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Memory and Imagination: From Aristotle's Silent Speech to Euripides' Tragic Utterances

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ABSTRACT

Memory and Imagination

The aim of this study is twofold: to elaborate on Aristotle's nexus of memory, "mental speech", and *phantasia* in relation to sensation pursuing the implications of such view, i.e., the relevance of the individual's experience and the consequent individualization of memory and its content (section 1), and to look at a selection of Euripides' tragedies (namely*, Trojan Women, Iphigenia in Aulis,* and *Medea)* where this nexus is made explicit in the characters' utterances and exploited for the creation of pathos (section 2). I will show that Euripides uses the tragic characters' awareness of past happy experiences (i.e., their personal memory) to deepen the sense of loss and misery that accompany their fall into misfortune; and he does this in a nontechnical way that anticipates the Aristotelian linking of memory and imagination.

Key words: Memory - Imagination - Sensation - Aristotle -Euripides - Speech - *Pathos*

In the treatise *On Memory and Recollection* (hereafter *On Memory*), Aristotle's treatment of memory (*mnēmē*) is bent to his overall interest in comprehending living beings' life (humans included) as stemming from sensation[1]. In line with the treatise *On Sense* where memory appears in a series of affections common to body and soul[2], *On Memory* claims that it belongs to the primary perceptive part (*prōton aisthētikon*)[3]. While these attributions extend the possession of memory to nonhuman animals, Aristotle's ad hoc discussion engages the use of memory in the array of cognitive capacities available to the human being. He discusses memory in relation not only to sensation, which animals share with human beings, but also to thought, which is exclusive to humans: he claims that "when a man is exercising his memory he always says (*legei*) in his mind (*nous*) that he has heard (*akouein*), or felt (*aisthanesthai*), or thought (*noein*) it before (*proteron*)[4]." Hence the perception of time is crucial to Aristotle's definition of memory, and only the nonhuman animals provided with such perception are endowed with memory[5]; but in the case of human beings, Aristotle also recognizes a discursive element: "One says in his mind," he tells us, which only the human being can do, as s/he alone possesses *logos* qua rational speech[6]. Aristotle does not elaborate on this discursive element, but he does say that in order to acknowledge mentally sensations and thoughts as objects of the past and hence to remember, the human being needs imagination (*phantasia*), which he discusses in *On the Soul* 3 "as a movement produced by sensation actively operating[7]." The aim of my study here is twofold: to elaborate on the nexus of memory, "mental speech," and *phantasia* in relation to sensation pursuing the implications of Aristotle's view, i.e., the relevance of the individual's experience and the consequent individualization of memory and its content (section 1)[8], and to look at a selection of Euripides' tragedies (namely, *Trojan Women*, *Iphigenia in Aulis*, and *Medea*)[9] where this nexus is made explicit in the characters' utterances and exploited for the creation of *pathos* (section 2). I will show that Euripides uses the tragic characters' awareness of past happy experiences (i.e., their personal memory) to deepen the sense of loss and misery that accompany their fall into misfortune[10]; and he does this in a nontechnical way that anticipates the Aristotelian linking of memory and imagination—although the philosopher will anchor memory in the sensitive part of the soul qua imaginative regardless of pathos (as suffering)[11] and in the framework of a scientific discourse that aims at a general comprehension of memory as a psychological capacity[12] and thus transcends the individual[13].

1.The awareness of memory between sensation and phantasia

For Aristotle, memory's field of reference is the past. Controversial as it may appear[14], this claim stems from a physical conception of life that centers on sensation and radiates from immanence[15]. If sensation is of what is present (*to paron*), memory is of what happened (*to genomenon*)[16]. In *On Memory* Aristotle introduces this fundamental distinction with a preliminary discussion, pointing out that

> *no one could claim to remember the present while it is present. For instance, one cannot remember a particular white object while one is looking at it, nor can one remember a subject of theoretical speculation while one is actually speculating and thinking about it. One merely claims to perceive the former and to know the latter. But when one has knowledge or sensation without the actualization of these faculties, then one remembers: in the former case that he heard or saw it or perceived it in some other such way; for when a man is exercising his memory he always says in his mind that he has heard, or felt, or thought this before*[17].

Sensing an object of vision or speculating on a theoretical subject are not acts of remembering but actualizations of the human being's capacities to sense and think. Nobody would say that s/he is "remembering" a white object or a problem while actually seeing that white object or thinking about that problem. Significantly, in this passage the reference to a particular "white object" (*to leukon*) for the act of seeing is reminiscent of the treatment of the incidental sensibles in *On the Soul* 2.6, where Aristotle inscribes the cognition of specific entities within the range of sensation[18]. There we learn that to see in "the white thing" the son of Diares constitutes sensing an incidental sensible-that is, an object of sensation incidental to the special object of sight constituted by the color white. Memory, then, is activated when sensing and thinking are not: its work depends on the absence of these activities and related objects but presupposes their existence. Thus, while Aristotle clarifies the position of memory vis-à-vis knowledge and sensation, he also seems to stress, with respect to sensation, memory's reliance on the incidental sensibles and the range of entities a human being has grasped through sensation but is currently not continuing to sense. Memory is about objects that are absent because located in the experiential past of the person who remembers. And while providing the awareness of a past cognitive act or of a past object[19], memory enables the human being to supersede the present and becomes the locus of an expanded awareness that accounts for the lived life in a way that enacts its animal nature and will be further clarified in the upcoming pages. Suffice here to recall that memory has to do not with the intellect or thought, which are disembodied and which only humans possess[20], but with the sensitive part of the soul humans share with (many) other animals, and hence involves the body and its movement[21].

In the passage above, to express the expanded awareness afforded by memory Aristotle moves from endoxic practice to doctrine and appeals to different orders of statements: first to utterances by a hypothetical individual in a sort of test case, and then to speech that is internal to the human being itself. Indeed, at first Aristotle secures a distinct role for memory in respect to sensation and knowledge, telling us that "no one could claim (*phēnai*) to remember the present while it is present" and that "one merely claims (*phēnai*)" to perceive the object of sensation and to know the object of knowledge while engaging in these activities[22]. But then he discusses the activity of memory itself, claiming that when one remembers, "he always says in his mind (*legein nōi*) that he has heard, or felt, or thought this before." And while Aristotle does not further

elaborate on this mental speech[23], we should be cautious to take it as a mere rhetorical device inasmuch as the conclusion of his treatment of memory returns to an inversely related verb. That is, that one may doubt (*distazein*) whether one is dealing with actual objects of memory also seems to refer to a form of internal dialogue[24]. Perhaps Aristotle does not further discuss this discursive element because for him memory is a capacity that human beings share with the other animals, and pursuing a human trait in the phenomenology of memory would have undermined its common possession by humans and animals alike[25]. Still, as with "one says" (*legein*), that "one doubts" (*distazein*) regarding the subject of actual objects of memory continues to show the individual nature of memory and its dependence on the lived life of a given human being, while also pointing to memory as the awareness of one's past.

