to the editions by Delattre (2007) and Neubecker (1986), drawing on her Dissertation (1956), see, e.g., Woodward (2009), Albornoz (2014), Laurand (2014), and the contributions by Daniel Delattre and Mary-Ann Zagdoun in Malhomme and Wersinger (2007). Abreu (2017) is a short overview of the debate up and including Philodemus.

12 147.20-22; compare also, e.g., 124.18-20; 125.18-20; 132.5-6; 133.33-34: 134.2; 150.25; Albornoz (2014) 104-105. For more detailed discussion see below, p. 109.

13 Sen. *Ep*. 108.4 *non repugnantibus.*

if the audience is indifferent,[14] so that sounds acquire a force similar to what is described by Philodemus' Stoic target Diogenes. The listeners are aroused, sped up like "half-men raving at the command of a Phrygian flute player", carried away, pushed along, excited.[15]

On the other hand, Seneca lays great emphasis on the meaning of what is being said. Apart from the comparison with the flute player, his examples are verbal expressions in metrical or rhythmic form, not music in the narrow sense, which was the focus of interest in Philodemus' discussion. Contrary to some of the effects described by Diogenes (and before him by Plato and later by Posidonius),[16] aesthetic form in Seneca's letter is signifying and does not have merely motive force affecting the irrational. Rather, the effect is *motivational* – inciting emotions and thus impulses of the kind that rational animals have, e.g. a strong desire for what is right (108.8 *concitare ad cupidinem recti*). Emotional arousal is an intended effect, a means of exhortation. The listeners should form a "noble impulse" for action, which Seneca must regard as valuable since he regrets that it is endangered by the contrary advice they receive from their environment.[17] The source of such rational impulses is a cognitive arousal; the effects of aesthetic exhortatory language originate in the content of what the audience hears. It is moved by "the beauty of the things said, not the sound of empty words".[18] The philosopher's speech activates natural dispositions, the dormant "goods of the mind", the "foundations" and "seeds of virtue", which are the natural concepts (ἔννοιαι φυσικαί) from which

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[14] Sen. *Ep.* 108.4. The same is true of the audience in the theater (108.8-9, 11).

[15] 108.7 *excitantur; alacres uultu et animo; nec aliter concitantur quam solent Phrygii tibicinis sono semiuiri et ex imperio furentes; rapit illos instigatque;* 108.8 *concitare ad cupidinem recti; inritator.* – When translating the comparison with corybants, Graver and Long 2015 connect *Phrygii* with *semiuiri*, which is syntactically possible. My translation follows the word order since the reader has already connected the adjective with *tibicinis* before encountering the other possible antecedent *semiuiri*. The result is a greater focus on the music: it is the sound that transports the followers of Cybele and not any other feature of that ecstatic cult. It is also better to keep the reference to the person that plays the flute. The philosopher's command over his audience is like the command the flute player has over the corybants.

[16] On the conventionality of Diogenes' views see Woodward (2009) and Laurand (2014) 198-200, 209-213 (on the differences to Posidonius).

[17] 108.7 *si non impetum insignem protinus populus, honesti dissuasor excipiat*; compare also a little earlier: *iuuat protinus quae audias facere.* On the deliberate arousal of reader emotions in *Ep.* 108 and elsewhere, see Van Wassehove (2021), in particular 616-17, and Graver (2017), revised in Graver (2023) 214-221.

[18] 108.7 *rerum pulchritudo, non uerborum inanium sonitus.*

rational animals can develop a perfect understanding of what is good and right, i.e. the proper objects of rational impulse.[19] The audience reacts with assent (συνκατάθεσις) to a striking expression of their own natural concepts, which were dormant in them like half-forgotten memories: "[…] we all together *recognize* the presented truth and affirm it with expressions of agreement."[20]

Nevertheless, what happens cannot be analyzed only in terms of Stoic incorporeal meanings, the λεκτά or πράγματα, the "things" coveyed by the philosopher's words. For the Stoics, both the mind and meaningful speech are causally active bodies, and Seneca describes a physiological interaction that leads to changes and movements in both the recipient's mind and his body.[21] To explain this (*nam*), Seneca adduces Cleanthes' trumpet analogy:

> *Nam ut dicebat Cleanthes,*
> *"quemadmodum spiritus noster clariorem sonum reddit cum illum tuba per longi canalis angustias tractum patentiore nouissime exitu effudit, sic sensus nostros clariores carminis arta necessitas efficit."*
> *Eadem neglegentius audiuntur minusque percutiunt quamdiu soluta oratione dicuntur: ubi accessere numeri et egregium sensum adstrinxere certi pedes, eadem illa sententia uelut lacerto excussiore torquetur.*
>
> For, as Cleanthes used to say:
> "Just as the sound of our breath is amplified (*clariorem sonum reddit*) when driven through a trumpet with its narrow windings, flared at the end, so our thoughts are amplified (*clariores … efficit*) by the stringent necessity of verse."
> The same points are attended to less carefully and make less of an impact when expressed in plain speech. When meter is added to an excellent idea and forces it into a determined pattern, the same sentiment is hurled, as it were, by a stronger arm.[22]

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19 108.8 *fundamenta … semenque uirtutum; illa animi bona*; Armisen-Marchetti (2002 = 2020). On these "seeds" in Seneca, see Hadot (2014), who also argues that the theory of natural concepts is not exclusive to later Stoics, and Van Wassehove (2021), who argues that activating these "seeds" is the key function of *sententiae* according to Seneca.

20 108.8 *quotiens aliqua dicta sunt quae publice adgnoscimus et consensu uera esse testamur*; compare also 108.7 *iuuat … facere*; 108.9 *plaudit … gaudet*; 108.12 *confessio ueritatis; adclamant.*

21 This is clear from the analogy with ecstatic dancers (108.7, see note 15). Directly before that comparison the audience is characterized as *alacres uultu et animo*, i.e. they display a physical reaction through their facial expression.

22 *Ep*. 108.10, quoting *SVF* 1.487. Transl. Graver and Long 2015, altered for a more

Since Seneca usually develops quotes with a comment of his own, it is safer to assume that the second comparison (someone hurling an object) and the image of an impact[23] is his own, all the more so since he frequently uses the same imagery to describe the effect of objects (the missiles or gifts of Fortune) capable of arousing strong impressions and subsequent impulses in non-sages. Nevertheless, Cleanthes' comparison also implies some interaction that, in one way or other, is physically intense and may have included forms of hitting or striking.

How exactly the comparison was supposed to work is difficult to glean from what we have. *Illum* refers to *sonus*,[24] i.e. the spirit blows a sound into the trumpet and the *sound* undergoes some change in the tube so that it comes out louder at the other end. Similarly, speech utters a content (a thought or idea, Seneca's *sensus*), and when it is restricted by metrical form, that idea is reinforced. We should take into account that the Latin word *sensus* can refer both to the meaning and the meaningful utterance, while according to Stoic physics, a voice sound (φωνή) *is* breath that has been struck (ἀὴρ πεπληγμένος; *FDS* 476-495) and in turn causes sound-experiences by causally affecting hearers' auditory organs. Seneca is aware of this definition, renders it with *ictus aer* (Sen. *Q. Nat.* 2.29), and relates it to the concept of tension or τόνος: A voice sound is a "tensioning of the the air formed by beats of the tongue so that it may be heard".[25] There is no evidence attributing the definition of voice sound to Cleanthes individually, but it was a conventional and uncontested concept[26] so that it is very likely that Cleanthes too regarded speech as breath with a certain tension, an idea that he would also have found in one of his well-beloved classics that Pearson cites as a possible model for Cleanthes' comparison.[27] We also

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literal expression of the restricting effect of meter.

[23] *Percutiunt*, see also 108.11 *feriuntur*.

[24] This is how Armisen-Marchetti (2002 = 2020, 42) and Graver and Long (2015), e.g., translate the passage.

[25] Sen. *Q. Nat.* 2.6.3 *quid enim est uox nisi intentio aeris ut audiatur linguae formata percussu?* On Seneca's conception of *vox*, see Bouton-Touboulic (2020) 84-85; on the interpretation of the passage in *Ep.* 108 in light of Seneca's account in *Q. Nat.* 2, see also Armisen-Marchetti (2002 = 2020, 43-44.).

[26] In Eustathius' scholion to *Il.* 18.506, vol. 4, p. 237 van der Valk = *SVF* 1.74, Zeno may have been mentioned as the author of the definition by way of a personlized reference to the Stoics in general. Diog. Laërt. 7.55 explicitly mentions only Diogenes of Babylon, but very likely only as the source of the definitions or as the author of the alternative definition reported there.

