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Corresponding author:
luciana.repici@unito.it

Interpreting Pain in early Stoicism

Luciana Repici

Dipartimento di Filosofia e Scienze dell'educazione
Università di Torino, Italy

ABSTRACT

A dilemma might have faced Stoic philosophers on pain: in their view, properly speaking, the only evil is vice; but how else could pain be defined, seeing that in all evidence it is the opposite of the good, hence an evil? Proviso that in their view this was a real dilemma, in which way did the Stoics try to solve it without abandoning their own basic philosophical assumptions? In any case, what they could not avoid was trying to explain the undeniable existence of pain in humans and suggest possible remedies for the evident detrimental effects that it has on the individual way of life. Could pain at least be governed, and if so, how? In what follows I shall try to reconstruct step after step the Stoics' answers to the difficult questions involved in the topic and show that their treatment of the problem is extended from ethics to physical and physiological aspects, in the end requiring from their audience an effort of comprehension: understanding the true nature of pain and hence developing the rational persuasion that pain in the body cannot, under certain conditions, be avoided but can at least be endured, while pain in the soul is human responsibility only, insofar as it depends on unsteady opinions, lack of knowledge and erroneous evaluations of a state of affairs.

Key words: Pain - Body - Soul - Nature - Knowledge - Reason

1. Introduction

In his Tusculan Disputations Cicero invites to leave aside the Stoic definition of pain:

> *Whether or not pain (*dolor*) is an evil (*malum*) let the Stoics decide, who, by their certain arguments brief and*

> *subtle and twisted and in no way apparent to the senses, pretend to conclude that pain is not an evil*[1].

The critical intent of the comment is manifest. But the Stoics might have been really faced with a dilemma. In their view, as is well known, vice is the only one evil; therefore, pain could not properly be defined as an evil. Yet, it could not be denied that there were cases in which the opposite was true either. A piece of evidence is mentioned by Cicero himself and concerns the exemplary case of the Stoic philosopher Dionysius of Heracleia. As a pupil of Zeno, he had been instructed that virtue is the only good and vice the only evil. But the pain he suffered had led him to change completely his mind and approve conversely of the standpoint that pain is an evil, arguing:

> *If I were not able to endure pain though devoting myself to philosophy just a little, this would be sufficient to prove that pain is an evil; but I spent many years studying philosophy and I am not able to endure it; therefore, pain is an evil*[2].

If this was their dilemma, how did the Stoics try to solve it? And how did they explain the evident existence of pain and its consequences on the way of life? Though inescapable for living beings, can pain at least be governed? And if so, how? In the following, I will analyse step by step the Stoics' answers to the questions that the topic implies. Taken as a whole, their answers describe a sort of brief treatise on a problem whose different aspects cover different areas of their philosophical reflection.

2. Two types of pain: names and things

In an attitude common to classical and Hellenistic era, the Stoics distinguish between pain of the body (physical) and of the soul (moral). It is named *ponos*/pain when pertaining to the body[3] and *lype/*affliction when pertaining to the soul. Of the two, however, the latter case seems to be more serious. Chrysippus connected its etymology to a dissolving power of pain:

> *In all the ways need those who ruin and have no support owing to the intensity of the affliction (*aegritudo*) to be supported. Hence Chrysippus thinks that affliction is called* lype*, a sort, as it were, of dissolution (*solutio*) of the entire man*[4].

Cleanthes rather thought of *lype* as a sort of a "paralysis of the soul"[5]. But the effect does not change: moral pain corresponds to the dangerous condition in which the soul – and the entire man with it – risks to lose itself or is unable to act or function. Besides, feeling pain in the body means suffering (*algedon*), a condition of detriment for the body analogous to such states as disability, deformity, and illnesses (*nosoi*)[6]. So, flesh aches (*odynetai*) when it is cut or burned[7]. There are, instead, much more numerous species of pain in the soul: twenty-five according to an ancient source[8], though reducible to four basic ones[9]. Apparently, affliction manifests itself in many

different ways, each of which connotes a different condition of the soul and therefore requires a different name, even if only one is the cause of them all[10]. In much more ways than the body, then, the soul suffers when it is afflicted, as affliction can be, e.g., particularly painful (*epiponos*) like grief (*odyne*) or oppressive (*barynousa*) like anxiety (*achthos*)[11].

