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Michael Moran, The end of British politics? Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 104.

The end of British politics? is the last work by Michael Moran to have been published in his lifetime. The title plays on the ambiguity of the word "end", which - in the context of this discussion - is to be understood more in the sense of direction or purpose. The period under examination dates from the foundation of the British state with the Act of Union in 1707, and describes the creative role played by statecraft in "re-imagining" British identity (or national ideology) in order to ensure identification with the state in moments of crisis and constitutional flux, rejecting an overly teleological or accretive approach.¹ Hence also the question mark in the title: far from coming to an end, the state is constantly reinvented by its political actors who - through the agency of statecraft and notably *rhetoric* - persuade social actors of their interests.² This is a subject of particular relevance in the light of the constitutional crises represented by the recent referendums on Scottish independence (2014) and membership of the European Union (2016). In both cases, the metropolitan elites have found it difficult to "imagine" (argue) the case for "staying" or "remaining" in positive terms, relying instead on what in the latter case became known as "project fear".

So the 18th century was a period in which the affirmation of a Protestant identity was foremost, in resisting a Catholic Europe and the military and economic might of France in particular. As Burke put it, writing in 1790, "religion is the basis of civil society". The Act of Settlement (1701) had ensured the exclusion of Roman Catholics from the monarchy and there was no tolerance of religious minorities. In particular, Moran defines this Protestant identity in terms of providentialism and messianism. The British are a "chosen people", standing alone against the Continental threat (and here lie the seeds of today's Eurosceptic rhetoric). Their vocation lay in trade - in particular global trade - which continued to expand as the loss of the American colonies in the second half of the century coincided paradoxically with the opening up of new opportunities in the Far East.

Moran defines statecraft as the practice which allowed differing versions of providentialism and messianism to prevail at different historical moments. As Empire grew in the 19th century, British identity underwent its first re-imagining. The Catholic threat had subsided, and at home religious minorities began to be readmitted into civic life. The monarchy started to play a more public, ceremonial function, mobilising newly enfranchised public support with the trappings of imperial grandeur. Protestantism became less important as such (though the ceremonies of the Church of England were culturally interwoven with the elite establishment at all levels) and the emphasis shifted onto what was seen as the "civilising mission" of the British people.³ This was typified by the attitude of contemporary historian John Seeley in his description of the British as a global people.⁴

This idea of Britishness prevailed well into the 20th century. Prime minister Joseph Chamberlain was strongly influenced by Seeley's views, as indeed was Winston Churchill. The need to mobilise the population for total war led to the democratic enfranchisement of both women and men after the First World War. But the elite became more metropolitan: in the inter-war period government was modernised

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¹ Here he cites Renan (1882), "Forgetting, indeed historical error, are essential in the creation of a nation" in *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation*? (Section 1, paragraph 8), available at:

https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Qu%E2%80%99est-ce_qu%E2%80%99une_nation_%3F. He also invokes Anderson's notion of nations as imagined communities, see Anderson B. (1991), *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, (2nd ed.), London: Verso.

² Following Cowling M. (1971), *The impact of labour 1920–24: The emergence of modern British politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

³ As Kenyan novelist Ngugi wa Thiong'o put it, "The Bible paved the way for the sword" (1964, p. 57). Ngugi T. (1964), *Weep not child*, Heinemann Educational Books, London.

⁴ Seeley J. (1883 / 1971), The expansion of England, University of Chicago Press, London.

and centralised, and the new BBC became a powerful tool for creating consensus, as seen in its role in suppressing the General Strike of 1926. Although the government had already begun to address the inevitable question of Indian independence prior to the Second World War (the unravelling of Empire was inevitable after WWI), decolonization was only implemented in 1947.

The new civic ideology which emerged with the post-war settlement was primarily the result of Labour's ousting of the Liberals as the main rival of the Conservatives in the two-party system. It obtained a sweeping majority (its first) in the 1945 elections under the leadership of Clement Attlee, who had campaigned on a platform of social inclusion, promising the reforms which led to the creation of the British welfare state, of which the National Health Service has emerged as the most emblematic example. Moran defines the notion of Britain as "pioneer of the welfare state" and "mother of parliaments" as a *fresh imagining*, this time suggestive of participation in society through the exercise of duties and entitlements. This was a narrative with the power to supplant the previous narratives of Protestant providentialism and imperial messianism.⁵ Another example of re-imagining is the way in which the Royal Family (as opposed to the individual monarch) was cultivated as a source of affective citizen attachment (later running into problems with the decline of elite cohesion and the resulting inability to control the press).