[27] Aesch. *Eum*. 566-569 κήρυσσε, κῆρυξ, καὶ στρατὸν κατειργαθοῦ, / † ἥ τ' οὖν

have evidence that allows us to connect the idea that voice utterances involve some form of hitting with Cleanthes' psychology. According to Plutarch (*Stoic. rep*. 1034d = *SVF* 1.563), Cleanthes identified tension (τόνος) with the striking of fire (πληγὴ πυρός), which can be both a fire (e.g. fiery breath or the Sun) striking something else or fiery stuff, such as the material of the soul, being struck. Accordingly, Cleanthes can identify a sufficient degree of tension with psychic strength, the capacity to perform virtuous action.[28] Cleanthes may have envisaged the effect of poetry in a similar manner. If a language utterance strikes the fiery soul hard enough and in the right way, that soul should become stronger and thus more capable, and probably also more motivated, to perform the right kind of action. If Tieleman (2020) is right in attributing to Cleanthes a conception of thought, conceived as internal speech (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος), in terms of tensioned *pneuma*, we might even be able to explain the trumpet comparison more precisely: a thought (Seneca's *sensus*) exists in the speaker as tensioned or pulsating *pneuma* and is emitted more forcefully by being shaped into tight metrical form.

The same unity of semantic and physical features may have been conveyed by the word that Seneca renders with the adjective *clarus*.[29] I would suggest that the Greek original was λαμπρός, of whose many connotations Seneca was able to capture the following: The sound is made brighter, more brilliant and noble, but also clear, distinct, and evidently manifest. Like *clarus*, λαμπρός can qualify sounds, also the sounds of a trumpet. There are numerous examples in classical and later Greek.[30] A passage from Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists* illustrates how λαμπρός together with a reference to the ample presence of breath and the analogy of a trumpet could be used to describe a

διάτορος † Τυρσηνικὴ / σάλπιγξ βροτείου πνεύματος πληρουμένη / ὑπέρτονον γήρυμα φαινέτω στρατῷ. On the corporeal character of Cleanthes' psychology, see also Hangai (2022). Dinucci (2017) argues that Cleanthes was particularly interested in expressing the soul's undergoing the impact of an external cause. This fits the emphasis of being affected by an external cause, which Gazzarri (2020) 209-211 observes in the imagery of taking on an odor or a suntan in *Ep.* 108.4-5.

[28] On this definition and its parallels in Cleanthes' cosmology see Bénatouïl (2002) 326 n. 87 and passim; Asmis (2007) 419, 424.

[29] In line with his intellectualist reading of Cleanthes' poetry (see n. 95), Glei (1990) 591 translates "klarer".

[30] Some examples in *LSJ* s.v. I.4. There is also a composite λαμπρόφωνος.

particularly stately, dignified, and inspired style.[31] Unlike Latin *clarus*, Greek λαμπρός has a connotation of vigor, intensity, vehemence, and in this sense is applied to wind, another type of breath or *pneuma.* It may indicate the importance of this meaning in the original context of Cleanthes' fragment that Seneca adds exactly this idea of vehemence, which he could not express with the Latin adjective *clarior*, in his commentary. We will see that these properties denoted by λαμπρός as well as another one, namely that the object so characterized is "manifest" (LSJ s.v. I.6), appear to be relevant also for the other fragment of Cleanthean poetics, the quotation from the end of Philodemus' *On Music 4.*

SVF 1.586 and *SVF* 1.557

Delattre's edition of this text raises a number of new questions and suggests modifications to previous readings. For example, Delattre excludes the reading ἀ]μείνον[α at the beginning of the fragment (col. 142.3)[32] since, as he reports (292 n. 5), there is no space for a letter before the *mu*. "Poetic and musical examples" are not "better"; they are "permanent" (με{ί}νον[τα), i.e. they stay in the mind of the recipient.[33] If we read this together with the fragment in Seneca and what we know about Cleanthes' insistence that an impression is an imprint, a change in physical shape by "striking" (τύπωσις), not just an alteration in a more general sense,[34] we can explain this assertion as follows. Metrical speech or song with its stronger tension hits the mind harder than ordinary language; consequently, the impression and striking,

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[31] Philostr. *V.S.* 1, p. 542 Olearius Ἡ δὲ ἰδέα τῶν Πολέμωνος λόγων θερμὴ καὶ ἐναγώνιος καὶ τορὸν ἠχοῦσα, ὥσπερ ἡ Ὀλυμπιακὴ σάλπιγξ, ἐπιπρέπει δὲ αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ Δημοσθενικὸν τῆς γνώμης, καὶ ἡ σεμνολογία οὐχ ὑπτία, λαμπρὰ δὲ καὶ ἔμπνους, ὥσπερ ἐκ τρίποδος.

[32] Having established that the extant fragments collected as separate papyri belong to a single volume, Book 4 of Philodemus' *On Music*, and having found traces of the original column count on that papyrus, Delattre renumbered the columns in accordance with the palaeographical evidence. The final part of the original scroll with the Cleanthes fragment is *PHerc* 1497, and what is col. 142 in Delattre's edition, corresponds to the 28th column on that papyrus. Neubecker's edition comprises only *PHerc* 1497, beginning from what is col. 114 in Delattre's.

[33] That it is αἰεὶ διαμένον is one of the features of the good in Cleanthes' poem quoted in note 38. The permanence of mental changes is a recurrent issue in Seneca's letter: 108.7 *si illa animi forma permaneat*; 108.9 *demissuri in animum*; 108.15-23 (15 *inde mihi quaedam permansere*). Woodward's discussion of the Cleanthes fragment (2009) 19-20 is based on the readings and punctuation rejected by Delattre.

[34] *SVF* 1.484 = Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.372 and 8.400; see also Dinucci (2017).

the τύπωσις of the mind, is stronger too and thus has a more lasting effect – especially, we may add with a view to Seneca's comments about resuscitating dormant "goods of the mind" (*Ep*. 108.7), if the impression encounters and reinforces existing structures, such as the natural concept of the good.

Some evidence that this explanation may reflect Cleanthes' concerns correctly is provided by a famous anecdote according to which Zeno compared his student and successor to a writing tablet lined with a particularly hard wax filling. Almost impossible to inscribe, it keeps what has been written on it faithfully.[35] The anecdote may have come into existence as a pun on Cleanthes' psychology and lived on for its edifying value in a school setting. In its current context, however, it is cited to contrast Cleanthes' orthodoxy with the aberrant views of others among Zeno's students mentioned in the same paragraph. The convenient analogy to the wax tablets of the mind[36] is lost in Plutarch's parallel version featuring Cleanthes as well as another slow learner, Xenokrates, and adding the image of a vessel with a narrow opening. Nevertheless, the idea of a hard material, now bronze, receiving a shape through outside force is retained.[37]

Cleanthes' iamb listing features of the good[38] could be a practical application of poetry's power to activate and reinforce concepts. Tieleman argues that Chrysippus saw a function for poetry in the process of *acquiring* correct, detailed, technical concepts, which the Stoics called "articulation" (διάρθρωσις).[39] Poets express common notions and

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35 *SVF* 1.301 = Diog. Laërt. 7.37; Thom (2005) 4.

36 See Long (2006) 226-229 on Zeno's likely adaptation of the image from Plato's *Theaetetus*. The conceptualization of impressions as a form of imprint by striking (τύπωσις) is explicitly attested already for Zeno: *SVF* 1.58 = Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.230, 236; *SVF* 1.59 = Cic. *Acad*. 2.18; *SVF* 1.141 = Eus. *Praep. ev.* 15.20.3 = Ar. Did. *Frg*. 39.

37 *SVF* 1.464 = Plut. *De recta ratione audiendi* 47e. In Pseudo-Plutarch's account (*Placita philosophorum* 900b = 'Aëtius' 4.11.1 = *SVF* 2.83), this connotation is lost. He describes the mind as "papyrus well prepared for writing upon" (χαρτίον [χάρτην edd.] εὔεργον [ἐν- codd.; corr. Diels] εἰς ἀπογραφήν).

38 *SVF* 1.557 = Clem. Al. *Protr.* 6.72, also at *Strom*. 5.14.110.3, translation in LS 60Q: Τἀγαθὸν ἐρωτᾷς μ' οἷον ἔστ'; ἄκουε δή· / τεταγμένον, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, εὐσεβές, / κρατοῦν ἑαυτοῦ, χρήσιμον, καλόν, δέον, / αὐστηρόν, αὐθέκαστον, αἰεὶ συμφέρον, / ἄφοβον, ἄλυπον, λυσιτελές, ἀνώδυνον, / ὠφέλιμον, εὐάρεστον, ἀσφαλές, φίλον, / ἔντιμον, *** , ὁμολογούμενον, / εὐκλεές, ἄτυφον, ἐπιμελές, πρᾶον, σφοδρόν, / χρονιζόμενον, ἄμεμπτον, αἰεὶ διαμένον.