Memory awareness is thus expanded self-awareness, and Aristotle's remark that memory consists in one's awareness of her own past reflects the interest he has shown in discussing sensation in terms of the awareness of being the subject of sensation while sensing, i.e., in the present. For toward the end of his treatment of the *aisthētikon zōon* (the living being qua sentient) in *On the Soul* 3 he states that

> *since we can perceive that we see and hear, it must be either by sight itself, or by some other sense*[26].

In the argument that follows, Aristotle problematizes this alternative (whether one perceives oneself to be perceiving via the same organ of perception or another one) but ultimately indicates that the self-referentiality of the act of sensing pertains to the same act of sensing, while in the treatise *On Sleep* he attributes it to a common sensorial power (*koinē dynamis*)[27], i.e., the common sense residing in the heart[28]. Be that as it may, in relation to sensation too, awareness is interlaced with self-awareness[29], and in answering the difficulty pertaining to the consideration that the sense itself is what senses both its object and the act of sensing it[30], Aristotle begins to build the foundations of his study of memory. For he reveals that even when the objects of sensation are gone, "sensations (*aisthēseis*) and images (*phantasiai*) are still present in the sense organ[31]." This detail is key to understanding the working of memory, as *mnēmē* is made to depend on the retention of a living being's actual sensations and "things that are imaginable" (*phantasta*)[32]-a feature we will discuss in the following pages.

Past and absence are two interrelated factors that define the objects of memory and its activity vis-à-vis sensation's. In fact, the question of how memory can involve objects that are absent is a pressing problem for Aristotle:

> *It is obvious, then, that memory belongs to that part of the soul to which imagination belongs; all things which are imaginable* (phantasta) *are essentially objects of memory, and those which necessarily involve imagination* (phantasia) *are objects of memory only incidentally. The question might be asked how one can remember something which is not present, since it is only the affection that is present, and the fact is not. For it is obvious that one must consider the*

> *affection which is produced by sensation in the soul, and in that part of the body which contains the soul—the affection, the lasting state of which we call memory-as a kind of picture* (zōgraphēma)*; for the stimulus produced impresses* (ensēmainetai) *a sort of likeness of the percept (*hoion typon tou aisthēmatos*), just as when men seal with the signet rings. Hence in some people, through disability* (pathos) *or age* (hēlikia)*, memory does not occur even under a strong stimulus, as though the stimulus were applied to running water; while in others owing to detrition like that of old walls in buildings, or to the hardness of the receiving surface, the impression* (typos) *does not penetrate. For this reason the very young and the very old have poor memories; they are in a state of flux, the young because of their growth, the old because of their decay . . . Now if memory really occurs in this way, is what one remembers the present affection, or the original from which it arose? If the former, then we could not remember anything in its absence; if the latter, how can we, by perceiving the affection, remember the absent fact which we do not perceive? If there is in us an impression* (typos) *or picture* (graphē)*, why should the perception of just this be memory of something else and not of itself? For when one exercises his memory this affection is what he considers and perceives. How does he remember what is not present? This would imply that one can also see and hear what is not present. But surely in a sense this can and does occur. Just as the picture on the panel is at once a picture* (zōon) *and a portrait* (eikōn)*, and though one and the same, is both, yet the essence of the two is not the same, and it is possible to think of it both as a picture and as a portrait, so in the same way we must regard the mental picture* (phantasma) *within us both as an object of contemplation in itself and a mental picture of something else*[33].

Memory has to do with the affections of sensation that persist in the body, and these lasting affections are "images" (*phantasiai*)[34] or "appearances" (*phantasmata*) of sensations, which are gone. So how can they be considered in terms of the lived experience, and hence of the past, rather than in terms of the lasting affections, which are actually present (in the body)? To answer this question Aristotle returns to an elaborate set of comparisons drawn from the art of painting. The lasting state of the affection produced by sensation is a kind of picture (*zōgraphēma*), and what happens in the case of memory is similar to what happens with regard to a picture on a panel, which can be considered both as a picture (*zōon*) disconnected from reality and as a portrait (*eikōn*) representing a given entity. That is, the human being can merely contemplate the images resulting from past sensations as images disconnected from the past; but s/he can also connect them to her lived experience (e.g., what is now gone and absent), hence turning them into objects of memory. This operation presupposes an optimal body constitution: neither dry nor in flux. Only in such a physiological state is one apt to retain the affections that derive from sensations, making them available as images (*phantasmata*) covered by the double "reading" just discussed.

Because "things that are imaginable (*phantasta*) are essentially objects of memory," *phantasia* and related objects play a fundamental role in the exercise of the latter. And while the comparison with the art of painting discussed above seems to suggest that memory might deal only with quasi-visual representations[35], the causal definition of *phantasia* as "a movement produced by sensation actively operating[36]" denies it. The lasting affection of a scent or a sound (in the case of special sensibles) does not in-

volve pictorial images of these sensations; rather, it requires only representations that make accessible the now-gone sensations in their own specific nature, olfactory and acoustic. That is, the representations afforded by *phantasia* must be quasi-olfactory and quasi-acoustic. In this respect, it may perhaps be useful to revert to Aristotle's abstract definition of sense as reception of the form without matter, and more specifically of the *logos* (i.e., proportion between extremes) of the sensible object in *On the Soul* 2 12[37]. Broadly speaking (i.e., without getting into details that would be irrelevant to the present discussion), the lasting affection of sensation that produces the objects of *phantasia,* namely *phantasiai* and/or *phantasmata,* must consist in a retention of that *logos* through the body's physiology in its optimal state. For in explaining both the mechanism of the sense in *On the Soul* and the working of memory with the objects of *phantasia* in *On Memory*, Aristotle reverts to the same analogy of wax that receives the impression of the signet-ring[38]. Both sensation and *phantasia* have to do with *sēmeia* (signs), and so does memory albeit by relating such signs to the past. Thus, given the adoption of the same analogy for both the sense and the memory, and the very genealogy of memory from sensation via *phantasia*, memory emerges as intimately tied to the individual's experience and thus personal. Hence, to reaffirm a point made at the beginning of this essay, for Aristotle the awareness of having being the subject of past sensations and thoughts is constitutive of the capacity to remember, but not because, as Sorabji reminds his critics[39], to remember having seen something before entails that "one remembers her seeing of it." The use of *legein* in Aristotle's discussion of memory[40], on the one hand, and the parallel with sensation, on the other, challenges such a contemplative gesture. For in connecting the images persisting in the body with the past, one becomes a locus of an awareness that preserves, through the sensation of time, the lived life- and not by seeing the past encounter but by being aware of having been the subject of that encounter. All in all, Aristotle's stress seems to lie more on the human being's capacity (and the capacity of any other living being endowed with memory) for an expanded awareness, transcending sensation's circumscription to the present, than on the "contemplation" of the past encounter and related subjectivity.