Nonetheless, in a sense they both suffer and are affected by infirmities (*arrostemata*) analogously, as Chrysippus insistently argued[12]. For, infirmity is disease (*nosema*) accompanied by weakness (*astheneia*) and for the soul disease is "the belief that something is excessively preferable", like in the search for opinion or for pleasure, while the infirmities that affect the body are diseases such as gout or arthritis[13]. And as an alteration of blood produces in the body catarrh and bile, which diseases and sufferings come from, so in the soul the agitation of bad and mutually contrasting opinions deprives it of its health and produces in it a pathological disturbance[14]. Yet, analogy does not mean identity and there is a basic difference to be pointed out between infirmities of the soul and of the body. It consists in that

> *souls can be exposed to disease just like bodies, but the injuries (*offensiones*) of the bodies can come in without any fault (*sine culpa*), while this is not so with those of the souls. For, all the infirmities and the disturbances of the souls depend on an detachment from reason, which is why they exist in men only. Animals can act in similar ways, but do not fall into disturbances*[15].

Briefly, the infirmities in the soul are diseases that affect it when it voluntarily moves away from reason and pursues opinion in an excessive ways, as happens when it is affected by passions/emotions (*pathe*). For, this is the nature of passions: an irrational movement of the soul against nature, or even an impulse in excess, or else, according to Chrysippus at least, judgments of the rational faculty of the soul[16]. Accordingly, moral pain is, together with desire, fear and pleasure, one of the "first and principal" passions, particularly that *pathos* of the soul which consists in "the opinion of a present great evil", or rather "the fresh and new opinion of such an evil that it seems right to be worry about it"[17]. In the body, on the other hand, the capacity of being affected (*patheton*) by disturbances or infirmities cannot be separated from the capacity of perceiving by the senses (*aistheton*), by which (physical) suffering and pain (= *ponos*) are experienced sensibly[18]. It is however the singular part of the body – a finger, e.g.– that detains the capacity to be affected (acted upon), but it is the dominating part (*hegemonikon*) of the soul that detains the power to render suffering and pain perceptible[19]; for this is the faculty which produces impressions, assents, perceptions and impulses[20].

3. Physiological causes and philosophical remedies

In the body it is also localised the organ to which sufferings produced by "the passions (*pathe*) of the pain (*lype*)" converge as to their appropriate physiological seat. This is

the heart and the region surrounding it, according to Chrysippus, seeing that "no other place is co-affected (*sympaschon*) and shares affliction (*synalgoun*)" and no other is apparently involved when passions are in excess, which makes the heart jump in the chest[21]. The painful affection arises when the internal heat spreads all over the body and moves forcefully within it without a way of escaping[22]. Indeed, when too sharp, pains can be cause of death, even if not at once, just like too strong fears or too intense pleasures. This happens to individuals whose vital tension (*zotikos tonos*) is weak owing to their lack of education, and who, consequently, are subject to be affected by "strong passions/emotions of the soul"; their soul, therefore, is "easy to dissolve (*eudialutos*)"[23]. Anyway, sharp pains alter the state of the psychic pneuma because they produce an effect of lowering, or contracting, or diminishing its tension[24].

As now to the body, the story about it is almost similar. A suffering body is a diseased body, but to the Stoics too health or disease depends on a correct or altered balance and mixture of the four elemental qualities (heat, cold, dry and wet) and the relative humours constituent of the body[25]. Yet, it can be affected in three ways: by an illness (*morbus*), i.e. "the corruption of the entire body"; by an infirmity (*aegrotatio*), i.e. "an illness accompanied by weakness"; by a defect (*vitium*), that is the condition in which the parts of the body are not disposed in mutual harmony, in which case bad or maimed conformation of the parts and deformity ensue. Therefore, illness and infirmity originate from an alteration and disturbance of the health of the entire body, while defect is evident though health is in a good state. The slight difference with the soul is that in the latter it is difficult to distinguish illness from infirmity (soul does not fall ill like the body) and viciousness (*vitiositas*) in it is either a temporary disposition (*adfectio*) or a permanent state but inconstant and self-contradictory[26]. The *vitiositas* in the soul, therefore, does not correspond exactly to the *vitium* in the body, maybe in so far as the latter implies an irreversible condition. The intent seems to be excluding that the passions in the soul are vicious, that is reducible to the permanent state of vices. On the contrary, passions are mobile and this is why it is more difficult to remove them than the "the greatest vices" opposite to virtues; vices can in fact be removed while illnesses are present, for curing the latter requires much more time than eradicating the former[27]. Yet, it is as natural entities that both soul and the body analogously[28] can make experience of such state of affairs like health or disease and be affected by pain. For, they both possess properties (*hexeis*) that admit of contraries and can convert into their opposite or a privation[29] (SVF II fr. 178). So, the body can possess, e.g., illness instead of health, weakness instead of strength, a maimed conformation instead of a complete one; and soul can possess scarcity of natural endowments instead of their plenty, or badly functioning senses instead of well functioning ones[30]. The opposite of pain (= *ponos*) has, rather, no specific name but its privation (= *aponia*)[31]; which means that between them there is no reciprocal conversion, so that pain can turn in its privation and disappear, but the reverse is impossible[32].