39 Tieleman (1996) 229-233; in the following sections, up to p. 248, Tieleman illustrates his thesis with readings of poetic quotations in Chysippus' *On the Soul*. – For a possible development of such ideas by Diogenes of Babylon see n. 45.

shared understandings. By analyzing poetic language and examples represented in poetry, the philosopher can make important distinctions and provide evidence for their correctness, thus refining the terminological grid with which we process new impressions. Contrary to this, Cleanthes poem seems to *reinforce* an already existing concept. It takes the concept for granted and lists its distinctive features, or ἰδιώματα, i.e. that which a philosopher might identify in the process of concept articulation and which Chrysippus points out in his readings of poetry. Cleanthes presupposes that an argument for articulating the concept with such features has already been made, or is being made separately, concomitant to the poem. The poem may even have been intended to work without further argumentative support, if Cleanthes agreed that humans share a natural concept of what is good. It is such shared natural understanding that finds its expression in the poets adduced by Chrysippus and is used for forming the premises in syllogisms to prove certain features of the good in technical ethical discourse. Thus, by activating dormant "goods of the mind" (Sen. *Ep.* 108.7), giving them a strong push with forceful metrical language, the poem activates knowledge the audience already has. The contrast between Chrysippus' argumentative use of poetry and Cleanthes' idea of "striking" language finds a parallel in Seneca's distinction between paraenetically ineffective *subtilitas* and the blunt force of imperious voicings of truth, e.g. in *Ep.* 82.19-24, or the sublime, "big talk" in *Ep.* 102.[40]

The second part of *SVF* 1.486 and the context of the fragment

Delattre furthers our understanding of the fragment also by rejecting Neubecker's punctuation according to which the section col. 142.16-22 that follows on what is printed as *SVF* 1.486 would be a literal quotation from Cleanthes, or at least represent Cleanthes' ideas in near-literal form.[41] Delattre sets the text given in von Arnim's collection in quotation marks to indicate its close alignment with Cleanthes' own words, even though that passage is reported speech. What we

[40] See Wildberger (2010).

[41] See Delattre (2007) vol. 2: 293 n. 4. The use of the term διανο[η]μάτων in 142.20 points to Philodemus as the author of the expression. Neubecker's punctuation is retained by Thom (2005) 5.

read after this, from col. 142.14 to 143.6, is a mixture of paraphrase and commentary by Philodemus himself. In order to establish what Cleanthes wanted to say, it is necessary to consider the context of the fragment and identify the points Philodemus himself wishes to make with the reference. It will turn out that Delattre's interpretation of Philodemus' agenda must be modified in certain respects. Only after we have established Philodemus' own agenda, can we begin distilling information about Cleanthes' position from the fragment and the Epicurean's discussion of it.

Delattre has improved our understanding of the structure of *On Music* considerably. We now know that all extant fragments belong to only one book and that this volume is characterized by a series of correspondences:[42] At the beginning, in the first part of Book 4 up to col. 55, Philodemus summarizes points made by the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon in a treatise otherwise unknown to us; in the second part, beginning from col. 56, Philodemus refutes these points in the same order as they appeared before.[43] As a last part, Delattre marks off a section from col. 140.14 to col. 152 with the conclusion of Book 4 and of the work as a whole.

Cleanthes' role in this structure is unclear, and Delattre's solution assigns him a hybrid position: he includes the first reference to Cleanthes among the sequence of points refuted one by one in the second part of *On Music 4*, but attributes the second mention of Cleanthes to the conclusion of the book, i.e. the part that follows on the refutation of single arguments. At col. 53 (= *PHerc* 424, col. 2a), lines 8-9, we can recognize Cleanthes' name but not enough legible context to make any assumptions about what was said or quoted from him. With some doubts, Delattre counts this as the last correspondence. Directly before col. 53, Philodemus quotes extensively from Plato's *Laws*, and so we cannot exclude that Philodemus had put aside Diogenes' treatise at that point and engaged with works by Plato and Cleanthes directly.[44] The second extant reference to Cleanthes, our fragment *SVF* 1.486, is placed in the conclusion, the final part of *On Music 4* according to Delattre, and

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[42] Overview in Delattre (2007), vol. 1: cxcviii-cc.

[43] The first columns of the papyrus are badly damaged, so that no specific correspondences can be identified before col. 8/col. 77, but there are indications that the topics of the lost beginning and cols. 56-76 are related as well.

[44] See Delattre (2007), vol. 2: 292 n. 3 on known treatises by Cleanthes from which the fragment could come.

not in the second part with the discussion of correspondences. We can be fairly sure that the text from col. 144.6 serves as a conclusion to the whole work since there Philodemus returns to the topic of the lost first book of *On Music* about connections between musicology and cosmology (Delattre (2007) vol. 1: ccxlix). What precedes from col. 140.14 to 144.6 constitutes a single controversy about the proper understanding of the term "music" and is closely connected to the last point made in the first half of col. 140, which Delattre still attributes to the second part with refutations corresponding to Diogenes' arguments summarized in the first part of the book.

There, Philodemus sharpens a distinction that he has used throughout the second part in his refutation of Diogenes' examples for the thesis that music contributes to the acquisition of virtue. The Stoic errs in assuming that music has a motive force and is able to cause rational impulses.[45] For example, music does not help with hard work by motivating the listeners to exert themselves; rather, it distracts their attention away from painful toil and reduces the discomfort by mixing acoustic pleasure with the unpleasant sensations.[46] Where Diogenes refers to the effect of songs and poems, Philodemus distinguishes between the poet, the composer of words, and the musician, who sets the words to a melody and devises a rhythm and instrumentation for them.[47] But even as concerns the words of poets, Philodemus insists that what has a beneficial effect on the recipient's mind are ultimately the thoughts (διανοήματα) expressed

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[45] Diogenes' position on this point is reported or referred to most clearly in cols. 36.1-14 and 41.17-34; see also 121.22-27; 122.2-3; 124.40-42. – As it seems, Diogenes talked about music as the origin of a "rough" or preliminary "imprint of virtue" (ὑποτύπωσις ἀρετῆς) in children (23.6-7; 126.11-20) and the same idea may have occurred in the near context of the first reference to Cleanthes (54.1-4). Philodemus describes this as an imprinting of opinions (ὑπολή|ψεις, 126.18-19), and ὑποτύπωσις is also a term for an imprecise, preliminary definition (*LSJ* s.v. 1). Since definitions are the content of concepts, we might grasp here the traces of an account of concept formation supported by music. However, this paper is not the place to follow up this lead. See also Laurand (2014) 201-204 on music as a factor shaping the overall predisposition of the soul. – On Philodemus' view that music is a-rational and thus cannot affect the rational functions of a human being, see e.g. 121.36-41; 122.16; 124.15-18; 125.14-18; 126.17-21; 127.20-25; 129.4-5; 133.14-16; 138.12-16; Laurand (2014) 208-209.

[46] 122.22-25 τῶι ὑδ'' ἀνεπ[ι]βλήτους | ἐπὶ τὸν πόνον γίνεσθαι καὶ | κουφότερον ποεῖν τῆ̣ πα|ραμείξει τῆς ἡδονῆς.

[47] E.g. 118.36-40; 119.15-20, 28-31; 120.2-5, 13-15; 121.3-8; 129.7-9; 131.14-17, 24; 135.7-10. Examples in col. 124 imply that Diogenes made a distinction at least between poetry with and without music too. Poetry is equivalent to "words poetically embellished" (134.12-14 διὰ λόγων | κατεσκευασμένω̣ν ποιη|τικῶς; see also 133.36-38; 134.5).

with the words, not the words themselves.[48] Generating such thoughts is the task of the philosopher, not the musician (85.4-11; Albornoz (2014) 103). The fragmentary state of the text does not allow a certain reading, but at the transition from col. 139 to 140, Philodemus seems to have characterized what one reads about virtue in poets[49] as χυδαῖα, "poured out in streams", i.e. commonplace and garbled, as mere assertions (φατικά), and as inconsistent (141.2-3). Since he distinguishes some unnamed individuals in which this happens more, he also envisages the possibility that occasionally poets do have something sensible to say. Yet, even in such a case their beneficial expertise is that of a philosopher.

> Οὐ |(5) μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κ̣αθὸ ποιη|ταὶ ταῦτ' εἰδεῖε[ν] ἂν, οὐχ ὅτι | καθὸ μουσικοί, καὶ τοῖς δια|νοήμασιν, οὐ τοῖς μέλεσι | καὶ ῥυθμοῖς ὠφελοῦσι· παρέλ|(10)κεται δὲ ταῦτ' ἄλλως, μᾶλ|λον δὲ καὶ περισπᾶι συμ|πλεκόμενα [πρ]ὸς τὸ τ[ο]ῖς δι|ανοήμασιν π[α]ρακ[ο]λου|θεῖν.
>
> They would know these things not insofar they are poets, let alone insofar they are musicians, and they benefit with their thoughts, not with the melodies and rhythms. These [i.e. the melodies and rhythms] are dragged along[50] pointlessly, or rather they distract, interwoven as they are with the [act of] following the train of thought. (140.4-14)

Contrary to my translation, which agrees in sense if not in the grammatical details with Neubecker's, Delattre understands the opposite: "leur entrelacement a pour effet précisément de concentrer l'attention sur les pensées." According to this reading, the addition of music to the thoughts would cause the audience's attention to become more focused on the thoughts. Not only does this contradict the theses maintained by Philodemus elsewhere;[51] it is also incompatible with his technical use of

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48 127.39-40; 128.4-23; 129.15-22; 131.33-5; 132.16-19; 133.13-16.