As for the content of memory, we have seen earlier that it relies on everything that can be imaginable-that is, "images" or, better, "representations" provided by *phantasia* both in relation to sensation[41] and as instrumental to thought[42]. It is interesting, then, to ask, what is the range of such "imaginable things"? As I noted earlier, in distinguishing memory from sensation Aristotle's reference to a particular "white thing" indicates an incidental sensible[43], while the use of the deictic (*touto*) in his discussion of memory[44] leaves it open: it may relate to all the senses that are naturally within a human being's reach, i.e. proper and common, besides the incidental, qua objects of imagination[45]. Thus, conceived of in terms of the wider perceptual network that makes up living beings' life, *phantasia* relates to the perceptual fabric of a given ani-

mal, human and not, and must be fundamentally synesthetic. True, Aristotle does not pursue the personal aspect of *phantasia* and how it lets the lived past emerge in its individual-bent sensorial constellations. He is more interested in a general discussion of the relation of memory to *phantasia* and in resolving the impasse that memories are indeed of the past, as well as (in a parallel line of inquiry) in assessing the role memories (*mnemai*) play in the acquisition of experience (*empeiria*) and human knowledge (*epistēmē*)[46]. By contrast, personal memories along with images of the lived past are a crucial component of Euripides' dramatic art, discussed in the next section.

2. The Tragedy of Happy Memories

In *Poetics* Aristotle defines Euripides the most tragic (*tragikotatos*) of the poets, a superlative he awards to him based on the preferential direction of the tragic change: Euripides' plots tend to represent a change from good fortune to misfortune rather than the opposite[47]. But one also notes another complementary tendency. That is, whether the fall is impending or has already been consummated, the tragic character's sense of loss and consequent suffering are further extended and aggravated by the resurgence of memories that bring back a happy past in stark contrast with a miserable present. In her discussion of the development of memory in fifth-century tragedy, Simondon has considered the pathos-producing effect of such remembrances as characteristic of Euripides[48], but much remains to be explored in relation to the personal nature of memory in Euripidean drama and its contribution to the characters' identities as well as its materiality. In other words, within the framework of this trope (i.e., the appeal to a happy past to underscore the unhappy present), characters remember what is constitutive of their own identity, and for each character the exacerbation of pathos is accomplished through an evocation of images from their personal past often catalyzed by and around specific situations and objects. Such an evocation verbalizes the mental speech mentioned by Aristotle in *On Memory*, discussed above, and conveys the awareness of being the subject of one's past but in a way that fulfills the tragic requirements of eliciting the audience's pity and fear through the poetic representation of the characters' pathos. In sum, in Euripides personal memories are exploited in view of their tragic effects. In the pages that follow I will focus on selected expressions of personal memory in *Trojan Women, Iphigenia in Aulis*, and *Medea* and analyze their charged dramatic role, further pursuing, when appropriate, the existential import attached to the capacity to remember.

A central figure in *Trojan Women*, Hecuba is a symbol of both Troy's demise and its people's fall into misfortune. In her first utterance, she recounts the sea-journey of the Greeks to the bays of Troy, which leads to the murder of Priam, the city's fall, and her unhappy lot, hence interlacing a piece of collective memory with her own[49]. Then she incites the chorus to lament the burning of Troy, saying that like a mother-bird over her brood she will initiate the strain. But she leads off, "as Priam leaned upon

his scepter, with the confident beat of chorus' leader's foot in praise of Troy's gods[50]." To the song of lamentation for Troy, Hecuba juxtaposes the one she sang in a festival when Priam was still alive, his royal power (symbolized by the scepter) intact. Similar contrasts between the present (and immediate future) and the past recur over and over in *Trojan Women*, and it is Hecuba herself who explains to the chorus the technique's dramatic potential as she recognizes that the awareness of the past heightens the *pathos* and attracts the greatest pity:

> *My desire therefore is first to sing of my blessings. For in this way I shall make my woes seem the more to be pitied. I was of royal blood and married into a royal house. There I gave birth to children of great excellence, no mere ciphers but preeminent among the Phrygians. No woman, Greek nor yet barbarian, could boast that she gave birth to their like. These sons I beheld slain by the Greek spear, and I cut my hair before the tombs of the dead. Their father, Priam, I did not lament from the report of others: I myself, with these eyes, saw him slaughtered at the household altar, saw too my city captured. The virgin daughters I raised to be deemed worthy of husbands of great station I raised for others' benefit, and they have been taken from me. I have no hope that I shall ever see them again or they me. Last, to put the capstone to my misfortunes, I shall go to Greece as an aged slave woman…They will make me lay my aged back on the ground after sleeping in royal beds* (basilika demnia)*, my broken body dressed in tattered rags, a disgrace for the prosperous to wear. Ah, unhappy me, what suffering I have and shall I continue to have because of a single marriage of a woman! ...Lead my once-graceful foot* (Habros pous)*, now enslaved, to my pallet on the ground and my stony bedding so that I may fall upon it and waste to death, worn down with weeping. Consider no prosperous man blessed until he dies*[51].

Of royal birth and married into royalty, the queen Hecuba had the finest children. Now all is lost: status, husband, and sons. Her daughters will soon be lost too, as they will be assigned to the Greek conquerors. Polyxena is already missing. Hecuba's speech unfolds in a series of counterpoints, staging the happy past against the grim present and even worse future. Her fall from her past blessings and what they consisted in[52] is pressingly underscored and magnified through the remembrance of her individual losses, and the ensuing denial of hope. Hecuba witnessed the murders of her sons and mourned for them cutting her hair, and she saw the killing of her husband at the altar. And as she claims to have seen these events and performed the ritual lamentation, she remembers them. Covered by rags and lying on the ground, she imagines her future tasks as slave of a new Greek master and swiftly envisages tokens of her old glamour: the royal bed (*basilika demnia*), and her graceful foot (*Habros pous*) walking on the streets of Troy. These images connected to the past and others anticipating the future conjure up Hecuba's frail, precarious situation, poised between the lost status and the upcoming enslavement. Rehearsing a kernel of Herodotean wisdom, the old queen finally admits that nobody can be labeled happy before s/he dies[53].

The evocation of happy memories increasing the character's pathos characterizes Andromache's speech too, but in a way that mobilizes gloomy existential considerations:

> *Not to be born is the same, I say, as to die, and to die is better than to live in pain. For <one who is dead> feels no <more> pain <than those who have never been born> since he has <no> sense of his troubles. But the man who enjoys good fortune and then falls into misery feels his spirit straying* (alatai) *from the scene of former joys* (eupraxia)[54].

