

John Douthwaite  
University of Genoa

## Tracking the Mind in Edith Wharton's Writing

### Abstract

This paper carries out a close reading of a short extract of an Edith Wharton story using the tools of stylistics. The objective is to demonstrate that Wharton's fundamental aims are to investigate the mind and to show how mind and society are inextricably intertwined. This she does by employing subtle linguistic means to vary the 'degree of focalisation' on the character in order not simply to guarantee the faithfulness of the mode of speech and thought presentation employed at each point in the text, but also to unveil the nature of the character's thought processes at that given point in the text, thereby distinguishing between the character's presentation of the Self in everyday life and his private musings, the latter being of two types: unconscious or inchoate thought or conscious thought which the character is fully aware of. It will be shown that each 'type of thought' reveals different aspects of the character's personality and that each type is identifiable through specific linguistic means which Wharton reserves for each thought type. Thus, in addition to providing an analysis of the character's personality and how society has impinged on his personality, the paper also constitutes a theoretical investigation of the methodological tools employed by Wharton.

Keywords: cognition, emotion, speech and thought presentation, conceptual metaphor, pragmatics, projection, mind and society.

### *1. Introduction: Wharton's theory of writing<sup>1</sup>*

In her book on writing technique, *The Art of Writing Fiction* (1924/1997), Edith Wharton devotes the first chapter, "General", to what, in her view, are the major issues in creative writing. The first section of the chapter is

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<sup>1</sup> My thanks go to Mick Short for his feedback on the application of STP categories in the text analysed. Naturally, any mistakes are mine.

devoted to identifying what she holds to be the central feature of the modern novel:

Modern fiction really began when the “action” of the novel was transferred from the street to the soul; and this step was probably first taken when Madame de La Fayette, in the seventeenth century, wrote a little story called *La Princesse de Clèves*, a story of hopeless love and mute renunciation in which the stately tenor of the lives depicted is hardly ruffled by the exultations and agonies succeeding each other below the surface (p. 7)

### *1.1. Mind and emotion*

The first quintessential point to note about her theorising is that in defining the change of the focus of the novel from the “street” to the “soul”, or from “incident to character”, (ibid 14), namely from external to internal, from action and events to thought and feeling, Wharton sees the investigation of the mind and emotion as the central subjects of modern fiction.

Wharton insists on the centrality of mind and emotion as theme by tracing the development of its treatment in the novel and short story over time. From Madame De La Fayette, she moves on to the Abbé Prévost, then on to Balzac and Stendhal, with a small backward step to the tragedies of Racine, then forward again to Maupassant and Zola, to end with stream of consciousness writers, the latter technique being the second quintessential point of interest for present purposes.

### *1.2. Stream of consciousness as technique*

#### *1.2.1. Internal and external*

Two aspects of Wharton’s thoughts on stream of consciousness are central to my analysis. First, as Wharton herself points out in the quotation below, this technique is not new, that is to say, it is not the preserve of the modernists. The use of Speech and Thought Presentation (STP) forms such as Free Indirect Thought (FIT), Direct Thought (DT) and Free Indirect

Speech (FIS) is now recognised as having been established long ago. For instance, Herman (ed.) (2011) provides a panorama of STP use in British literature from Old English to Postmodernism, while various stylisticians show STP forms at work in texts other than literary, such as newspapers (e.g. McIntyre & Walker 2015).

Second, Wharton analyses the nature of the technique:

The stream of consciousness method differs from the slice of life [method of Zola] in noting mental as well as visual reactions, but resembles it in setting them down just as they come, with a deliberate disregard of their relevance in the particular case ...

This attempt to note down *every half-aware stirring of thought and sensation, the automatic reactions to every passing impression*, is not as new as its present exponents appear to think. It has been used by most of the greatest novelists ... [when] it happened to serve their general design: as when their object was to portray a mind in one of those moments of acute mental stress when it *records with meaningless precision a series of disconnected impressions*. The value of such “effects” in making vivid a rush of tidal emotion has never been unknown since fiction became psychological (p. 13, my emphasis)

What I wish to stress about Wharton’s theorising is not simply the notion of “just as they come”, which reiterates in concrete, mundane terms the basic constituent William James (1890) identifies with his metaphors “river” or “stream” of consciousness, but the “half-aware stirring of thought and sensation, the automatic reactions to every passing impression ... when it [the mind] records with meaningless precision a series of disconnected impressions”, for these reactions and the “meaningless precision of a series of disconnected impressions” reveal themselves to be anything but “meaningless” and “disconnected” when scrutinised carefully, in psychoanalytical fashion, so to speak, as in Wharton’s work. They thus constitute one of the major sources of ‘information’ to understanding the way the mind works.