49 In his translation Delattre indicates Philodemus' opponents as the logical subject of εἴ]ρηται (140.1), but (a) the near context is concerned with the uselessness of learning music at an old age and thus what one may learn from song and (b) the opponents do not discuss virtue itself but music as something that contributes to the acquisition of virtue. Further arguments for poets as the subject in Neubecker's commentary (1986) 181.

50 Given the negative context, I prefer a more literal translation. See, however, *LSJ* s.v. παρέλκω I.4 "to be brought in as an accompaniment".

51 In col. 126, for example, he rejects the thesis that "some melodies should arouse and focus the mind on" something (126,6-9 ὡς ἐπεγει|ρόντον τινῶν μελῶν καί | τὴν διάνοιαν ἐντεινόν|των πρὸς …).

the verb περισπᾶν to describe the distracting effect of music.[52] For Philodemus this means that the mental focus on something, what Epicureans call ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας, is interrupted by music.[53] Evidently, music attracts attention to itself in that process, but this is not what Philodemus wishes to describe with the word. He regularly points to what music distracts *from*: some painful experience or aggressive intentions when the effect is positive,[54] while the effect is negative when the focus of attention should be "our pressing concerns and what prepares us for a happy life" (69.39-42) or from some true ideas about virtue set to music as in the passage under discussion here.[55] It is as a reply to this fundamental distinction between content and musical elements that Philodemus introduces the objection with which he engages in the following section (140.14-144.6) at the beginning of what Delattre regards as the final and concluding part of the book. In order to understand Philodemus' reference to Cleanthes, it is essential to clarify the exact nature of that objection and of Philodemus' answers to it.

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[52] Delattre (2007) 124 n. 4 notes this term (see also Albornoz (2014) 105) but focuses on the construction with ἀπό to indicate the object from which someone is distracted. As it seems, the occurrence of this preposition's antonym πρός as well as the reference to some kind of attention (παρακολουθεῖν) motivated Delattre's reading of lines 140.11-14. The problem is that Philodemus' expression is elliptic with either the verb περισπᾶι or the participle συμπλεκόμενα lacking some modifier. According to Neubecker's translation, which is similar in sense to mine, Philodemus omits to say what music distracts from (it being understood that it distracts from the ideas with which it is interwoven); according to Delattre, Philodemus does not indicate what the music is interwoven with (in which case it would be taken for granted that this would be the things referred to with the anaphoric pronoun ταῦτ' at the beginning of the sentence). Like περισπᾶν, "interweaving" (συμπλέκειν, συμπλοκή) is a recurrent term with which Philodemus describes the combination of music with text or other phenomena. The relation is symmetric, such that musical elements can be interwoven with thoughts or words (141.34-35) or, in turn, the words with music (e.g. 96,1-2 and 7-8; 148.15). That with which something is intervowen appears in the dative in the two comparable instances of *On Music* (69.7; 141.34-35), but the construction with πρός + acc. is also well attested (*LSJ* s.v. συμπλέκω 1). That the muscial elements are here intertwined with the concentration on the train of thought and not the thoughts themselves is comparable to Philodemus' description of music intertwined with another activity, fighting (ταῖς μάχαις), at col. 69.7.

[53] Compare col. 122.22 ἀνεπ[ι]βλητους and, with regard to music as a remedy for unhappy lovers, 129.5-6 ἀλλ' ἀν⟦α⟧επιβλή|τους ποιεῖ περισπῶσα. At col. 146.36-9 Philodemus heaps scorn on those believing that music could have a distracting effect on something that seems to be a hybrid of Plato's λογιστικόν and the immobile mind of a Stoic sage.

[54] For distraction from an aggressive impulse see 133.32-33; a distraction from pain is described in the example cited in n. 46, without the use of the verb περισπᾶν, however. On περισπᾶν in Sextus Empiricus, see Neubecker (1986) 185-186.

[55] On περισπασμός at 142.27 see below p. 119.

First of all, the objection moves the debate to a meta-level. It is concerned with how Philodemus has been discussing issues so far and not another argument about the value of music itself. Nor do the objectors against whom Philodemus defends his position condemn the Epicurean views on music in general, as Delattre assumes.[56] Their criticism is more specific, namely that all the preceding discussion has been misdirected. Philodemus has the objectors frame the issue in a two-pronged manner: Philodemus[57] shows his lack of education by (i) misunderstanding the claims of the philosophers and musicians he has been trying to refute – his targets, as I will call them from now on, in contrast to the objectors making the two-pronged attack (140.14-27). These objectors also take issue with (ii) Philodemus' use of the term μουσικός, which makes them wonder whether he really knows what he is talking about (140.27-35). As concerns the second criticism, Philodemus is happy to affirm his understanding of the term, which corresponds to our modern sense of the word "music". The term applies to instrumental music (143.12-21); word artists produce the accompanying (22-23 τὰ πε|ριγινόμενα) non-signifying (31-32 τὰ ἀσήμαν̣|τα) elements of their compositions only insofar as they are musicians (καθὸ μουσικοί), not as poets;[58] and if someone were to reserve the word μουσική exclusively for the phenomena of melody and rhythm, Philodemus would regard this as a very appropriate usage (143.39-43).

The major part of the passage is devoted to refuting the first aspect of the objectors' criticism. According to them, Philodemus' thought is so primitive that he cannot comprehend his targets, the philosophers and musicians he argues against. It is this form of ἀγροικία or "rusticity"

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[56] See, e.g., his summary in vol. 2, p. 275: "… contre certains adversaires, qui prétendent qu'une telle position des épicuriens sur la musique vient de ce qu'ils sont incultes."

[57] I take the first-person plural verbs in that passage to refer to the author of the treatise. Reading them as a reference to Epicureans in general would not pose a problem for my interpretation. In that case, Philodemus' manner of discussion in *On Music* would be described as representative for the shortcomings of his school.

[58] See col. 143.25-26, 30-31, and compare 140.7. – In this context, Philodemus makes two quick additional points about the benefits of music that support Delattre's assumption that the section as a whole is a conclusion for Book 4. 143.6-12: All, not only the objectors of col. 140.14, disregard the fact that their claims about positive effects pertain to both the trained and the untrained. Thus, even if one accepts those claims, there would be no reason to study music (a question raised also on col. 139, directly before the part under discussion in this paper). 143.33-39: If musicians (in Philodemus' sense) benefit others, then they do so as educated men, no more or less than other πεπαιδευμένοι.

(140.15; 144.3) that recurs in the conclusion of the passage 144.1-6 (Delattre (2007) vol. 2: 298 n. 1). There, Philodemus insinuates that the objectors themselves are stolid "rustics", while attentive readers will have long since understood perfectly well what he wanted to say. Also in the refutation proper, Philodemus accuses his objectors of intellectual failures similar to those they attribute to him. The objectors themselves are victims of an *ignoratio elenchi*[59] and misrepresent Philodemus' targets, the philosophers and musicians whose claims the Epicurean refutes. After all, these targets explicitly talk about the effects of musical scales, instruments, melody, or rhythm.[60] In this "first" (140.41) reply, Philodemus further states that the targets of his refutations often do not treat thoughts (διανοήματα) at all or, if they do, clearly distinguish the effects of each, music on the one hand and thoughts on the other (141.9-10 τὸ γινόμενον ὑ|φ' ἑκατέρου). The objectors should therefore acknowledge that it is their own opinion rather than that of Philodemus' targets which they propose as the "correct" interpretation. The exact meaning and implications of this interpretation are at the heart of Philodemus' other two replies.

According to the objectors, Philodemus errs in thinking (17-18 οἰό|μενοι) that his targets, "certain philosophers and musicians of good sense" (140.18-19), would "say that melody and rhythm without meaning (ἄνευ σημασίας) would exhort toward virtue (ἐπ' ἀρετὴν προ|τρέπειν)" (16-17, 20-21). This part of the objection is countered with the first reply (140.1-141.16) summarized in the previous paragraph. What the objectors regard as the "correct" interpretation of the targets' claim is indicated in the genitive absolute that follows (140.21-24), according to which "these men[61] claim that words [set] in melodies

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[59] 140.36-37 ἀπερρυ|ηκέναι τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς (see *LSJ* s.v. ἐπιφορά: "question at issue").