Here Andromache is attempting to comfort Hecuba about the news she has just reported to the old queen: that Polyxena, her daughter, is dead. Andromache presents a series of contrasts that stage life against death, and memory against oblivion, with relative shortcomings and benefits. Rather than implying loss of life, death in this discourse is equated to the stage before birth, to the tabula rasa of unlived experiences, while life is associated with memories[55]. For Andromache the dead are not affected by the awareness of past miseries, but the living are, and their pain consists in the wandering of their soul away from the former happiness (*eupraxia*) [56]. Thus the process of memory is expressed figuratively as a movement of the soul from *eupraxia*, which literally means "doing well"[57] and, in light of the characters' actual memories in this tragedy, refers to the living conditions afforded by a noble and wealthy status, rich in harmonious family relationships and affections (i.e., husband and children)[58]. Andromache considers death better than life because it destroys the capacity to remember, as if human life is indissolubly accompanied by the memories of the (happy) past and the only way for a human being not to remember is to die. Polyxena's death is a happier fate than Andromache's life, doomed as she is to remember what she has lost forever. As for her individual memories, they pertain to Hector's house, where she gave birth to her child[59]. There she resided, living a chaste life far from gossips engaging in a respectful and balanced relationship with her husband[60]. With the house's destruction and Hector's death, this life is hopelessly lost, and the memories of it make the present unbearable. Even as she ponders her impending future as Achilles' concubine and slave, Andromache still copes with her ineludible memories. Wholehearted acceptance of life with Achilles would indicate a detachment from her dead husband and hence a loosening of her memory, a fact that would rank her below the irrational animals, for even horses continue to remember their mate and do not tolerate to draw the yoke when separated. But the tie with Hector is still so alive and the memory of her shared experience with him so strong that Andromache addresses him as if he were there, once more linking in a shrill contrast the most emblematic scene from her wedding (i.e., the journey from her father's house to that of her husband) with her bleak upcoming enslavement:

> *In you, beloved Hector, I possessed a husband that sufficed me, great in intelligence, in birth, in wealth, and in courage. You received me as a virgin from my father's house and were the first to yoke my maidenhood in love. And now you are dead, while I am going by ship to Greece as a captive to bear the yoke of slavery. Does not Polyxena's death, which you weep for, involve less misery than mine*[61]*?*

From the apostrophe to Hector Andromache swiftly moves to a rhetorical question for Hecuba-rhetorical inasmuch as she herself has provided earlier an answer: Polyxena

is more fortunate because she has stopped living and hence remembering. Hecuba does not answer Andromache but gives her advice on how to behave with her new master in the hope that Astyanax might one day refound the city of Troy.
Accordingly, when Astyanax is thrown down from the walls of Troy and killed by the Greek army, Hecuba's last hope shatters. Her lamentation at that point is overwhelming and, in tune with Euripides' dramatic strategy discussed so far, interlaced with tender family scenes:

> *Dear child, what an unlucky death was yours! If you had attained manhood and marriage and godlike kingship and attained manhood and been killed defending the city, you would have been blessed, if blessedness lies in any of these things. As it is, though you are aware that you have seen these things and known them in your imagination, my child, you are unable to get the enjoyment of them for yourself. Poor child, how terribly your father's walls, fortifications Apollo built, have shorn your curls upon your head which I so often tended, so often smothered with kisses! That is where, with your bones shattered, the blood now appears in a smiling gash, to speak the ugly truth plainly. O hands, how sweet is your resemblance to your father's hands, but now you lie all slackened in your joints! You often uttered grand promises, dear lips, but now you have perished, and it was a cheat when you used to fling yourself into my robe and say "Grandmother, I shall cut a great lock of curls for you and bring gatherings of my agemates to your tomb and speak loving words of farewell." For now you are not burying me but I am burying you, who are younger, I an old woman with no city or children and you an unlucky corpse*[62].

Astyanax has been robbed of his royal future and the joys that were in store: manhood, a beautiful marriage, and power. But he has also been robbed of his own mother's ritual lamentation. It is his grandmother who now performs the funerals, and as she looks at the dead child for the last time, her mind goes back to fragments of past happiness, or, in Andromache's words "wanders away from them." The contrast is dreadful. The child's locks remind Hecuba of Andromache's caresses, his small hands of Hector's, and his closed mouth of the promise he made her while falling into her garments, in a physical proximity that points to their intense affection. Astyanax promised his grandmother to cut many locks at her funeral and to mourn for her, but his tragic destiny has led to an overturning of roles: she now mourns for him. Hecuba also remembers her motherly gestures, how often she kissed the child and nourished him and her sleepless nights, stressing the futility of her care, as the child did not make it to adulthood. Andromache entertained similar thoughts. Once she learned that her child was destined to die, she lamented that it was for nothing that she had breastfed him[63].
With a touch of Euripidean irony, Astyanax will be buried in his father's shield, which was unable to protect him in life but will still shelter his dead body. And as the hands of the child have reminded Hecuba of Hector, so the shield presents the vestiges of the hero who carried it: the old queen observes,

> *How fair upon your handle lies his imprint, and on the rim that circles around are marks of sweat, that trickled often from Hector's brow as he pressed it against his beard in battle's stress*[64].

The shield handle shows the signs of Hector's hand, the rim those of his forehead. Hector is dead and gone, but his presence and valor are recalled to Hecuba's mind by the marks he left. Hence, in Euripides' dramas memory has a materiality: its arousal is intrinsic to the objects, features[65], and spaces[66] that continue to exist evoking the characters' memories attached to them. In this case, Hecuba may not have seen Hector fighting, but she associates the marks of his sweat on the shield with the image of the hero she preserves. In *Trojan Women* even Cassandra in her delirium shows a moment of lucidity when she throws the garlands of Apollo to the ground. This gesture marks her withdrawal from the festivals, which the garlands symbolize and which brought her joy in the past. With the garlands gone, the material token of memory dissolves, and perhaps Cassandra's memories likewise soften too[67].

In *Iphigenia in Aulis* too, memory and its objects are used to intensify the characters' pathos. We find this trope elaborated in a direct way: with the appeal to actual images from the past, as in *Trojan Women*, but also in an indirect way, as projections into the future of imaginary scenes disconnected from the personal experience[68]. After having envisioned the slaughter of men and the ensuing pain of their women, soon to occur in Troy, the chorus of Greek women says,

> *May no foreboding ever come to me or to my children's children like that to be felt by the gilded Lydian women and the wives of the Phrygians as by their looms they say to one another, "What man, tightening his grasps on my luxuriant hair to make me weep, shall pluck me from my perished fatherland[69]?"*

The chorus sympathizes with the Lydian women anticipating the apprehension they will express when they await to know who will take them away. Embraced by destruction and standing by their looms, the Lydian women will see the forced departure from their fatherland with the metaphor of plucked (*apolōtilizein*) flowers. Thus the chorus wishes they and their descendants may never suffer the same experience. And in a similar fashion (i.e., projecting into the future memories associated with events yet to be realized), Clytemnestra addresses Agamemnon, who has agreed to immolate Iphigenia for the sake of the expedition against Troy, imagining her own life in a house that will remind her of her absent daughter:

> *Come, if you go on campaign, leaving me in the house, and are there for a long time, what kind of heart do you think I will have in my breast at home when I see the chair of your daughter empty, and her maiden chamber empty, and sit alone in tears, always bewailing her[70]?*

Clytemnestra knows that when she returns to Argos, Iphigenia's chair and bedroom will keep evoking her memory of Iphigenia (and of her death by the father's hand), sparking unbearable pain. With the chair and room left empty, a void inscribes the places where Iphigenia used to be, making her absence tangible–a claim that again points to the materiality of memory[71].