In all evidence such events as these point to the existence of things that are contrary to nature (*para physin*) or, conversely, in accordance with it (*kata physin*). But what we are talking about are things that pertain to the class of "prime things (*prota*) by nature (*kata physin*)" (health, strength, privation of pain, beauty as well as fame or wealth), which attract our impulses and are instinctively preferred to their opposites[33]. Moreover, neither case (health or disease, pain or privation of pain) is a matter of choice, nor depends on us, but on external things out of our deliberation; indeed, to Chrysippus it was the apprehension of their external character that could grant for an undisturbed course of life and "impassivity" (*apatheia*)[34]. Nor can both opposites (strength and weakness, pain and its privation) be qualified as goods or evils; for, a good is helpful, not harmful and can be used well or badly, while they, like wealth, can be no more helpful than harmful and can be used both well and badly[35]. Pain particularly, as Chrysippus[36] and even Seneca[37] argued, is not an evil, seeing that an evil is harmful and what is harmful makes one worse; but pain, like poverty, does not make one worse; therefore, pain is not an evil. Then, it is not that a maimed conformation, pain or diseases are things to be refused (*pheukta*) and harmful; rather, "nature renders us extraneous (*allotrioun*) to some things and familiar (*oikeioun*) to their opposites"[38]. We are faced, conclusively, with "indifferent" species of things, i.e. things that, like health and disease, all the bodily goods and the most part of external ones, do not contribute either to happiness or to unhappiness. And as they can be used well or badly indifferently, they therefore have no influential power on the right use of virtue as the only one good and on the bad use of vice as the only one evil[39]. In Zeno's view

> *feeling or not feeling pain does not make any difference for a perfectly happy life, which is posited in virtue only, but it has to be rejected. Why? Because it is sharp, contrary to nature, difficult to endure, dim and hard*[40].

Could we say at least, as Zeno himself and Chrysippus did[41], that the opposite possesses of health or absence of pain are to be included in the species of indifferent things that are "preferred" (*proegmena*) because of their value, rather than in the species of things "not-preferred" (*apoproegmena*) because of their disvalue? In a polemical attitude, Aristo of Chios, a pupil of Zeno, disagreed on that[42]. In his view, qualifying health and everything similar in terms of a preferred indifferent would mean qualifying it as a good and conferring it a value, while among things such as these that are neither goods nor evils and refer to particular circumstances, there can subsist no difference nor any preference for one instead of its opposite. But, whichever the case, the reduction of physical pain to an indifferent should disaggregate bodily sufferings from the anxiety about its harmful consequences. For, pain neither does benefit us, like the good, nor is harmful in rendering us worse, like the evil, all the more so, obviously, if health and disease are equally declared completely indifferent. If pain is estimated as the greatest evil, the reason is its asperity, which makes it seem an anticipation of

death[43]. And it can be, in fact, a cause of death, but only if it is exceedingly acute and affects subjects whose weak tension in the soul weakens their capacity of resistance[44]. Anyway, admonitions and exhortations to endure would be of no use; the nature of pain has, as Aristo of Chios would have argued, its own definite time: if acute, it does not last and, if it lasts, is not acute. When faced with it, we have rather "to accept with strength what the necessity of universe orders us"[45].