[60] Philodemus may have mentioned other aspects of music at the fragmentary end of col. 140, saying that he was talking about treatises (44-5 πρα]γμ|[ατει..?) concerned with such matters, and continuing in col. 141.1-2 with the assertion that these things (ταῦτ') were (sc. presented as) motive of passion "as well as the kinds of scales, but obviously also of musical instruments" (141.2-3).

[61] 141.21 τῶν ἀ[ν]δρῶν, referring back to Philodemus' targets and not distinguished Epicureans, as Delattre suggests (vol. 2: 288 n. 4) in contrast to Neubecker's correct translation (111) and paraphrase in the commentary (1986, 182). – The reading proposed here is, however, incompatible with Delattre's far from certain conjecture φιλοποηταῖς at the beginning of 140.27. The papyrus is damaged at that point and the facsimile drawings differ from each other. According to Neubecker's and my reading, one would expect some reference to Plato criticizing people interested in instrumental music without words, thus demonstrating that Plato explicitly rejects the idea that music on its own could be beneficial. Philodemus quotes exactly such a passage (Plato *Laws* 2, 669e) in the first part of the book (beginning at col. 51.35),

and rhythms (τοὺς | ἐμμελεῖς καὶ ἐνρύθμους | λόγους) bring with them[62] this [effect]".

But what exactly do they mean when saying that words are "in melodies and in rhythms"?[63] In his first answer to the objection, Philodemus assumes that the objectors mean that words and music somehow form a unity and are not two separate causes of one effect. In his second reply (141.16-24), he interprets the phrase as indicating that rhythm and melody constitute some kind of coating (141.20-21 περι|χρείσματα) of the words, which are what is causally active. Second, the objectors talk nonsense (140.39-40) because their conception of the issue includes the belief that it would suffice for musicians to know which coating to apply to "what educates and motivates and helps with the acquisition of virtue".[64] It is not the musical coating but what is being coated by music that has the beneficial effect. The neuter participles in the cited phrase are deliberately ambiguous since for Philodemus yet another distinction is necessary that cuts right through what the objectors present as one entity "words". This distinction is made in Philodemus' third reply (141.24-143.3), the longest of the three and the one that includes the Cleanthes fragment.

The objectors are stupid, thirdly, because they do not realize that their criticism has no bearing on Philodemus' argument. For Philodemus, the thoughts (διανοήματα) are the cause of any benefit in education or progress toward virtue. When the objectors say that in fact it is the words set in music, they do not realize that with this "they have not yet abolished" Philodemus' point that "what is signified through the voice-sounds … is able to produce the same" benefits,[65] just by itself, irrespective of how exactly it is uttered or phrased. Thoughts benefit in whatever way they arrive in the mind of a person. Here it is important to see that the things signified (τὰ σημαινόμενα) are the thoughts (διανοήματα) in the words of a song or poem. The phonetic

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directly before the first occurrence of Cleanthes' name in the extant fragments of the papyrus; see p. 108.

62 Or: "contribute", see *LSJ* s.v. προσφέρω C.2 and 4. The middle draws attention to the words as the origin of the decisive factor.

63 Watanabe (1988) 49 points to similar expressions in Posidonius' definition of "poem" (Diog. Laërt. 7.60 = *Frg*. 44 Edelstein/Kidd).

64 141.21-24 τῶν [π]α[ιδ]ευόν|των κ[αὶ π]αρ[ορμ]ώντων | καὶ συνεργούν̣τω[ν] πρὸς ἀ|ρετὴν.

65 141.25-27 ὅτι τ[ὸ] τὰ̣ [ση]μ̣αινό|μενα ̔διὰ' τ̣ῶν̣ φ̣ω̣νῶν οὐδέπο|τ' ἠθέτησαν̣ καὶ τα[ῦτ]α ποιεῖν.

shape of those words is combined with the non-signifying, speechless elements (141.30 ἀλογήματα) into one category "voice" (φωνή), the sounds bearing the meaningful utterance. Now, if the things signified, or thoughts, have the beneficial effect just by themselves, it follows that the musical, speechless coatings interwoven with the words (141.34-35) do not produce any such effect at all.[66]

After a few lines too fragmentary to glean their meaning, Philodemus introduces Cleanthes as the proponent of yet another, fourth, explication of what the objectors could possibly mean when speaking of benefit through "words in melody and rhythm". The difference to the previous interpretation is that now it is not the thoughts or words set in music that benefit but thoughts (i.e. the examples – παραδείγματα, 142.4 – in the first part of the fragment already discussed) or words ("the account, λόγος, of philosophy") *both* by themselves *and* when they are presented in poetic or musical form. Philodemus cites Cleanthes as saying:

> τοῦ λ[ό]γ̣ου τοῦ τῆς φιλοσο|φίας ἱκανῶς μὲν ἐξαγγέλ|λειν δυναμένου τὰ θεῖα καὶ | ἀνθ[ρ]ώ[πι]ν[α], μὴ ἔχοντ̣ος δὲ | ψειλοῦ τῶν θείων μεγεθῶν | (10) λέξεις οἰκείας, τὰ μέτρα καὶ | τὰ μέλη καὶ τοὺς ῥ̣υθμοὺς | ὡς μάλιστα προσικνεῖσθαι | πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς τῶν | θείων θεωρίας
>
> While the account given by philosophy by itself is able to convey sufficiently what is divine and human but as bare [prose] lacks expressions appropriate to the greatness of the the divine, meter, melody, and rhythm come as close as possible to the true reality of the contemplation of divine things.[67]

Melody and rhythm would thus not be completely inefficient; rather they somehow reinforce or support the kind of effect the thoughts and words also have by themselves.

Already from this contextualization we can see that the fragment was concerned not so much with the idea most modern readers of the fragment regard as central to it, namely that one needs a special language to talk appropriately about the divine (see p. 9). Rather, the issue continues to be effective paraenetic communication, and unless Philodemus has taken Cleanthes' words completely out of their original context, the kind of cognition that the Stoic wants to reinforce by

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[66] 141.36-37 μηθὲν π[οι]εῖν | τῶν ὑπονοουμ[ένω]ν.

[67] 142.5-14. This is the second part of *SVF* 1.486.

aesthetic means concerns exhortation and not only theoretical contemplation or learning through memorization of well-articulated concepts. The examples (παραδείγματα) could very well be moral examples provided in the myths and plots of poetry; the effect of the philosophical account is discussed in terms of motivation (παρόρμησις, p. 118); and in his ridiculing illustrations Philodemus shows us the philosopher as adviser and therapist (142.35-143.6).

The specific position of Cleanthes in the conceptual grid of possible meanings of "words in melody and rhythm" confirms the results from our reading of Sen. *Ep*. 108, namely that Cleanthes did not aim at causing pre-rational, merely physiological states of the mind. At least according to Philodemus, Cleanthes differs from the other philosophers the Epicurean refutes, in particular also Diogenes of Babylon, in that aesthetic form serves as an amplifier to content rather than either just "coating" or conveying content by itself. For Cleanthes, aesthetic form supports rational processes in the mind and does not just cause calm or arousal somehow conducive to moral education.

As concerns the internal structure of Philodemus' presentation of the fragment, matters are less clear. We can be fairly certain that col. 142.3-14, the part printed as *SVF* 1.486 by von Arnim and set in quotation marks be Delattre, is the closest rendering of Cleanthes' ideas that we get. The insistence on the divine (τὰ θεῖα) and the reference to contemplation (θεωρία) do not further Philodemus' own agenda, and therefore are likely to derive from Cleanthes himself. The mention of ἀλήθεια also must have been made already by Cleanthes since it is taken up again in Philodemus' comments (142.25). The description of the aesthetic elements as "meter, melody, and rhythm" (142.10-11) matches Philodemus' own formulations elsewhere and probably is his contribution, serving to extend Cleanthes' original reference only to poetry to music in general. The rare and poetic verb προσικνέομαι occurs only here in Philodemus' work and more likely belongs to Cleanthes' vocabulary.[68]

The rest of the passage, beginning from line 14, is Philodemus' commentary and does not contain direct quotes from Cleanthes, contrary to what Neubecker seems to have assumed (p. 107). Contorted syntax combined with irony do not facilitate comprehension, but the general structure of Philodemus' comments seems to be the following:

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[68] It is attested in Aeschylus (*Ag*. 792) and thus suits Cleanthes' linguistic tastes.