But it is Iphigenia herself who evokes powerful memories of her actual past (happy and promising even more happiness), punctually recalling gestures and words in a desperate attempt to persuade Agamemnon to change his mind and spare her. She tells him,

> *I was the first to call you father, and you called me your daughter first of all. I was the first to be dandled on your knees and to give and receive that dear joy. You used to say, "Shall I see you happy in your husband's house, living a flourishing life worthy of me?" And I used to say as I hung about your chin, the chin I now grasp with my hand, "And how shall I see you faring, father? Shall I lovingly receive you into my house as an old man, father, repaying you for the toil of my nurture?" I remember these words, but you have forgotten them and wish to kill me*[72].

Iphigenia reminds Agamemnon that she was the first of his children to play with him and the first to have entertained a relationship based on reciprocal affection. She reminds him of his own words, and how he questioned anxiously whether he would have been able to see her married and feel proud about it. In this scene Agamemnon's chin itself becomes a locus of memory: if Iphigenia now grasps it to supplicate her father, in the past her proximity to it represented the affection between father and daughter[73]. And because Agamemnon's current behavior contradicts his words, Iphigenia claims that he does not remember them anymore. Oblivion makes him a different person. Now her father wants to kill her rather than see her flourish. So, in the end, much like Astyanax in *Trojan Women*, Iphigenia will be robbed of her future and the enjoyment of *eupraxia*[74] and, ultimately, of the stored images of a lived life that provide the material for happy memories.

As for *Medea*, the evocation of personal memories plays an important role in the creation of Medea's pathos and memories themselves are reconsidered and invested with a new affectivity in light of the current events–that is, Jason's betrayal and Medea's consequent fall into misfortune. In the play Medea's first confrontation with Jason is central to her remembrance process. She reviews one by one the actions she performed to help him succeed–she killed the dragon, provided an escape for Jason, abandoned her father, and murdered Pelias in Iolchos destroying his house. As she recalls her deeds, she imagines the sinuous coils of the sleeping dragon but also claims agency for an action she in fact did not perform: *she* killed Pelias[75]. As Medea lists her actions, the contrast between her past dedication to Jason and his current betrayal emerges as the most acute and her fall into misfortune as most dramatic: abandoned by Jason and facing exile, she does not have anywhere to go. Now, *a posteriori,* her betrayal of father and fatherland takes on a new light. Throughout the tragedy, Medea regrets having done this, as if she realizes that happiness and security–what Andromache in *Trojan Women* will call *eupraxia*– belonged to her place of origin, in Colchis, and that they are irremediably lost[76]. Emblematic of Euripides' attention to his characters' diverse psychology and thought, Medea's set of experiences is revisited and anticipated by the nurse's initial account of the events that led to her fall in Corinth. Locating

Medea's serial actions in a wider "historical" perspective that connects them to the original cutting of the pine trees on Mt. Pelion (providing the Argonauts' oars), the nurse disinvests Medea of her agency: Medea sailed away on the boat, having been struck by Love; she did not kill Pelias but persuaded his daughters to do so. And the nurse's negative wish that the trees might have never been cut and that Argo might have never reached Colchis seems indeed to conjure up the view that before Jason's arrival Medea's life was good and susceptible to happy developments.

As for the materiality of memory, in *Medea* it is Medea's body itself that becomes at once both an object and a subject of memory. And while this strategy can be interpreted in terms of theatrical gestures[77], it also underscores the complexity of Medea's character, dramatizing her intimate dilemma and pointing to the extreme nature of her ultimate crime. After listing the deeds accomplished for the sake of Jason, reviewed above, Medea mentions the forgotten marriage oaths and says,

> *Respect for your oaths is gone, and I cannot tell whether you think that the gods of old no longer rule or that new ordinances have now been set up for mortals, since you are surely aware that you have not kept your oath to me. O right hand of mine, which you often grasped together with my knees, how profitless was the suppliant grasp upon us of a knave, and how we have been cheated of our hopes*[78].

Medea addresses her own hand recalling Jason's previous acts of supplication. The hopeless hero supplicated Medea many times grasping her right hand and knees, and subsequently took his oaths promising her what he eventually disavowed[79]. Thus, Medea's hand stands as an object of memory materializing the remembrance of Jason's ritual approaches and subsequent oaths. Yet the hand is also, and strikingly, a subject of memory: like Medea, it has been deprived of the hopes raised by Jason's promises[80]. Not a mere rhetorical device, this doubling of subjects anticipates the most charged scene of the play[81], the one that precedes Medea's murder of her children. The heroine has just expressed to the chorus her fierce decision, which will spare her children from being murdered by a "less kindly hand." She continues,

> *They must die at all events, and since they must, I who gave them birth shall kill them. Come put on your armour, my heart. Why do I put off doing the terrible deed that must be done? Come, wretched hand, take the sword, take it and go to your life's miserable goal. Do not weaken, do not remember that you love the children, that you gave them life. Instead, for this brief day forget them–and mourn hereafter: for even if you kill them, they were dear to you*[82].

Determined to pursue her plan but procrastinating in the deed, Medea asks her heart (*kardia*) to win all resistance and arm itself (*hoplizesthai*)[83]. She then incites her hand not to play the coward and not to remember (*anamnēsthai*) the children but forget them (*lanthanesthai*). Only by forgetting that she had given them birth and hence her motherhood and love, can she (i.e., the hand) kill the children. With magisterial art, in this scene too Euripides doubles the subjects that reveal Medea's inner conflict. In

other words, in this synecdoche Medea's hand represents the hesitating mother, who loved the children and now has to kill them by suppressing for a day her own memory, and hence her identity, while a larger-than-life, all-observing Medea speaks. Crucial for Euripides' conception of Medea's responsibility (not discussed here) this scene centers on the awareness of having performed one's action (an awareness intrinsic to memory and here attached to the hand) and casts into words the silent speech, mentioned by Aristotle in *On Memory*, connecting memory to *phantasia*: "Medea's hand" has to forget "the children and that she was giving birth"–where the stress on "the continuity of the process" seems to express the relative pain (and courage) Medea experienced at that time and still remembers[84].

To conclude, from Aristotle's discussion in *On Memory* to the selection of Euripides' dramas discussed in this essay, memory is conceived to stem from one's lived life and to be intertwined with imagination: in Aristotle because, programmatically, all things that are imaginable are essentially objects of memory, and *phantasia* is enduring sensation; in Euripides, because characters are staged *tout court* as subjects of memory bringing back scenes, people, and objects of their own past to create an utter contrast with their present. Conceived of as such, for both authors memory is essentially personal, and the silent speech which in Aristotle denotes the awareness of having been the subject of one's own past gives way in Euripides' dramas to the characters' utterances about their former *eupraxia*. Euripides is a poet, however, and uses personal memories to create pathos in a variety of ways: in combination with historical memory, as hypothetical recollections of events yet to happen, and as recollections invested with a new affectivity or displaced onto a "split" subject. Prominent in his misfortune-oriented dramatic art is the materiality of memory, and this too is mobilized in different ways: memory may gravitate around past objects, or may forever be objectified in a part of the character's own body, and is often tied to what still remains, inscribed with an overwhelming absence[85].