However, Wharton does not limit her analysis to conveying (hence disclosing) these thoughts and impressions, (viz. sensations and emotional turmoil) through words and (reported) thoughts, but also, and highly significantly, through describing actions.

One particularly cogent instantiation of Wharton's probing of the mind by reporting unconscious or semi-conscious (hence seemingly non-deliberate) actions, (and/or even minute details composing an unconscious action), revealing a state of mind or an emotion that will emerge from the analysis below is the deep significance of an apparently "disconnected", 'precise' detail provided by the prepositional phrase "away from his writing-table" in the third sentence of the text to be analysed. When such disconnected yet precise details, (the two adjectives implying the details referred to are apparently unimportant, irrelevant), are investigated in depth, they enable the reader to identify focal stable or transient features of the character under scrutiny. Thus, one way of seeing Wharton's theorising in *The Writing of Fiction* is as an analysis of her own technique.

### *1.2.2. The importance of external as signifying internal*

Before proceeding to the third quintessential point concerning Wharton's theorising, the role of outer activity (behavioural acts) as an indicator of inner activity (thoughts and emotions) must be investigated further since the importance attributed to action as an indication of mental states by researchers in a variety of domains has increased considerably in recent years.

In the literary field, Fludernik (2011) proposes a consciousness-representation model with seven categories in analysing English Medieval literature. Her first category is labelled "Descriptions of Gestures and Other Behaviours Indicative of Emotional States" and is described as follows (p. 75): "descriptions of gesture and physical movement [are] indicative of emotional disturbance, what I would like to call narrative indexes of interiority. This correlates with what psychologists call affect display. It is an extremely natural category ... We all observe other people express their emotions in body language". One example Fludernik provides is the (translated) sentence from the thirteenth-century romance *King Horn*, "They took the children, who were wringing their hands, to the beach". Here the wringing of hands is interpreted as conveying despair.

If we move on to laboratory experimentation in cognitive psychology, then we find a theoretical leap forward from classic Behaviourist psychology in the claim that one can “non-inferentially see others’ mental states” when observing others’ actions (Becchio *et al.* 2017). In other words, what was believed to be unobservable, (hence not open to scientific investigation), – the brain and its workings – because it was ‘hidden’ in the skull, and therefore required inferencing from observable behaviour now becomes “direct perception”, that is to say mental states may be observed “as long as mentalistic information is available in the stimulus” (ibid: 12). Direct perception is thus hypothesised as follows: “*Perception of a mental state from a given behavior is ‘direct’ insofar as the features of the observed behavior predict the mental state an observer will perceive*” (ibid 12, original emphasis). From this definition, Becchio *et al.* draw the following conclusion: “A key advantage of this formulation is that it turns the issue of ‘direct’ perception into one that is empirically addressable. If a definable and measurable relationship between movement features and perceived mental states can be established, then perception may be qualified as ‘direct’. In this case, direct would no longer define the nature of perception, but instead would relate to the perceptual efficacy of available mentalistic information.”

Now “perceptual efficacy” is significant as their “key” criterion since what Becchio and her co-researchers are interested in are not simply “theoretical considerations [but also] potential impact in application, the range of applications spanning from social signal processing to human-robot interaction (e.g., making humanoid robots’ movements more predictable for human partners)”.