He argues that Cleanthes's view (as it has just been related) is quite ridiculous (142.14-15), for the following reasons:

[Cleanthes does] not (οὔτε[69] γὰρ) [make the same claim as the objectors and/or the original targets of Philodemus' book, namely that] the ideas (διάνοιαι) by themselves are useless and motivation (παρόρμησις) comes about through ideas and music combined (16-19), – since (καὶ γὰρ) [according to Cleanthes] considerable motivation happens already by the thoughts (διανοήματα) themselves, and [only] more (motivation) with music (19-22).[70]

Instead (ἀλλ') Cleanthes claims what Philodemus attributes to him in his own paraphrase of 142.5-14, highlighting perceived inconsistencies and contradictory consequences and taking as an example

- a philosophical account of the divine (22-35).

And moreover (καὶ δὴ γὰρ), who would not burst into laughter when considering the similarly absurd scenarios Philodemus paints of advice or consolation in order to demonstrate the absurdity of Cleanthes' thesis if a philosopher presented it

- in the form of a song accompanied by instrument (142.35-143.1);
- or as an actor in a play; even such a performance, being closer to ordinary speech, would be inacceptable (143.1-6).

Philodemus first clarifies the specifics of Cleanthes' position by contrasting it (142.19-22) with yet another formulation of the claim he attributes to his targes (16-19). For Philodemus, the decisive contrast is between content and musical form, and so he does not mention words but only ideas or thoughts in this summary. The refutation proper happens by ridicule and a *reductio ad absurdum* based on Philodemus' own theory about the nature and effects of music. For this purpose, Philodemus describes in detail what happens when the "account of philosophy" is supposedly reinforced by the means envisaged not so much by Cleanthes in the fragment – he talks only about poetry – but rather by the targets Philodemus argues against throughout the book.

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[69] Οὔτε without a second negation (*LSJ* s.v. οὔτε II.5.d) appears also in Philodemus' S*toicorum historia* 40.4. The continuation with ἀλλά is appropriate since Cleanthes is supposed to accept the later description (so that it cannot be negated), while Philodemus wants the reader to see the contrast with what precedes.

[70] The parenthesis does not end in line 21, as Delattre assumes. Note also how the ellipsis of the two words (γίνεται, παρόρμησις) in the second part binds the two phrases together.

Philodemus' first move is to take apart the idea that "the account of philosophy" is able to utter content "sufficiently" (ἱκανῶς, 142.6). This leads to the paradox that, on the one hand, thoughts together with music produce "greater" or stronger motivation,[71] while, on the other hand (ἀλλ', 141.22), "if some [account, i.e. mere λόγος) is acceptable (ἐπιεικής), it will say [i.e. produce with prose speech] an equal [amount of motivation]".[72]

The verb ἐρεῖ points to non-poetic prose, and as we will presently see, Philodemus ridicules Cleanthes' claim in the order in which it appears in the fragment, taking up the antithesis markers μέν and δέ from the fragment[73] and repeating key concepts of both parts. Τις in line 23 thus likely refers to λόγος, the naked account of philosophy from 141.5-6, which is also a more natural antecedent for ἀλη[θής in the next sentence. On the other hand, one would expect a person to say something rather than speech itself speaking, even though such an expression is not impossible,[74] and that would be in line with Philodemus' emphasis on speech as a signifier of thoughts. If one prefers to identify the referent of τις with a person, it would be some philosopher capable of uttering an effective philosophical account.[75] If constructed with λόγος, however, ἐπιεικής assumes a very precise meaning as the antonym of ἀληθής, a meaning that is closely connected to Cleanthes' claims in the fragment itself. An ἐπιεικὴς λόγος is plausible or appears reasonable; it is an acceptable way of saying something, but *not* an exact expression of a certain truth (*LSJ* s.v. II.1). In his polemical paraphrase, Philodemus would thus present Cleanthes as indicating that the prose version of philosophical speech may have the same motivational effect, while not providing perfect cognitive access to what really is the case, unlike the account combined with music, the one that Philodemus now refers to as the λόγος which is bluntly, directly, harshly true (142.24-25 ἀποτόμως | ἀλη[θής).

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[71] 141.21-22; παρόρμησις from line 19 is to be supplied with μ[ε]ίζων.

[72] 141.22-24 ἀλλ' ἂν | μὲν ἐπιε[ι]κ[[ων]]ὴς' ᾖ τις, ἐρεῖ | τὴν ἴσην.

[73] 142.6 and 8 in the fragment; 142.23 and 24 in the commentary.

[74] *LSJ* s.v. λέγω III.1 point to Plato. *Protag*. 312c τοὔνομα λεγει

[75] Reading ἐπιεικής in the sense of *LSJ* s.v. II.2.a, while Neubecker and Delattre understand the adjective as a reference to fairness, or rather generosity (II.2.b), which would mean that Philodemus would mock Cleanthes' and Philodemus' opponents' willingness to concede that prose can have an effect too.

Before using Philodemus' commentary for a closer analysis of Cleanthes' fragment itself, it is necessary to clarify what Philodemus wants to achieve with his mocking paraphrase. In a *reductio ad absurdum*, Philodemus interprets Cleanthes' "sufficient" (142.6 ἱκανῶς) philosophical account in prose as a λόγος ἐπιεικής: as not quite representative of the real facts and only a plausible, perhaps even somewhat misleading, approximation. Still, being "able to convey sufficiently what is divine and human" (142.6-8), the λόγος ἐπιεικής has the same paraenetic effect as thoughts combined with music – while that combination was supposed to be more effective, according to Philodemus' preceding summary of Cleanthes' ideas (21-22). Musical λόγος would therefore be both more effective and equally effective, i.e. not more effective than the same λόγος without music.

This first inconsistency arises from the following distortions: Philodemus (i) interprets sufficient effectiveness (6-7) as equal effectiveness (24), while (ii) simplifying the effect to one quantifiable phenomenon "motivation" (παρόρμησις) and (iii) identifying "expressions appropriate to the greatness" (9-10) that take the recipient closer to something (12) with thoughts-with-music that generate "greater" motivation (21-22). Philodemus generates a second inconsistency by applying his own concept of music to the second part of Cleanthes' claim. Further distorting the fragment, Philodemus reads (iv) "coming as close as possible to the true reality" of something (12-13) as equivalent to an account that is simply true. Finally, (v) the "expressions (λέξεις) appropriate to the greatness (μεγεθῶν) of the divine" (9-10) become a musicalized performance in a cult setting such as the instances discussed earlier in the book (e.g. in col. 124). "Great", i.e. both loud and impressive, voices and sounds (29 τοῦ μεγέθους | τῶν φωνῶν) and unnatural expressions[76] are uttered at an extraordinary place and occasion (32-33). Based on the arguments he has made throughout the book, Philodemus takes it for granted here that such an experience is bound to produce pleasure and a distraction[77] caused by this pleasure and by the other attention-grabbing features mentioned above. If one agrees with Philodemus on this point, the absurdity of Cleanthes' claim is apparent. Not only would the account that

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[76] The phrase μηδὲ κ̣ατ[ὰ φ]ύσιν τὰς λέξεις | ἐκφέρεσ[θαι] (142.31-32) is reminiscent of the utterance (ἐξαγγέλ|λειν) and the "appropriate expressions" (λέξεις οἰκείας) in the Cleanthes fragment (142.6-7, 10).

[77] 142.26-27 διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν (see p. 100 with n. 12) καὶ διὰ | τὸν περι[ση]̣`σπα΄[σ]μὸν (p. 10).

presents truth directly be the one that distracts the audience from the presented truth. Being pleasurable and distracting, the musicalized account also would produce a motivation that is "relaxed" (25 ἀ]νιεμένην [sc. παρόρμησιν]) and thus rather less intense, "smaller" than the "equal" motivation caused by prose speech (23-24) – while in fact it was supposed to be "greater" (22)!

Even though ἀ]νιεμένην occurs at the emphatic first position in Philodemus' description of the effects a musicalized account of the divine would actually have, we should be wary to make too much of the reference to "relaxed motivation". Philodemus expresses similar ideas, again using the verb ἀνίημι to describe a relaxed and pleasurable state, also elsewhere in the book.[78] Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that he counters Cleanthes' thesis (of which he may have read more than he reports to us) by highlighting that in practice the Stoic's suggestions would lead to a relaxation of tension rather than the opposite. The choice of the adverb ἀποτόμως is also remarkable since it has interesting connotations that point beyond the purely semantic sense "absolutely", i.e. "precisely", proposed by *LSJ* s.v. ἀπότομος II. It may have been chosen instead of, e.g. ἀκριβής, in order to underscore the contrast between the actual slackening effect of this form of account with Cleanthes' ideas about communication through tension-rich language that pushes and strikes. In its literal meaning, ἀπότομος refers to something that is cut off and thus steep or too short. Applied to language utterances it thus denotes brevity, but also bluntness, a direct expression without circumlocution or verbal mitigation, so that it may be perceived as sharp and aggressive,[79] just as a person who is ἀπότομος is harsh and severe (*LSJ* s.v. I.3.b). In that sense it is a perfect antonym to the range of meanings denoted by ἐπιεικής, the adjective used to describe philosophical communication in prose (p. 118), which would beat about the bush in its imprecision but might also mitigate the injunction uttered in that manner. The blunt account, on the other hand, would name the things directly but also shock the

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[78] See, e.g., 46.16; 47.20; 82.32; 130.21-28; 132.16-27.