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1. For the contextualization of Aristotle's treatment of memory in his "enquiry of living things," see King RHA, Aristotle and Plotinus on Memory. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter; 2009. pp. 20-22.
2. de Sens. 436a6-10; cf. DA 403a3-25.
3. De Mem. 450a14, 451a16-7; cf. 449b30. For a discussion of the primary perceptive part as a unity that encompasses perceptive and imaginative capacities as conceptually distinct and that constitutes the cognitive non-rational part of the soul, see Gregoric P, Aristotle on the Common Sense. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 2007. pp 102-107.
4. De Mem. 449b22-24. All translations of Aristotle's On Memory and Recollection are by W. S. Hett from the Loeb edition.
5. De Mem. 449b27-30.
6. Aristot. Pol. 1 1253a9-18.
7. DA 3 429a1-3. Interestingly, in the same treatise phantasia is also claimed to be the capacity that enables animals to communicate (DA 2 420b31-3).
8. The position argued for in this part of the essay is close to Annas' in her seminal article about memory and the self, in which she argues for Aristotle's mnēmē as personal memory (1999), but the framework is different. In starting from Aristotle's conception of living beings (human included) qua sentient and of sensation as being of the present (inasmuch as it receives the "current" sensorial stimuli from the environment), the line of inquiry pursued here does not problematize the fact that for Aristotle memory is of the past (see Annas J, Aristotle on Memory and the Self. In: Nussbaum M, Annas J (eds), Essays on Aristotle's De Anima. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1992. pp. 297-311. Sorabji R, Aristotle on Memory. Providence RI: Brown University Press; 1972 and more recently Castagnoli L, Is Memory of the Past? Aristotle on the Objects of Memory. In: Castagnoli L, Ceccarelli P (eds), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2019. pp. 236-57); see section 1 below.
9. The order of discussion of Euripides' plays does not follow the chronology of their composition but instead reflects a systematic analysis of the dramatic, pathos-producing role of memory: the Trojan Women (415BC), dated after Medea (431BC) and before Iphigenia in Aulis (405BC), is the first tragedy to be discussed because in Hecuba's words it presents an implicitly programmatic statement on such a role, which it then elaborates with regard to the other female characters in the play.
10. For a discussion of the mythical and doctrinal elaboration of memory in archaic Greek poetry, see Simondon M, La mémoire et l'oublie dans la pensée grecque jusqu' à la fin du Ve siècle avant J.-C. Paris: Belles Lettres; 1982, part 2 and 3, who pursues the transformation of this notion in tragedy and its "new individualizing role," remarking, among other features, on its different uses in Sophocles and Euripides. For the first, memory is a source of drama,

for the second of pathos. In this essay too I pursue the pathos-producing role of memory, but I further explore its imaginative content so as to see in Euripides an anticipation of Aristotle's technical discussion of memory as dependent on phantasia and attached to the individual.

11. Aristotle does refer to pathos in his discussion of memory but not in the technical sense of Poetics, where this notion indicates the physical and psychological suffering of the tragic characters (Poet. 1452b9-13). Rather, memory is an affection (pathos) which depends on the body physiology and which he discusses in relation to whether it can be of the past (see de Mem. 456b12-8 and the discussion below).
12. For a discussion of memory as a psychological capacity and a common state to body and soul, see Morel PM, Mémoire et charactère. Aristote et l'histoire personelle. In: Brancacci A, Gigliotti G (eds), Mémoire et souvenir: six etudes sur Platon, Aristote, Hegel et Husserl. Napoli: Bibliopolis; 2007. pp. 47-87, especially 54-60.
13. As stated at the beginning of the treatise, Aristotle's inquiry grapples with three main questions: what memory is, why it occurs, and to what part of the soul it belongs (de Mem. 449b4-7; cf. 451a15-18).
14. Sorabji R, ref. 8, p. 14.
15. See Zatta C, Aristotle and the Animals: The Logos of Life Itself. London/New York: Routledge; 2022. Chapter 4.
16. De Mem. 1 449b15.
17. De Mem. 1 449b15-24.
18. DA 2 418a20-4.
19. De Mem. 1 450a23-450b26. For a discussion of the exegetical possibilities with regard to the past as object of memory, see Castagnoli L, ref. 8, pp. 240-248.
20. For Aristotle's exclusion of the rational soul from his study of living beings and life, see Zatta C, ref. 15, chapters 1 and 3.
21. Aristotle delineates a physiology of memory based on age and body condition, see de Mem. 1 450b1-11 (quoted below).
22. For the endoxic nature of these claims, see Castagnoli L, ref. 8, p. 35 n. 4.
23. See Annas, who considers Aristotle's use of legein in his discussion of memory "an unsolved problem" (1999, 303).
24. de Mem. 1 451a.
25. There is another instance in Aristotle's psychological work of the use of legein but attributed to the actual discrimination between sweet and white (and, hence, more extensively to the difference between special sensibles), rather than to the very subject of memory, as in On Memory (see On the Soul 2 426b20-23: "That which asserts, legein, the difference must be one; for sweet differs from white. It is the same faculty, then, that asserts, legein, this; hence as it asserts, legein, so it thinks, noein, and perceives, aisthanesthai"). In this respect, it is interesting to note that like memory (see below and n. 27), the discrimination between sensibles (along with the awareness of sensation discussed earlier) is an activity of the common sense (koinē aisthēsis) and hence pertains to the human being qua animal (even if in the context of that On the Soul passage Aristotle discusses sensorial discrimination in reference to humans using the first-person plural). Given that animals have the sensation of time and are able to remember, they too must be able in some way to realize that they have been the subjects of their objects of memory.
26. DA 3 425b13-4.
27. De Somn. 445a12-26, and in particular "The special function, e.g., of the visual sense is seeing, that of the auditory, hearing, and similarly with the rest; but there is also a

common faculty (koinē dynamis) associated with them all, whereby one is conscious that one sees and hears (for it is not by sight that one is aware that one sees; and one judges and is capable of judging that sweet is different from white not by taste, nor by sight, nor by a combination of the two, but by some part which is common to all the sense organs (tini koinōi moriōi tōn aisthētēriōn hapantōn); for there is one sense-faculty, and one paramount sense organ, but the mode of its sensitivity varies with each class of sensible objects, e.g., sound and color); and this is closely connected with the sense of touch (for this is separable from the other sense organs, but the others are inseparable from it. We have discussed this in our speculations On the Soul).” For different attempts to reconcile the seeming contradiction between On the Soul (3 425b13-26) and this passage from On Sleep, see Modrak DKW, Aristotle: The Power of Perception. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1987, pp. 66-67; Johansen T, In Defense of the inner sense: Aristotle on perceiving that on perceives. Proceedings of the Boston Aera Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 2006;21(1):235-276; Gregoric P, ref. 3, pp. 174-192; Polanski R, Aristotle’s De Anima. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2007.