This interest is borne out by the type of action the research group monitored in the experiment: grasping. One may grasp a bottle to “accomplish one of four possible actions: pouring, displacing, throwing, or passing” (ibid 5). This is possible because movement kinematics convey “specificational information” enabling the discrimination of intentionality (ibid 6). Two points are immediately relevant here. First, great weight is placed on the nature of the stimulus, a kind of return to pre-Austinian and

pre-Gricean ‘literality’ in linguistic terms, with a consequent reduction in the number and difficulty of the mental processing operations required to reach an interpretation (and consequently a reduction in meaning potential or ambiguity of the signal – see Douthwaite 2000). This, of course, suits the machine environment nicely, when the options are limited and readily programmable. Second, the authors admit that deciding whether a person is going to pour from a bottle or throw it at someone is a relatively straightforward case compared to ‘observing’ emotional states and other types of intentions. Nevertheless, like many of their colleagues working in this area, they believe that such ‘observation’ will be possible in future. Nissan, for instance, is working on the prototype of a Brain-to-Vehicle technology in which the car can ‘read’ the human brain and thus anticipate the driver’s reactions, cutting down his reaction times and enabling safer and more comfortable driving.

The analysis of “Diagnosis” that will be offered in section 2 will demonstrate that action is indeed a significant indicator of mental activity, but not exactly in the ways hypothesised by Fludernik on the one hand and Becchio *et al.* on the other. By way of introduction to my theses, I comment on the validity of the two theoretical positions on action sketched out in the preceding analysis by succinctly anticipating two Whartonian examples that will be investigated in depth below.<sup>2</sup>

With regard to Fludernik’s stance, her Medieval example “They took the children, who were wringing their hands, to the beach” is comparable to Wharton’s expression “He drew a great breath of relief”. In both Fludernik’s utterance and Wharton’s utterance, a certain amount of inferencing is required to achieve comprehension, though perhaps less so in Fludernik’s example, since ‘wringing one’s hands’ has a conventional

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<sup>2</sup> What follows is not intended as a criticism of Fludernik’s and of Becchio *et al.*’s position, but rather as an important expansion of the signifying realm of action.

implicature and can therefore be at least partially divorced from context, (“context free” in linguistic terms). Instead, what is important in the Whartonian exemplification is understanding the nature and significance of the emotion felt. Comprehending this can only be achieved by relating the stimulus to co-text, context and knowledge of the world– the by now classic model of language comprehension (Douthwaite 2000). Stated more simply, much more information is required and much more complex mental processing is involved in unpacking a conversational implicature compared to the relatively greater simplicity of comprehending a conventional implicature.

Turning to Becchio *et al.*'s standpoint, the cogent example enabling a preliminary evaluation of their position to be undertaken is “Paul Dorrance walked away”. In the present state of knowledge specific features of the action of walking away are totally insufficient, when applying Becchio *et al.*'s framework, to directly and explicitly prime the understanding of the intentionality and the mental and emotional states which, as we shall see, trigger the behavioural act of walking to the window, even if one adds further “specificational information” such as “from his writing desk” and “to the window of his high-perched flat”, since unpacking that clause to identify the mental states and emotions revealed by the action requires co-textual and contextual information and a series of complex pragmatic connections which, as we shall see, go far beyond the information contained in the purely verbal signals furnished by the text and the external behaviour those signals describe. Another cogent instantiation in the Whartonian text is the action described in “[h]e touched the bell at his elbow”.

Having clarified the nature of the relationship between action and mental state with regard to some current theorising, we may now return to the main argument, the quintessential points of Wharton's theorising on the art of writing which are relevant to examining her technique in tracking the mind.

### *1.3. Mind and society*

The third quintessential point was introduced, albeit tangentially, in the first extract quoted above. In that excerpt Wharton goes much further than ‘simply’ (*sic*) tracking the mind, as may be seen from her deliberate use of metaphors as defining terms – “street” and “soul” – the terms intentionally being brought to the readers’ attention by alliteration. She alludes to this ‘extra structure’ (Fowler 1986) provided by metaphors by referring to the “stately tenor” of the lives depicted, by which she intends, in the first instance, social class, thereby introducing the sociocultural dimension and, thereby, the relationship between mind and society.