[79] See in particular Ael. Aristid. *Or*. 47 Πρὸς Καπίτωνα, p. 325 Jebb ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἐφαινόμην οὐδ᾽ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις ἀποτόμως τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος, ἀλλὰ πεφεισμένως καὶ σχηματιζόμενος τὰ πρέποντα; Plut. *Crassus* 3.1 ἀπήτει δ᾽ ἀποτόμως τοῦ χρόνου παρελθόντος εἰς ὃν ἐδάνειζε; Polyb. 9.32.6; Suda A.3602 (quoting Diod. Sic. 29.4.1) Ἀποτομία· τραχύτης, ἐναντίωσις· οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀποτομίαν τῆς ἀποκρίσεως οὐ τὸ τυχὸν δέος εἶχον περὶ αὐτούς.

recipient in some way. One may compare in particular how the same adjective ἀπότομος is used in [Longinus] *Subl.* 27 to describe the striking effect, as it were, of introducing a menace in direct speech without a distancing, and thus mitigating, line to indicate that the words in question are those of a character and not addressed at the audience by the narrator. Ἀπότομος may even assume a physical meaning if Diodorus Siculus' use of the adjective to denote the piercing visual impression created by a bright fire is not a unique exception.[80]

Our detailed reading of Philodemus' criticism as well as the context of the fragment, have provided evidence that Cleanthes' main concern was not just finding appropriately elevating language for a religious context. Nevertheless, he singles out the divine as the subject of communication, and we must now discuss why this may be so. What exactly does Cleanthes mean when he says that prose lacks appropriate expressions for divine greatness and that poetry and song "come as close as possible to the true reality (ἀλήθεια) of the contemplation of divine things"? The translation I suggest here[81] already implies a certain answer based on the range of meanings the word ἀλήθεια can assume. In his polemic, Philodemus takes up the word to characterize the account supposedly envisaged by Cleanthes as true (142.25 ἀλη[θής), i.e. as that account which expresses what is true in contrast to what is false. In the fragment itself, however, ἀλήθεια is connected to a form of perception (142.14 θεωρίας) to which the recipient of poetic words is brought closer, i.e. the words lead the recipient toward a perception of divine things that is characterized by ἀλήθεια. We must not forget that Cleanthes has already said that for denoting (142.6-7 ἐξαγγέλ|λειν) the same divine things non-poetic speech is sufficient.[82] Therefore, when contrasting the two kinds of communication as a plausible (but not exactly true) account opposed to the account that is simply, bluntly true, Philodemus distorts Cleanthes' point. According to Cleanthes, both prose and poetry are equally true in the sense of being not false and factually accurate. Rather, Cleanthes seems to have had in mind the contrast between hearing the truth about a thing and

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80 3.48.3 καὶ τὸ φῶς βάλλειν ἀπότομον καὶ πυρῶδες καθ' ὑπερβολήν.

81 In sense it is close to Neubecker's "wahre Betrachtung" since German "wahr" here assumes the meaning "real" rather than "true."

82 Glei (1990) 597 overlooks this in his paraphrase (597: "die einzig mögliche Form") and translation of the phrase (597, 583: "theologische Wahrheit").

actually perceiving the *real* thing *itself*.[83] If it has the right philosophical content, then listening to a poem about the gods brings us as close as is humanly possible to really, directly comtemplating the divine things themselves in all their greatness. If one contemplates a thing, one has an impression of it, and we may assume that an impression of a divine thing itself would be more forceful than an indirect account of it. So here again we see Cleanthes concerned with causing audiences to have strong impressions that hit home deeply and cannot be ignored – even more so, if the poetic words about the divine take the pragmatic form of a prayer.[84]

SVF 1.537 (*Hymn to Zeus*) and *SVF* 1.527

It is now time to test these results by reading an example of Cleanthes' poetry about the divine, his *Hymn to Zeus*, to see if we can observe signs of its intended effect on the recipient. We will see that the pragmatic purpose of the hymn corresponds closely to the purpose Seneca attributes to the prayer *SVF* 1.527, which he adapts in *Ep.* 107.

It is remarkable how much Cleanthes' hymn focuses on the unhappiness of the "bad ones", whose behavior might rather point to a failure of the praised god, such that Cleanthes needs to explain that it is not the god's fault.[85] The explanation for this focus is that the hymn has a paraenetic function and serves as an exhortation to virtue similar to the function which Philodemus calls παρόρμησις (142.19) in his discussion of *SVF* 1.486. It is thus an example of exhortation by talking about the divine.

The hymn showcases two types of agency: The heavens submit to the rule of Zeus and willingly follow wherever he leads; the bad ones among mortals "flee"[86] the eternal, harmonious λόγος of all and do not obey God's universal law; instead, they conceive impulses by

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[83] Compare *DGE* s.v. II: "ref. a acciones, pers. y cosas. 3 en el plano ontológico realidad, naturaleza, lo natural, lo que es, verdad"; *LSJ* s.v. I.2 "*truth, reality,* opp. *appearance.*" Note also the use of ἀλήθεια in contrast to a dream, *LSJ* I.4 and *DGE* II.3.

[84] Pià Comella (2016) observes functions similar to those outlined here concerning the Imperial Stoics. As I hope to show, these functions go back at least to Cleanthes himself.

[85] The prominence of human badness is the core focus of Thom's (2005) commentary; arguing against Glei (1990) and others, he rightly rejects the idea that Cleanthes' interest in including that topic was theodicy (17, 95-97).

[86] 22 ὃν φεύγοντες ἐῶσιν ὅσοι θνητῶν κακοί εἰσιν.

themselves (26 αὐτοί) in different directions, which all lead away from what they really desire. At the end, the poem envisages happy humans who join the gods in hymnic praise of Zeus, i.e. who opt for the type of agency described first rather than the one exemplified by bad humans. As Thom underscores, the bad ones "are not accused of any immoral behaviour; they are rather epistemologically impaired […]". Bénatouïl specifies that Cleanthes attributes their badness to a *lack* of reasoning rather than bad reasoning.[87] The cognitive deficiency can be defined even more precisely. The bad ones are unable to perceive the divine, even though in Cleanthes' characterization that perception would be as natural as perceiving objects with one's senses. They are blind and deaf to the divine[88] and thus suffer from a lack of experience (ἀπειροσύνη) that causes them great mental pain. They long (23 ποθέοντες) for the real good but are unable to perceive it. In other words, they are unable to receive vital information that is "sent" to them by sensory or verbal channels. The stimuli they encounter do not generate in them impressions from which they could build correct concepts (νοῦς or γνώμη)[89] through memory and experience. Nor were whatever impressions they actually had sufficient to stimulate the right kind of action.

Cleanthes thus diagnoses exactly the predicament to which he thought poetic form can provide a remedy if my reading of his poetics is correct. The bad ones need stronger, more forceful impressions about the divine and the good. Verbal instruction should have a form that brings them as close as possible to directly perceiving God himself. The fragment reported by Philodemus does not provide us with sufficient information to glean how precisely Cleanthes imagined ap-

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87 Thom (2009) 202; Bénatouïl (2002) 330: "[…] la méchanceté humaine […] n'est en tout cas jamais attribué à la *raison* humaine. Cléanthe souligne même l'absence de pensée et d'intelligence des méchants (vv. 24, 33), et l'oppose à la 'connaissance' nécessaire pour chanter Zeus (vv. 25, 35)."

88 24 οὔτ' ἐσορῶσι ... οὔτε κλύουσιν; see also Thom's commentary (2005) 123-124 for the connotations of that phrase. When praying for help against lack of experience in lines 33-34, Cleanthes alludes to *Il.* 17.645-646, where Aias asks Zeus to disperse the darkness so that the Greeks can see again.

89 Note how the bad ones are characterized by absence of good sense (ἄνοια) instead of the deliberate wickedness (ἀτασθαλίη – not "blind folly", as Thom (2005) 95, has it, following the Loeb translation of Murray and Dimock) in the Homeric phrase (*Il.* 4.409; *Od*. 1.7, 34), which Cleanthes adapts. Steinmetz (1986) 25 assumes that "Anschaulichkeit des bildhaften Ausdrucks" was one of the reasons why Cleanthes valued poetry.

propriate expressions to have this enabling effect. However, it is interesting to see that he also encourages direct perception right at the beginning of the "argument" part of the hymn. With emphatic deixis[90] he points to the heavens, to that part of the world where the divine is most evidently visible, and continues to focus attention on those parts of the world where the nature of God's power and agency is manifest for everyone to see.