28. For the location of the common sense in the heart, see de Somn. 456a1-14; cf. PA 2 656b24-5.
29. See Polanski’s commentary to this chapter that “consciousness and self-consciousness are intimately related” (see Polanski R, ref. 27, p. 380).
30. For a critique of Aristotle’s line of argumentation, see Hamlyn DW, Aristotle De Anima Books II and III (with passages from Book I). Oxford: Clarendon; 2002. p. 122. (Reprinted).
31. DA 3 425b24-6.
32. De Mem. 1 450a24-5.
33. De Mem. 1 450a23-450b26.
34. On the persistence of “images” and their resemblance to sensation within a discussion of animals’ practical life, see also DA 3 429a5-8.
35. Sorabji takes the mental images involved in memory as pictorial images based on Aristotle’s claim in On the Soul that “phantasia is a process by which we say that a mental image (phantasma ti) is presented to us” (2 428a1-2) (1972, 72; 2006, ix-xiv); for a critique of Sorabji’s position, see Gregoric P, https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2006/2006.08.08.
36. DA 3 429a1-2.
37. See DA 2 424a17-29: “We must understand as true generally of every sense that sense is that which is receptive of the form of sensible objects without the matter, just as the wax receives the impression of the signet-ring without the iron and the gold, and receives the impressions of the gold or bronze, but not as gold or bronze; so in every case sense is affected by that which has color, flavour, and sound, but by it, not qua having a particular identity, but qua having a certain quality, and according to logos; the sense organ in its primary meaning is that in which this potentiality lies. The organ and the potentiality are identified, but their essential nature is not the same. The sentient subject must be extended, but sensitivity and the sense cannot be extended; they are a kind of ratio (logos) and potentiality (dynamis) of the said subject.” As Ward has explained, each special sensible (color, sound, flavor, etc.) is defined by a logos (ratio) between two extremes. For example, when a living being sees a red rose, it experiences that red color by receiving the determinate ratio (logos) of white to black that makes it (i.e., the color) up (1988, 221-2); cf. Modrak DKW, ref. 27, pp. 56-57, who takes the sensible’s logos between a pair of opposites as indicating “the unique character and unity” of the sensible quality

in a way analogous to an arithmetical logos which "assigns a single value to the relation between the two numbers". On the proportion of the sensible objects, see de Sens. 439b27, 440a13, 440b19 (about colors deriving from the different proportions of the two extremes white and black), 442a12-17 (about flavors from sweet and bitter), 442b17-19, 448a8-12. The same is true for the other special sensibles, although Aristotle is not explicit about it. Sounds are a mixture composed from acute and grave, odors from sweet and bitter, and touch from hot and cold, hard and soft, moist and dry.

38. See DA 2 424a17-25 and de Mem. 1 450a29-450b1; cf. Sassi MM, Aristotele fenomenologo della memoria. In: Ead. (ed.), Tracce nella mente: Teorie della memoria da Platone ai moderni. Pisa: Edizioni della Normale; 2007. pp. 31-33. In the first case, Aristotle says that the sense receives the sensible objects without the matter and recurs to the analogy of the wax to show this specific (i.e. formal and accurate) type of reception (hoion ho kēros tou daktyliou aneu tou sidērou kai tou khysoun dekhetai sēmeion); in the second, the analogy of the wax is appealed to in the definition of memory in relation to sensation and in a passage, quoted extensively above, that overall underscores its link to phantasia. In the relevant part we read, "For it is obvious that one must consider the affection which is produced by sensation in the soul, and in that part of the body which contains the soul-the affection (pathos), the lasting state of which we call memory-as a kind of picture; for the stimulus produced impresses (ensēmainesthai) a sort of likeness of the percept, just as when men seal with signet rings."
39. 2006, x-xi.
40. See de Mem. 449b22-24, quoted earlier; cf. 450a19-22.
41. See above.
42. If aisthētikē phantasia is common to both humans and animals, in On the Soul Aristotle discusses also a type of phantasia which is exclusive to the human being, the bouleutikē or logistikē (which Aristotle refers to without qualification in On Memory when discussing the contribution of phantasia to thinking), see DA 3 434a6-9 (and de Mem. 449b31-450a13). As Beare remarks, in human beings phantasia "cooperates with rational deliberation" and possesses rationality only by accident (kata symbebēkos), namely, in virtue of such cooperation (1906, 297-98). On the need of human thought for phantasia, see DA 1 403a8-10, 3 431a17-18, and de Mem. 449b30-450a6, where Aristotle illustrates it with geometrical reasoning. In this respect, as Gregoric remarks, Aristotle's discussion of the use of phantasia in human thinking aims to establish that memory for Aristotle should not directly be linked to the rational soul (Gregoric P, ref. 3, pp. 100-101). For a discussion of the dependency of mind on phantasia providing it with "a permanence in the sensible beings," see Whit K, The Meaning of 'Phantasia' in Aristotle's "De Anima", III, 3-8. Dialogue 1985;XXIV:498-505. On the other hand, human beings still resort to aisthētikē phantasia under the influence of emotions, disease, and sleep (DA 3 429a5-9).
43. See p. 99 above.
44. de Mem. 449b22-24, quoted earlier; cf. 450a19-22.
45. Aristotle distinguishes special, common, and incidental sensible objects in DA 2.6. Special sensibles are those grasped by their own relevant sense, colors by sight, sounds by hearing, scents by smell, and so forth. The common sensibles are not specific to any sense but graspable by them in common. Among the common sensibles Aristotle lists movement, rest, number, shapes, and size, to which in On Memory he adds time. As for the incidental sensibles, they entail the recognition of particular entities, as when one sees in that "white thing" the son of Diares. For phantasia as representing this range

of sensible objects, see Everson S, Aristotle on Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1999.