She does so, however, with her typical indirectness, as the said noun phrase “stately tenor” indicates. She continues this strategy with “hardly ruffled by the exultations and agonies” in which she pits ‘external’ social behaviour (*viz.* conformity to “custom”, the latter word having been selected to insinuate the title of one of Wharton’s novels), against ‘internal’, emotional life. A further metaphor, “below the surface”, reiterates the ‘invisibility’ of mental life contrasting with the visible social trappings of life (“stately”). Nevertheless, the complexity of Wharton’s writing emerges immediately, for while “stately” evokes, in the first instance, the social trappings introduced earlier, in the second instance it emits a (positive) value judgment (a mental activity), which, in the third instance, triggers an emotional reaction (joy), which in turn bolsters the positive (mental) value judgment. Mind and society cannot be split into neat, watertight, independent, isolated entities. Quite the opposite:

Stendhal ... is intensely modern and realistic in the individualising of his characters, who were never types ... but always sharply differentiated and particular human beings. More distinctively still does he represent the new fiction by his insight into the springs of social action ... What was new in both Balzac and Stendhal was the fact of their viewing each character first of all as a product of particular material and social conditions, as being thus or thus because of the calling he pursued or the house he lived in (Balzac), or the society he wanted to get into (Stendhal), or the acre of ground he coveted, or the powerful or fashionable personage he aped or envied (both Balzac and Stendhal).



Critics have long noted<sup>3</sup> the ‘anthropological’ stance of Wharton’s work and her interest in Darwinism, her profoundly social and sociological analyses of the society she describes (Bentley 1995). To give just one specific exemplification, Pizer (1992: 138) comments that

the social and moral world portrayed in *The Age of Innocence* – the world which Archer describes as a “silent organization” of habit, custom, and assumption – exerts a web of compulsion which powerfully shapes and controls individual belief and behaviour in the most vital areas of human experience

Thus Wharton’s work does not simply lay bare how the mind works, but also how such workings are inextricably linked to the way society impinges upon the individual.

#### *1.4. Wharton’s goal and linguistic techniques*

The fourth and final quintessential point is that Wharton is no professional psychologist examining the patient on the couch in return for a fee. As a writer herself, she is fully aware that to keep readerly interest alive, the writer cannot simply “note down every half-aware stirring of thought and sensation, the automatic reactions to every passing impression”. The material presented to the reader must be carefully selected (“any theory must begin by assuming the need for selection”, p. 11) and organised.<sup>4</sup> But doing so al-

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<sup>3</sup> One might wish to bear in mind that George H. Mead’s classic work on the interaction between the individual and his world, “Mind, Self and Society”, was published in 1934 but was a posthumous ‘reconstruction’ of his life’s work.

<sup>4</sup> For a more detailed treatment of Wharton’s theorising on writing technique, see Douthwaite (2017).

so, crucially, involves achieving the ultimate goal of bringing out the significance of the material to life:

... there must be something that *makes* [the moments of conflict treated by the writer] crucial, some recognizable relation to a familiar social or moral standard, some explicit awareness of the eternal struggle between man's contending impulses (p. 14, original emphasis):

A good subject, then, must contain in itself something that sheds light on our moral experience (p. 24).

Wharton's goal is ultimately that of teaching a moral lesson.

As we analyse the extract selected for scrutiny we shall find all these themes - tracking the mind, the relationship between society and mind, the domination of society over the individual through voluntarily obtaining consent or through constraining obedience to social norms when the individual resists social indoctrination – as well as all the linguistic devices identified in the few preceding words present in the text, despite its brevity!

Given the space available, the paper will concentrate almost exclusively on tracking the mind, only hinting at the rest of the picture. The reasons prompting this choice are numerous. First and foremost, the immense complexity of Wharton's indirect style of writing, which calls for precise, detailed explication if any justice is to be done to her greatness as a writer. Second, the examination of the themes treated and of the development of the story, patriarchy, the subaltern's voice, and consequently unravelling the relationship between mind and society as illustrated in this story, would require the scrutiny of several extracts specifically selected for that purpose, hence another paper in itself.

### *1.5. Aims and rationale*

In this article I will analyse the opening paragraph of Edith Wharton's short story "Diagnosis" using the tools of stylistics (Short 1996; Douthwaite 2000; Jeffries & McIntyre 2010). This story was selected for several reasons. The most important is that it perfectly illustrates the major objectives of this paper: to show how Wharton scrutinises the mind, laying bare the linguistic devices she employs to do so, and demonstrating the link between mind and society.