So far, our analysis has been suggesting a clear-cut dichotomy between author and recipient. The philosopher-poet appeared as a wise man instructing his audience with the most effective means at his disposal.[91] This is certainly wrong. Not only has it been demonstrated by Brouwer ((2014), ch. 3) that the Stoics did not regard themselves as sages. Thom also points out the "subtle rhetorical shift from the bad people (vv. 17,22) to humanity in general that has to be saved from its ignorance (v. 33) […] to the all-inclusive 'we' […] (vv. 36-37)" (Thom (2009) 202). To this list I would add the speaker of the poem himself, not just because he is logically included in the universal "we"; he is explicitly someone who still has to learn how to truly give hymnic praise to Zeus' law. The "I" of the hymn has not yet reached such full agreement. Even though all humans (33) are to be saved from lack of experience, in line 34 the speaker turns the focus on his own predicament. He addresses a divine father in the vocative, i.e. speaks as a son would to his own father; he asks his father to disperse lack of experience from a soul – here referred to in the singular – and to grant the attainment of insight (γνώμη). The fact that he does not name a recipient in the form of an indirect object to the verb δός[92] also implies that the speaker talks about his own soul and wants to receive the gift of insight himself. In this context it is significant that the speaker never describes himself as actually praising Zeus hymnically in

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[90] 7 σοὶ δὴ [Scaliger; δὲ F] πᾶς ὅδε κόσμος … The deictic particle δή is so unusual that Zuntz (1951) 337-338 rejects Scaliger's plausible conjecture. Sier (1990) 99 notes the thematic focus on those parts of the world where the divine fire is most visible, while Thom (2005) 70 reminds us that "Cleanthes considered the regular and ordered movement of the fixed stars, the sun, moon, and planets, the greatest cause of the belief in the gods"; see also 84. – Asmis (2007) argues that the structure of the poem was designed "to jolt the listener into a sharp awareness of his own situation in the world" (415; see also 421).

[91] Compare Fantuzzi and Hunter (2004) 237: "(Stoic) philosophers such as Cleanthes are clearly excluded from this prayer, as they have already seen the light."

[92] 33-35 ἀνθρώπους ῥύου <μὲν> ἀπειροσύνης ἀπὸ λυγρῆς, / ἣν σύ, πάτερ, σκέδασον ψυχῆς ἄπο, δὸς δὲ κυρῆσαι / γνώμης.

the indicative present. He addresses Zeus (3 προσαυδᾶν) and sings presently and incessantly[93] about Zeus' might; but he *will* praise him hymnically, asks for insight in order to become able to do so ("so that we *may* honor you, praising you hymnically")[94] and finally states that for either gods or mortals there is no greater *gift* of honor (38 γέρας) than actually praising Zeus' law in this way – which is precisely the gift the speaker prays for and therefore still has to receive. Just as one would expect of a Stoic intellectualist,[95] successful cognition of the good, the reception of insight that enables the agent to make the right choice and praise God, coincides with that praise itself. Since praising God is none other than the good life of constant agreement with Nature (ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν), the attainment of insight that enables one to do so is the gift of the supreme good.[96]

We thus have both a hymn and a non-hymn. In the ordinary formal sense, it is doubtless a hymn. In the proper Stoic sense, however, it is an utterance that *can* become a hymn once Zeus has granted the prayer expressed in it. This in turn will be the case when the speaker has had the impressions supposed to be generated by the poem, i.e. when he has really perceived what the hymn is about and, as a result, truly means and intends what he sings. Seen in that way, the hymn is something like an impression-generating device to be recited to others, who are to identify with the speaker, or to be directly spoken for oneself, *repeatedly*, until the language sounds[97] that bring rational beings close to the contemplation of divine greatness itself turn into truly meaning-bearing speech (λόγος) for the one that utters it. Zeus

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93 Following Thom (2005) 68, I read αἰὲν ἀείδω in line 5, as suggested by ἀίδω in the only witness for that passage (F), in contrast to the future ἀείσω favored by von Arnim and other editors. For my interpretation, the tense of the verb is irrelevant.

94 36-37 ὄφρ' ἂν τιμηθέντες ἀμειβώμεσθά σε τιμῇ, / ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα διηνεκές. Thom (2005) 7-8 notes the recurrence of the word and its emphatic position at the end. According to him, however, this activity is already taking place: "ὑμνεῖν indicates the ongoing activity expected of those who have been enabled to understand the way God is at work in the world (vv. 34-35) – a continuous praise of which the present hymn itself is a beginning and a prime example" (163).

95 This point is underscored by Glei (1990) 589.

96 See, e.g., Thom (2005) 18-20, 27, 159; Asmis (2007) 425-428.

97 I would not exclude the possibility that ἤχου μίμημα in line 4 (a review of the issue in Bees (2010) is a reference to the ambiguous status of verbal signifiers uttered by someone who does not yet intend the meaning contained objectively, as it were, in that utterance. We have evidence that the Stoics discussed such issues, also in Sen. *Ep.* 108, but none that points to Cleanthes specifically; see Wildberger (2006), chs. 2.4.4.4 and 2.4.6.2-4.

grants the gift of insight by showing himself to rational animals; with his hymn, Cleanthes causes himself and other users of the poem to open their eyes and look at what is there for them to see as soon as they start paying attention. As we see here, the tuba player does not only arouse ignorant others; a man intent on self-improvement may play the tuba to himself.

A similar cognitive and performative function can be demonstrated for Seneca's Latin version of Cleanthes' adaptation of Polyxena's words in Euripides' play *Hecuba.*[98] Seneca, and similarly also Arrian's Epictetus (*Ench*. 53 and elsewhere), recommend the poem as an effective exercise, which implies that the poem is to be spoken repeatedly. Like the hymn in my interpretation, the poem is a prayer in which a first-person speaker directly addresses God. If spoken by a someone who really means what he is saying, it constitutes an act of assent to Fate and thus a necessary condition or a constitutive element of the agreement that is the good life. We no longer have any context for Cleanthes' original, but it is very likely that both this poem and the hymn (*SVF* 1.527 and 537) were composed with a similar purpose in mind. Seneca, at least, hints at a connection by alluding to the hymn when quoting the trimeters of *SVF* 1.527 (Thom (2005) 35, 72). Unlike the Greek original but similar to the hymn, the speaker of the Latin version addresses God as father (*parens*), and in this address and the embedding comments Seneca includes attributes that are missing in *SVF* 1.527 but read like a condensation of the first part of the hymn.[99] The parallels extend even to the deixis that implicitly encourages the reader to look at the evident manifestations of the divine and see for themselves.[100]

Seneca's adaptation of the prayer *SVF* 1.527 occurs at the end of the letter preceding *Ep.*108, which discusses ways to communicate philosophy, presents Cleanthes' take on the matter, raises the issue of implict knowledge that needs to be activated, and contrasts effective, meaningful speech with the use of language as mere verbiage without intending what the uttered words mean. This juxtaposition of themes

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98 *SVF* 1.527, based on Eur. *Hec.* 345-348, 369, as Praechter (1908) saw; Sen. *Ep*. 107.11; Thom (2005) 26, 71; for further discussion and bibliography, see Wildberger (2006), ch. 3.3.2.1 and Pià Comella (2016).

99 107.10 *Iouem, cuius gubernaculo moles ista derigitur*; 107.11 *parens celsique dominator poli*; 12 *de ordine mundi.*

100 107.10 *hunc operis pulcherrimi cursum*; *moles ista.*

and quotations from Cleanthes is yet another piece of evidence justifying the thesis that Cleanthes' poetology was concerned with cognition as a physiological process that required striking (τύπωσις, πληγή) and tension (τόνος) and that Seneca's own understanding and use of poetic form is indebted to the older Stoic.

According to Cleanthes, poetry is capable of reinforcing ethically relevant cognition because it increases the tension of language and thus creates stronger impressions. Those impressions direct the recipient's attention to the right objects of cognitive focus, such as the good and the divine. Seneca takes up and develops these ideas with further reflections on the mechanisms of these psychological phenomena. High-tension impressions create more permanent memories from which concepts can be generated. They also reactivate existing natural concepts, the "seeds of virtue" by connecting with them, hitting them more forcefully than the impressions created by ordinary speech, eliciting the recipient's assent, and thus causing affective states that further the recipients' progress toward virtue. When the recipient identifies with the speaker of the poem or speaks it himself, he rehearses the use of the concepts thus reactivated and learns to turn the utterance heard and repeated into his own meaningful speech act, moral judgment and thus, for a Stoic, moral action. It would exceed the scope of this paper to analyze how the poetology of these two thinkers, especially also the pragmatics they envisage for poetic speech, shapes Seneca use of meter and aesthetic form in his œuvre overall. Greater clarity about Cleanthes' role may, however, help to disentangle the different strands of Stoic and rhetorical influences that shape Seneca's artistic projects and his ideas about it.

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