On the other side, the reduction of moral pain to opinions or erroneous judgments of reason should resolve the anxiety about the possibility to remove from the soul its opinions on evils from which affliction originates; for affliction is but "the opinion of a great evil presently existent" or even, more precisely, "the fresh opinion of such an evil that it seems right to worry about it and of an evil about which it is opined that he who suffers from it must be worried"[46]. As a comfort to such afflictions, therefore, Cleanthes found it a duty to explain simply that affliction is not an evil[47], while Chrysippus argued that the very point in comforting someone suffering from affliction was eliminating from his mind the opinion that he "fulfilled a right and due obligation"[48]. But giving comfort does mean to free soul from passions that affect it owing to a distortion (*diastrephesthai*) of the reason[49], and cause in it, just like in the body when it is not healthy, infirmities by which its judgments and opinions are no more coherent, nor sound or well-founded[50]. It could not be excluded, according to Chrysippus[51], that by the time the fire of passions receded; but if the judgment and the opinion, from which passions derive, persist, the problem is not yet solved. Instead, passions should be eradicated[52] and the erroneous opinions should be replaced by true knowledge. A threefold therapy was needed: the cognition of the cause, the cognition of how a passion can be removed and, last but not the least, "the exercise of the soul and the habit to be able to attain the right purposes"[53].

4. Pain and the human condition

Pain therefore, both physical and moral, in a sense can be rationalized; quite another story to avoid or eliminate it. An further complication is the existence of a "proneness" (*euemptosia*; lat. *proclivitas*) to disease", which is said to be able to affect body and soul analogously: as a body is more or less prone to certain disease at risk of falling ill, so the soul "inclines" to passions or actions contrary to nature at risk that, by consolidating, they become habitual affections and infirmities[54]. Does such proneness designate the direct cause of the origin of illnesses in the body and of infirmities in the soul? Admittedly, health and disease in the body have been told to depend on its natural constitution and on the right balance of its elementary components. Proneness to disease could be, then, if any, a concomitant or indirect, not a determinant cause. As to the passions in the soul, on the other hand, Chrysippus made them depend on a "distortion of the reason" caused by the "persuasiveness" of the external things or

by the influence of those whom we are in contact with[55]. Proneness rather was in his view an infirmity by itself, just like a body prone to fever is easily affected by it[56]; and inclination was how passion manifests itself at first[57].

Indeed, proneness might suggest a sense of fragility in the body and in the soul as well. After all, in the body the tendency to fall ill may be the sign of a weak and delicate constitution, which may make worse the course of a certain illness and harder the strategy of defence for a recovery. In the soul, education must be operative and the tension adequately strengthened, if dying by affliction, or something even more acute than affliction, has to be avoided. Yet, to succeed, the firm possess of the virtue of magnanimity (*megalopsychia*) is required[58], i.e. the science subordinate to courage, which makes them aware of being elevated "over the events that pertain in common to both good and bad human beings"[59]. But is it easy to reach such a high level of virtuous impassivity? Nor is proneness in the soul only to virtue, as Zeno had stated[60]. According to his pupil Aristo of Chios, there was in the soul also proneness to errors[61]. In his view, this was one of the causes of the distortion of the reason at the origin of passions, and it was a cause internal to the soul, not external like those admitted by Chrysippus, who instead evaluated as "not-distorted (*adiastrophoi*)" the impulses coming from nature[62].

In the wise man (*sophos*) only any such difficulties would be overpowered, but in his condition reason, knowledge and virtue would be firmly and irrevocably perfect and complete. Then, in comparison with the foolish men (*phauloi*) that are the great majority of human beings, he would appear a somehow paradoxical or fabulous exception[63] and the conclusion might be drawn that he hardly exists[64]. But in fact he would make no error; indeed, he would be infallible[65], and also impassive (*apathes*) because unerring (*anemptotos*), but in no way hard or insensitive as the fools[66]. Only in his soul there would be no passions, nor consequently any infirmities[67]. Hence, in his soul no proneness to disease should exist either. Posidonius objected to Chrysippus that the causes of the passions could not be only external and that a proneness to disease in the soul too should be assumed. But – we might say – the objection could value in cases where soul manifests inclination to passions, which however is not the case of the wise man. Posidonius objected also to the use of the analogy between the health of the soul and the health of the body. In his view, such an analogy would be only partially applicable. For, as in the wise man it is soul that displays perfect health, while no such perfection can be found in the physical health of a body always prone to diseases, health in its physical sense could belong to fools only and their infirmities in the soul would be either states of physical health accompanied by proneness to disease or physical illnesses directly[68].

But – we might say – the analogy could rather suggest that soul and body suffer similarly, with a difference however: that sufferings in the soul can be removed if passions are eradicated or, at least in the wise man, do not affect soul from the beginning, while

bodily affections and physical pain cannot be avoided (they do not depend on us), nor always come to an end by cures, and the painful state of affairs of the body goes on. Admittedly, Chrysippus said that the wise man also suffers (*algein*), but he is never oppressed with anguish because his soul never yields[69]. His condition is such as no fear, torture, acute pain and even death force him move away from his duty and right purposes[70]. But if he were affected by too hard pains or incurable illnesses, or else his body were maimed, he would be reasonably (*eulogos*) authorized to commit suicide[71].