Second, it represents an extension to a previous article (2017) on another short story by Wharton, "The Day of the Funeral". Both stories constitute a stark criticism of patriarchy. One significant difference between the two stories is that while the female voice is silenced in "After the Funeral" by the wife committing suicide at the very outset of the story as a result of the way her husband treats her, the female voice in "Diagnosis" is present for a good part of the tale before she dies of illness and the male protagonist discovers at the end of the story that while he believed he was manipulating his lover, following her death he discovers that the opposite was actually true. Despite these thematic and structural differences, both stories tackle the same basic issue: socially-determined gender relations; both stories involve doctors, (*viz.* high status males); both stories involve powerful men who reflect the *Weltanschauung* of their time; both stories show (male) power working against the female. For if in "The Day of the Funeral" the wife commits suicide, the female lover in "Diagnosis" acts the manipulative way she does because the socio-economic structure and cultural values of the time left her no option. One might also add that both women die before the male protagonist. Symbolic, perhaps?

Third, in "Diagnosis" Wharton employs her typically rich implicational style, making her points with such remarkable subtlety and delicacy that, despite the mordant criticism which is implied, an incautious or rapid reader might well miss much of the hidden meaning. This he would be 'encouraged' to do by the surface simplicity of the ideational content and by a notable proportion of the language being of the informal, spoken variety, thereby creating the impression that this the narrator just telling an 'ordi-

nary' story, one in which nothing 'deep' or 'important' is being said. Furthermore, the fact that the 'topic' of the story - a man learning he is terminally ill and how he reacts to the situation - constitutes part of most adults' experience, (that is to say, of their knowledge of the world, a fundamental component in understanding language), means the reader is not expecting estrangement in the Russian Formalist sense (Douthwaite 2000) to be at work. In other terms, the style is typically Whartonian in being deceptively simple. Such a style is 'reminiscent' of authors such as James Joyce and is ideally suited to Wharton's goal of penetrating and mirroring the depths and subtleties of the human mind.

At the micro-level of analysis, Wharton employs an immense range of linguistic devices to get her message across, including style clashes, collocation and semantic field, evaluative language, the violation and exploitation of Gricean maxims to create implicatures, reduction in explicitness, parallelism, focalisation, modality, alliteration. (On modalisation and evaluation, see Douthwaite 2007; on the remaining analytical tools employed in this article, see Douthwaite 2000.) Thus, a second crucial objective of this paper is to demonstrate how Wharton is a master of the language (please note my avoidance of the gendered equivalent "mistress"). Stylistics is eminently suited to this task.

One of the most important methodological tools deployed in the present analysis is speech and thought presentation (henceforth STP), since the interpretative key to the investigation lies with the identification of the consciousness behind the words and actions, or who sees what is spoken or thought or done, to paraphrase Genette, and why it is that at any given point in the text that specific voice is heard. Stated differently, point of view is crucial in interpreting any text, especially so when the text has political, social or suasive functions.

Fourth, Wharton was well aware of the importance of the opening to short stories in penetrating the heart of the matter instantly, in order both to arrest attention and to ensure that vividness, precision and depth be

achieved in the short space available in the genre (Wharton 1924; Douthwaite 2017). "Diagnosis" is a cogent instantiation.

### *1.6. Speech and thought presentation*

As stated above, central to this analytical operation is STP. One major linguistic model identifying forms of representing speech and thought is that provided by Semino and Short (2004), which constitutes a comprehensive extension of the original model developed by Leech and Short (1981). It offers a viable analytical tool for a number of reasons: a) it is an "analytically specific account of STP" (Semino and Short 2004: 3), b) it is founded on relatively explicit criteria, (ibid: 14), based on linguistic and functional criteria as well as on contextual and pragmatic parameters, (the latter points being insisted on through the book, e.g. 11, 14, 39, 141), c) the categories can be identified as producing specific textual effects, d) despite rigidity that might appear to stem from the first three points, the model is flexible: it can be adapted to the vast range of variations occurring in 'real language' speech events. These features have led to its having provided solid investigative results. The proof of the pudding is in the eating.

Two preliminary observations are in order. First, writing presentation, which Semino and Short added to the original Leech and Short (1981) model, is not dealt with in this paper since it is not pertinent to present purposes. Second, and crucially, "Free Indirect Style" as a general category and concept in the literature on consciousness presentation, ('general' since it includes both speech and thought presentation modes), has been the object of fierce debate (e.g. Palmer 2004, 2011, Thomas 2012), Palmer taking exception to what he terms the "speech-category approach". As Rundquist (2017 xiii) puts it, "There is one thing which has always been uncontroversial about Free Indirect Style, and that is that it exists. Even while the precise parameters of its construction are, like everything else, disputed, FIS is empirically verifiable in the grammar of texts."