46. See Aristot. Met. 1 980a21-981a2.
47. Aristot. Poet. 1453a.
48. Simondon M, ref. 10, pp. 206-209. If, as explored in this essay, in Euripides memory is specifically invested of a pathetic role by highlighting a contrast in the characters' lives between a happy past and a miserable present and is, in this respect, predominantly personal, fifth-century drama exploits it in different ways. Besides Simondon's extensive discussion (193-256), and individual dramas' focused analyses (for instance, Jefferson's discussion of the memory of historical pain in Phrynicus and Aeschylus, Jefferson D, Shouting in Fire in a Crowded Theater: Phrinicos's Capture of Miletos and the Politics of Fear in Early Attic Tragedy. Philologos 1993;137(2):159-196 and Gerolemou and Zina's analysis of collective and individual memories and relative mediation in Euripides' Iphigenia in Aulis, Gerolemou M, Zira M, The Architecture of Memory: The Case of Euripides' Iphigenia in Aulis. Skenè 2017;3(1):59-81; see most recently Ceccarelli, who points out tragedy engagement with the audience's cultural and collective memory, and after analyzing the "selective memory" mobilized by the messengers' speeches, focuses on another dramatic use of memory, "when the latent tension between the investment in reliable remembrance and the forces of flux or indeed oblivion explodes on stage" (Ceccarelli P, Economies of Memories in Greek Tragedies. In: Castagnoli L, Ceccarelli P (eds), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2019. pp. 93-114). For a subtle distinction of memory involving the ancient audience (or modern reader) and the staged characters, and the remembered myth versus the making of myth, see Gould J, Myth, Memory, and the Chorus: 'Tragic Rationality'. In: Gould J (ed.), Myth, Ritual, Memory, and Exchange: Essays in Greek Literature and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2001. pp. 405-414, especially pp. 406-407.
49. By attaching personal memories (Hecuba's) to historical memories (the Trojan expedition) Euripides engages with the spectators' memory too, maximizing its potential for creating the tragic emotions of fear; see n. 48 above.
50. Eur. Troad. 122-52; the lines quoted above are 149ff. All translations of Trojan Women are by D. Kovacs from the Loeb edition. For the epic resonances in Hecuba's discourse on the history of Troy, see Goff B, Euripides: Trojan Women. London/New Delhi, New York/Sydney: Duckworth; 2009. p. 44.
51. Eur. Troad. 474-511, with modifications. I translate demnia as "beds" rather than "state," and the expression "who once walked so delicately in Troy, but I am now a slave" with the more literal "my once-graceful foot, now enslaved" hence pointing to the materiality of memory ascribed to the character's body itself (see below the discussion of Medea's hand).
52. Cf. lines 190-5, in which, sympathizing with the chorus' fear for the future, Hecuba worries about her own, envisaging the task of door keeper or nurse in stark contrast with her past royal honors (timai).
53. Cf. Hdt. 1 32.
54. Eur. Troad. 636-40, with some modifications (see n. 55 below).
55. Aristotle seems to be responding to Andromache's view when in Nicomachean Ethics he notes that even dead people can be minimally affected by the misery of the living. This interpretation is all the more tempting if we consider that in this same passage Aristotle distinguishes between tragedies whose "crimes and horrors" have happened earlier (as in Trojan Women) or are enacted on the stage (Aristot. NE 1 1101a24-1101b9).

56. The last line (640) of the excerpt from Andromache's speech (psykēn alatai tēs paroith' eupraxia) is crucial to understand Euripides' take on his characters' psychology and the phenomenology of memory but difficult to render and, in modern translations, has been often "improved" in a way that obliterates its original figurative meaning. See, for instance, "the man . . . is distraught in mind because of his previous prosperity" (Kovacs), "while those who have fallen from good fortune into misery are heart-sore because of the prosperity they have lost" see Morwood J (ed.) Euripides: Iphigenia among the Taurians; Bacchae; Iphigenia at Aulis; Rhesus. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1999.
57. For eupraxia along with euzōia as describing happiness (eudaimonia), see Aristot. NE 1 1098b22.
58. Prosperity (eupraxia) is also a key word in Oedipus' promise of blessings to the Athenians, their land, and followers on the reception of his dead body in the Athenian soil (Soph. OC 1554).
59. Eur. Troad. 605. Andromache's description of her past as tied to the house is inscribed in tragedy's standard portrayal of "static household bound women," discussed by Hall E, Greek Tragedy. Suffering under the Sun. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2010. p. 131.
60. See Eur. Troad. 645-53.
61. Eur. Troad. 678-80.
62. Eur. Troad. 1168-1186.
63. Eur. Troad. 760.
64. Eur. Troad. 1197-9.
65. See above the details about Astyanax' body reviewed in Hecuba's lamentation.
66. In this play the connection of memory to space is powerful. The action itself takes place in front of Troy while the city and its palace are burning hence creating an emptiness in the landscape that intrinsically contrasts with the familiar image of it held by the characters. In other words, in Trojan Women Euripides mobilizes a materiality of the absence.
67. Eur. Troad. 451-2.
68. In this respect, see Lusching's discussion of the conception of time in IA, which is not linear but, rather, moves between past and future (Luschnig CAE, Time and Memory in Iphigenia at Aulis. Ramus 1982;11:99-104, especially 104).
69. Eur. IA 785-93.
70. Eur. IA 1171-6.
71. For the affective role of objects in narratives of loss and remembrance in Euripides' Ion, see Estrin 2018, 111-32.
72. Eur. IA 1220-32. All translations of Euripides' Iphigenia in Aulis are by D. Kovacs.
73. On gendered, emotional memory in tragedy and Iphigenia's lack of experience and limited repertoire of memories, see Gerolemou M, Zira M, ref. 48, pp. 64-65.
74. On the meaning of eupraxia as involving prosperity joined with the fulfillment of family relationships, see above.
75. Eur. Med. 475-490.
76. See, for instance, Eur. Med. 31-5, 166-7. True, central to Hecuba's (and Andromache's) notion of eupraxia is a good marriage with ensuing children, but as a princess of Colchis, Medea too had possessed all the conditions necessary to attain it.
77. For a discussion of staging and how it underscored key moments in Greek tragedy, see Taplin's seminal study (Taplin O, Greek Tragedy in Action. London/New York: Routledge; 2002. Second edition); Halleran M, The Stagecraft of Euripides. London/Sidney: Croom Helm; 1985.

78. Eur. Med. 492-8.
79. Although the play is not explicit about it, we must understand that Medea responds positively to Jason's supplications by asking him to seal the ensuing transaction (her consent to help) with the oaths (see the nurse's speech, 21-3). As for the divine witnesses of Jason's oaths, Medea recalls Artemis and Themis (160-4, 208-12). Unmentioned in the play, the content of the oaths must be understood to consist in Jason's promise to be Medea's consort.
80. See line 498 where the subject of the verb kekhrōismesthai is a first-person plural referring to Medea and her hand.
81. On the transformation of the symbol of the right hand, see Flory S, Medea's Right Hand: Promises and Revenge. TAPA 1978;108:69-74, 70-2.
82. Eur. Med. 1240-50.
83. For the frequent use of kardia in Medea, see Sullivan DS, Euripides' Use of Psychological Terminology. Montreal/ Kingston/London/Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press; 2000. pp. 72-9), who notes that it may generally indicate the seat of emotions or may be associated with specific emotions such as courage, pain, fear, or love. Interestingly, when inciting her heart to put on the armor (hoplizesthai), Medea associates herself with it in delaying the murder, but when inciting her hand to accomplish the deed, she makes it the subject of the forgetting (and subsequent killing), hence maintaining at this point an ultimate dissociation from her children's murder.
84. When asking her hand to forget that she has given birth to the children, Medea uses the imperfect of tiktein, which expresses the process of giving birth rather than the act itself. Significantly, the memory of labor appears earlier in the play when, addressing the Corinthian women, Medea underscores the danger associated to giving birth claiming that "she would rather stand three times with a shield in battle than give birth once" (cf. Med. 250-1). This earlier contrast between holding the shield in battle, on the one hand, and giving birth, on the other, intensifies Euripides' use of hoplizesthai for Medea's heart in line 1242 (quoted above), contributing to the depiction of her extraordinary heroic nature. As all women do, Medea fought to give birth but now fights to suppress her children.
85. See, respectively, Hecuba's song, Medea's hand, and falling Troy, Astyanax' dead body, Hector's shield, Iphigenia's chair and room, discussed above.