Conclusions

Summarizing, the treatment of the theme, to my knowledge never explored in its specificity and completeness, shows that attention was paid to the problem in the school, perhaps also in opposition to Epicureanism and its conception of pain as the supreme evil. The division between physical pain and moral pain identifies the soul and the body as both exposed to suffering and explains the sense of an analogy between them. If accepted, the analogy can help to establish a correspondence between painful states of the body and the soul, but it does not eliminate decisive differences between them: first, physical sufferings are a fact of sensory perception, while those of the soul are an emotional and passionate fact. Secondly, the pain of the body is something that is experienced because of an alteration in the state of health of the body and does not depend on our will, while the pain of the soul is determined by our opinions about things or events and the judgments we make of their value. By analogy, the presence in the body of a proneness to disease, and therefore to the suffering that would follow the onset of the disease itself, should also have a counterpart in the soul. But as in the body the physiological causes seem to be the determinant ones, so in the soul it would not be the proneness to fall prey to passions that would be the determinant cause for their onset, but our way of relating to things, events or even people. Of the two, moral pain manifests itself in a multiplicity of ways and in disparate passions, which cause affliction in the soul by weakening its strength and tension. But physical pain can also have deleterious effects because of its intensity, if not its duration. This suggests that soul and body share a condition of fragility if certain conditions are not given, i.e., health for the body and tension of the psychic pneuma for the soul.

To their audience, the Stoics present a way out that is not easy and, particularly in the case of the body, not definitive. The affliction of the soul can be overcome if opinions are converted into their opposite, that is, into knowledge, but the soul must be constantly exercised. The pain of the body, on the other hand, requires a reflection on good and evil: if one understands its irrelevance with respect to what is truly good (virtue) and truly evil (vice), it will not cease for that, but at least one can bear it with a strong mind and dignity. But the work in this case seems to be much harder.

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1. Cic. Tusc. II 42.
2. Cic. Tusc. II 60 = SVF I fr. 432.
3. Stob. Ecl. II 80, 22 = SVF III 136, p. 33, 10 Arnim.
4. Cic. Tusc. III 61 = SVF III fr. 485. Cf. Plat. Crat. 419c.
5. Stob. Ecl. 108, 59 = SVF I fr. 575.
6. Plut. Comm. not. 4, 1060c = SVF III fr. 146.
7. Gal. CAM 7 = SVF II 420, p. 138, 7 Arnim.
8. Ps. Andronicus De passion. I 1-4, 223-224 = SVF III fr. 414.
9. Nem. Nat. hom. 19 = SVF III fr. 416.
10. Cic. Tusc. III 83 = SVF III fr. 419.
11. Diog. Laert. VII 111 = SVF III fr. 412.
12. Cic. Tusc. IV 23 = SVF III fr. 424; Gal PHP V 2-3 = SVF III 470-472.
13. Diog. Laert. VII 115 = SVF III fr. 422. Cf. Cic. Tusc. V 26 = SVF III fr. 427; Sen. Ep. 75, 11 = SVF fr. 428.
14. Cic. Tusc. V 23 = SVF III fr. 424.
15. Cic. Tusc. IV 31 = SVF III fr. 426.
16. On these definitions see Diog. Laert. VII 110 = SVF I fr. 205; Gal. PHP V 1, IV 3, III 5 = SVF I fr. 209-210; Stob. Ecl. II 7, 10 = SVF III fr. 378; Diog. Laert. VII 110-111 = SVF III fr. 412 and 456; Gal. PHP V 1 = SVF III fr. 461; Gal. PHP IV 5 = SVF III fr. 479.
17. Cic. Tusc. III 24 = SVF III fr. 385.
18. Gal. CAM 7 = SV F II FR. 420, p. 139, 5-13 Arnim.
19. Aët. IV 23, 1 = SVF II fr. 854; Plot. Ennead. IV 7, 7 = SVF II fr. 858.
20. Aët. IV 21, 1-4 = SVF II fr. 836.
21. Gal. PHP III 7 = SVF II fr. 899, p. 248, 1-6 Arnim. See also Gal. PHP III 5 = SVF I fr. 210.
22. Gal. Caus. puls. IV 3 = SVF II fr. 875.
23. Gal. Loc. aff. V 1 = SVF II fr. 876.
24. Gal. Loc. aff. IV 3 = SVF III fr. 877. See also SVF III fr. 391-392, 394, 463.
25. Gal. Adv. Jul. 4 = SVF I fr. 132 = SVF II fr. 771; Gal. PHP V 2 = SVF III fr. 471 and 471a.
26. Cic. Tusc. IV 29 = SVF III fr. 425. Cf. Gal. PHP V 2 = SVF III fr. 471, p. 120, 31-121, 3 Arnim.
27. Cic. Tusc. IV 32 = SVF III fr. 430.
28. Cic. Tusc. IV 30-31 = SVF III fr. 279.
29. Simpl. In Cat. 388, 24 = SVF II fr. 173 and cf. 177-179; Stob. Ecl. II 70, 21 = SVF III fr. 104.
30. Diog. Laert. VII 102 = SVF III fr. 117. On other examples see SVF III 127, 129, 135-138.
31. Cic. Tusc. IV 14 = SVF III fr. 438, p. 107, 18-19 Arnim.
32. Simpl. In Cat. 401, 6 = SVF II fr. 178.
33. On the topic cf. SVF III fr. 1\40-145.
34. Epict. Diss. I 4, 27 = SVF III fr. 144.
35. Diog. Laert. VII 102 = SVF III fr. 117.
36. Plut. Comm. not. 25, 1070e = SVF III fr. 455.
37. Sen. Ep. 85, 30 = SVF III fr. 166. Cf. Gell. Noct. Att. XII 5, 4 = SVF III fr.168.
38. Plut. Comm. not. 4, 1060e = SVF III fr. 146.
39. Sext. Emp. Math. XI 59 = SVF III fr. 122.
40. Cic. Tusc. II 29 = SVF I fr. 185.