Table 1. Basic Speech and Thought Presentation scale (adapted from Semino & Short 2004: 49). The norm for each scale is signalled in bold type.<sup>5</sup>

	← <i>Speech presentation scale</i> →					
[N]	NV	NRSA	IS	FIS	<b>DS</b>	FDS
[N]	NI	NRTA	<b>IT</b>	FIT	DT	FDT
	← <i>Thought presentation scale</i> →					

Table 1 presents the basic framework of the Semino-Short model of speech and thought presentation, displaying a basic range of possible modes of presenting and representing a character’s speech and thought.

Four points are crucial here. First, arranging the model as a sliding scale indicates that the categories are not distinct, watertight and exclusive (Semino & Short *ibid*: 9). Categories may overlap to some degree or might be difficult to distinguish with absolute precision. It should, however, always be borne in mind that this stricture applies to linguistic and non-linguistic categories in general. Given these general features of ‘categories’, it is no coincidence that Rosch (1973) developed the theory of prototypes.

Second, since the above categories represent the basic framework, other categories not included in Table 1 do exist. One of these - embedded speech, (on embedding, see Semino & Short 2004: 33-35; 171-182) - will be of immediate interest.

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<sup>5</sup> N = narration; NV = narrator’s representation of voice; NRSA = narrator’s representation of speech act; IS = indirect speech; FIS = Free indirect speech; DS direct speech; FDS = free direct speech; NI = narration of internal states or internal narration; NRTA = narrator’s representation of thought act; IT = indirect thought; FIT = free indirect thought; DT = direct thought; FDT = free direct thought.

Third, given the nature of linguistic categories and given the complexity of language and its use, actual application of the scheme depends not only on the categories in the model but also, and principally, on the text, (i.e. the way the writer deploys the linguistic resources). This, therefore, involves the deployment of other features of communication: context, pragmatics, politeness, and so forth. Interpretation is thus fundamental. The model does not do the interpreting work, even less so does it work in isolation!

Fourth, the manipulation of STP may produce manifold effects. One crucial, basic, general, underlying effect is that it is employed to represent consciousness, subjectivity. That is to say, it enables the writer to give the reader direct access to the mind of the character, to his thoughts, sensations, cognitive processes, mental states and emotions.

This does not mean constant and total precision of language mimicking precision of thoughts, in the first instance since thoughts and emotions may not be not experienced directly in and as precise thoughts (i.e. they may not take a linguistic form). When they are indeed experienced as language, they may frequently be inchoate. Hence FDT and FIT are not necessarily the *direct* linguistic representation of thought.

Wharton was well aware of this fact, as her theoretical writings referred to above (e.g. "*meaningless precision a series of disconnected impressions?*") and the analysis of her literary work below show.

This specific aspect has two immediate, concrete consequences, the first of which Leech and Short (1981) had already theorised in the first version of the model. The first is a general precept pertaining to effect of STP deployment while the second is a specific methodological consequence.

The first consequence is that the more the realisation of a presentation-al category in a text lies to the left on the sliding scale, the more the ideational content of the utterance embodying that category appears to come under the control of the narrator, while the more the category lies to the right on the scale, the higher the degree of control over the proposition expressed seems to be exerted by the character. This phenomenon translates into the degree of reliability of a category in representing consciousness.

That is to say that the greater the control exerted by the character, the greater the reliability of the conceptual content and illocutionary and perlocutionary force(s) realised by the utterance as representing the ‘true’ state of a character’s consciousness. This constitutes Semino and Short’s “faithfulness” claim, (ibid 12; see also Short 2012). This stricture is particularly true of thought. Presentational mode is thus one fundamental linguistic resource aiding the reader to establish the identity of the focaliser, hence the point of view that is expressed by and through the utterance.<sup>6</sup>

However, given the preliminary analysis of action as revealing thought in section 1.2.2 above, a claim will be made in this paper that even certain uses of N mode may constitute a reliable ‘representation’ of mental and emotional states, functioning in this sense in a similar way to FIT and FDT, a thesis which, to my knowledge, was yet to be advanced in this precise fashion.