This settlement of social citizenship started to crumble in the 1970s, as oil shortages and economic decline made it increasingly difficult to fund the entitlements of the welfare system. Margaret Thatcher and her successors, including Tony Blair's New Labour, saw the answer in market liberalisation and financial deregulation, accompanied by a wholehearted involvement in the economic - if not political - development of the European Economic Community, later to become the European Union. Government and the civil service were modernized, becoming more professional and accountable, along with the institutions of civil society such as universities, which were made increasingly transparent (but with a consequent decline in elite cohesion). A European dimension was being added to the British identity, but meanwhile other tensions were emerging.

Self-determination in Northern Ireland was skilfully achieved in 1998 under Tony Blair, with the Belfast Agreement. It was always more likely that peace would be achieved under a Labour government, as the Conservatives were dependent for their majority, then as now, on the support of the Ulster unionists. Meanwhile Scotland and Wales had been pressing for autonomy, and devolution agreements were struck in the same period, but without similar settlement. Along with European membership, these agreements have however contributed to the general trend towards more open and codified arrangements in public life, the party system included. The SNP gained a majority in the new Scottish parliament in 2011, followed by the closest of calls in the referendum for independence held in 2014. Two years later the European referendum revealed a similarly divided electorate, this time with a majority voting to leave. But the result in the latter is actually a result of regional centripetal forces within England, with the post-industrial areas expressing their lack of identification with those metropolitan areas (primarily the London-Oxford-Cambridge hub) which are integrated into the globalized, service-driven economy. The City is the financial capital of Europe and it is dominated by mainly foreign companies.

One of the consequences of the "rolling back" of the state, followed by Great Financial Crisis, is that this metropolitan identity is finally being challenged by voters. Post-industrial malaise in places excluded from digital global development is a common pattern in many advanced economies, with the decline of the domestic supply chain. This, combined with devolution, has led to a crisis in the nationwide representativity of the traditional political parties. Moran cites Seeley's reference to Sweden as a post-imperial power which has since renounced its global mission. While Seeley cited Sweden in order to provide an unfavourable contrast to Britain's "global" role,⁶ Moran suggests that Britain might take a leaf out of Sweden's book in coming to terms with its post-imperial status, via radical decentralisation. He argues that the English regions, like Scotland, need to assert their own identities, as a prerequisite for political mobilisation and policy innovation.

Moran is pessimistic about the currently prevailing ideology of military providentialism, styled by

⁵ Here Moran challenges Marshall's (1951) description of social citizenship as a natural historical development of earlier civic and political rights. Marshall T. H. (1951), *Citizenship and social class; and other essays*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. ⁶ Seeley, 1883 / 1971.

Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin as the "special relationship" with the United States, i.e. a vocation to partner the US in the policing of the Pax Americana. This identification is perhaps unsurprising in a country which is the second largest exporter of defence products and services, and has the fifth largest defence budget. The ability of such interventionism to mobilise popular consensus was evident in the aftermath of the Falklands War in 1982, but it has also led to the disasters of British involvement in Iraq in 2003 (Chilcot, 2016) and Libya in 2011, which Moran also attributes to the failure of the military elite to modernise.⁷

Afterword. Michael Moran (1946-1918) was Professor of Government at Manchester Business School (Manchester University). Co-author of the classic textbook *Politics UK* (1990; sixth ed. 2006) and author of *Politics and governance in the UK* (2005; third ed. 2015) he was a leading authority on British government and public policy, publishing key texts on regulation. The last work to which he contributed, *The foundational economy: the infrastructure of everyday life,* was published in August 2018 by Manchester University Press.

⁷ CHILCOT J. (2016), *The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Public Inquiry*, 6 July, available at: https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123122743/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/