41. See Zeno in SVF I fr. 192-194; Chrysippus in SVF III fr. 27, 137, 191.
42. Sext. Emp. Math. XI 63 = SVF I fr. 361; Cic. Fin. III 50 = SVF I fr. 365.
43. Cic. Leg. I 31 = SVF III fr. 230.
44. Gal. Loc. aff. V 1 = SVF II fr. 876.
45. Sen. Ep. 94, 7 = SVF I fr. 359, paraphrasing Epicurus' remark on the nature of pain in fr. 446 Usener?
46. Cic. Tusc. III 29 = SVF III fr. 465 and cf. III fr. 444.
47. Cic. Tusc. III 76 = SVF I fr. 576.
48. Cic. Tusc. III 76 = SVF III fr. 485.
49. Diog. Laert. VII 89 = SVF III fr. 228; see also III fr. 381, III 472.
50. Cic. Tusc. IV 30 = SVF III fr. 279.
51. Gal. PHP IV 7 = SVF III 467.
52. Sen. Ep. 116, 1 = SVF III 443; Hieron. Ep. 132 = SVF III fr. 447.
53. Clem. Alex. Strom. VII 17 = SVF III fr. 490.
54. Stob. Ecl. II 93, 1 = SVF III fr. 421.
55. Diog. Laert. VII 89 = SVF III fr. 228.
56. Gal. PHP V 2 = SVF III fr. 465.
57. Stob. Ecl. II 93, 1 = SVF III fr. 421.
58. Gal. Loc. ff. V 1 = SVF III fr. 876.
59. Diog. Laert. VII 92 = SVF III fr. 265.
60. Cic. Fin. IV 47 = SVF I fr. 189.
61. Sen. Ep. 94, 13 = SVF I fr. 359.
62. Diog. Laert. VII 89 = SVF III fr. 228.
63. Plut. Stoic. rep. 17, 1041f = SVF III fr. 545.
64. Sext. Emp. Math. VII 32 = SVF III fr. 657.
65. Diog. Laert. VIII 122 = SVF III fr. 556.
66. Diog. Laert. VII 117 = SVF III fr. 448.
67. Cic. Acad. post. I 38 = SVF I fr. 207; cf. Cic. Fin. III 35 = SVF III fr. 381.
68. Gal. PHP V 2 (p. 294, 32-296, 36 De Lacy) = Posidonius fr. 163 Edelstein-Kidd = SVF III fr. 465.
69. Stob. Flor. 7, 21 = SVF III fr. 574.
70. Lact. Div. inst. V 13 = SVF III fr. 577; Gell. Noct. Att. XII 5, 4 = SVF III fr. 168.
71. Diog. Laert. VII 130 = SVF III fr. 757.