The second, and methodological, consequence is that I eschew the use of the term and the taxonomies of Free Indirect Style theorists, for two main reasons. Since in many critical works Free Indirect Style (or Free Indi-

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<sup>6</sup> My use of modalisation (“appears”, “seems”) in making the faithfulness claim is intended to underscore the fact that there is no one-to-one relationship between form and function. The use of FIT and FDT does not automatically mean that their use is “in-nately disruptive and destabilising” that it is “a technique that allows other voices to compete with and so undermine the monologic authority of the narrator or the implied author”, as has been argued by Gunn (2004 35). Supporters of the Semino-Short approach claim reliability of the figural consciousness is one of the major functions performed by the use of these STP modes, but it is by no means the sole function. Nor does it always apply, as I will attempt to demonstrate. Thus Gunn’s analysis of Jane Austen’s deployment of Free Indirect Discourse “as a kind of narratorial mimicry” (ibid) cannot be contested, (if one wishes to contest it), on theoretical grounds, only on interpretative grounds. Fergus (2016 548) is one critic who finds Gunn’s interpretation convincing. Readers must make up their own minds, for examining STP in Austen’s work is not the remit of this paper.



rect Discourse) subsumes both thought and speech, the flattening of categories can lead to a lack of clarity or to a lack of precision in the analysis. An extension of this point is that Free Indirect Style theorists claim or tacitly imply that access to the mind is achieved only through that style, whereas this paper will add further evidence to the thesis that the mind may be penetrated even through the use of narration, both N focalised through the character and, crucially, when the narrative is recounted by the narrator, namely when control and vision is external to the character.

The second reason for avoiding Free Indirect Style as a nomenclature and a categorical system is that, since observing the way an author examines the mind is the central issue in this (and in many critical works), then distinguishing between thought and speech is of the essence. This, too, justifies my opting for the Semino-Short model. Add to this a crucial justification: the application of the model to concrete texts yields solid results, as the present paper attempts to demonstrate.

Returning, consequently, to the central issue of point four, many other crucial effects are achieved through the skillful manipulation of STP. Two such effects of great importance for the present study are: a) the heightening of emotional impact through coming into direct contact with the character's 'real' thoughts and emotions, what Semino and Short (2004: 12) term "vividness" and "dramatization"; b) and often a consequence of the previous factor, a diminishing of distance between reader and character creating alignment of viewpoint, hence sympathy, between the two, or the opposite effect. Cogent examples of the diverse specific communicative effects achievable through the manipulation of STP employing the selected model may be found in Short (1983), Semino & Short (2004), Douthwaite (2004; 2017), McIntyre & Walker (2015), Bowles (2017).

## *2. The analysis*

### *2.1. The target text: the opening paragraph*

[1] 'Nothing to worry about - absolutely nothing. [2] Of course not ... just what they all say!' [3] Paul Dorrance walked away from his writing-table to the window of his high-perched flat. [4] The window looked south, over the crowded towering New York below Wall Street which was the visible center and symbol of his life's work. [5] He drew a great breath of relief - for under his surface incredulity a secret reassurance was slowly beginning to unfold. [6] The two eminent physicians he had just seen had told him he would be all right again in a few months; that his dark fears were delusions; that all he needed was to get away from work till he had recovered his balance of body and brain. [7] Dorrance had smiled acquiescence and muttered inwardly: 'Infernal humbugs; as if I didn't know how I felt!'; yet hardly a quarter of an hour later their words had woven magic passes about him, and with a timid avidity he had surrendered to the sense of returning life. [8] 'By George, I do feel better,' he muttered, and swung about to his desk, remembering he had not breakfasted. [9] The first time in months that he had remembered that! [10] He touched the bell at his elbow, and with a half-apologetic smile told his servant that ... well, yes ... the doctors said he ought to eat more ... [11] Perhaps he'd have an egg or two with his coffee ... yes, with bacon .... [12] He chafed with impatience till the tray was brought. (p. 177)

Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the above extract, one preliminary broad generalisation is in order. The text may be divided into two parts. The first part, (sentences 1-7), deals with Dorrance debating whether or not to believe the doctors' original diagnosis that he is seriously ill and his motives for doing so. The second part, (sentences 8-12), provides an account of Dorrance's mental state and consequent behaviour once he has decided that the doctors' second opinion that he is not seriously ill is the correct one. We now turn to the close reading of the text.

## *2.2. Part A: Sentences 1-7*

The first important point to note is that sentence 1 (S1) begins with inverted commas but ends without. S2 begins without inverted commas but ends with them. In neither sentence is there a reporting clause, only a reported clause. SS1-2 thus appear to be presented as a unit, one which is realised as speech or thought and not as narrative. Other linguistic signals bolster this

interpretation: a) incomplete sentences, indicating colloquial style. Both sentences are realised by two verbless clauses (hence are ungrammatical, since no main clause is present); b) the division of each sentence into two clauses is signalled graphologically and not syntactically (a dash in S1 and suspension points in S2). The two sentences are thus parallel, with a difference being signalled by the deployment of differing graphological devices to indicate the breaks in the sentence. Why the parallelism is not perfect will become clear three paragraphs below; c) the use of linguistic items which are characteristic of speech and not writing, such as “of course”, the repetition of “nothing”, intensified by the premodifier “absolutely” when it is repeated, thus underscoring the emitter’s emotional reaction to what he is conveying conceptually.

S3, on the contrary, immediately appears to constitute narration (N) since it consists of an external, objective description of a material process (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004) – an event or action. Indeed, as we read on, we will discover that S3 is recounted by a heterodiegetic narrator. However, we will also discover that matters are not quite so simple.

We are now in a position to advance a first hypothesis: SS1-2 constitute Free Direct Thought (FDT) and Paul Dorrance, the protagonist, is the consciousness. The latter point is demonstrated by the fact that no one else is present in the text, (hence Dorrance is the default option), and by sequencing, namely the exploitation of Grice’s (1991) manner maxim (sub-maxim: be orderly, from which the reader infers that the consciousness of SS1-2 is person referred to by the grammatical subject of S3, and by “Paul Dorrance” constituting Hallidayan theme and grammatical subject of S3. In simple terms, given the order in which the information provided is presented, the presence of only one actant in the text and the absence of reporting verbs and related obligatory constituents, (a subject), in SS1-2, then the source of the thoughts in SS1-2 can only be Dorrance. Finally, no information will emerge from subsequent co-text to invalidate this interpretation.

This discovery enables the formulation of a second, and more precise, hypothesis regarding SS1-2: S1 is actually Free Direct Speech (FDS) embedded in FDT in SS1-2, since in S1 Dorrance is repeating (viz. ‘reporting’) in his head what the doctors had said to him, while in S2 Dorrance’s FDT constitutes his reflection/evaluation on what the doctors had said to him. The evidence accumulated and consequent reasoning confirm that SS1-2 constitute a unit. The difference in functions performed by S1 and S2 accounts for why the mid-sentence breaks, as pointed out above, are different – a dash in S1 and suspension points in S2. They represent a clue to uncovering a change in mode of thought presentation from S1 to S2 corresponding to the source of the thoughts expressed.

However, to comprehend fully the nature of SS1-2 as FDT with embedded FDS (eFDS) we have to reach S6 in the text, where the noun phrase “the eminent physicians he had just seen had told him” confirms this inference. This mental operation is attributable to the fact that “Diagnosis” begins *in medias res*, a fact which accounts for the referential opacity of “nothing (S1) and of “they all” (S2).

Referential opacity is, in this case, one indicator that the sentence is not ‘communicative’. That is to say, SS1-2 do not constitute a speech act, i.e. the unit does not constitute an utterance directed by a speaker to another speaker in a speech event. It does not have an illocutionary and a perlocutionary force since there is no intention on the part of the ‘speaker’ to communicate something to another interactant. Dorrance is ‘merely’ thinking aloud to himself. As a result, since he knows what he is talking about, he has no need to be ‘communicatively’ transparent.

To anticipate another aspect that will be gradually uncovered as we read on, delayed comprehension in the reader performs at least two functions. On an immediate level, it arouses interest, motivating the reader to proceed in order to discover what is being talked about - arousing the reader’s curiosity by having suppressed information through beginning *in medias res*. On a global level, Wharton has immediately begun the operation of gradual revelation of the ‘truth’ to the reader, while concurrently laying the founda-

tions to convey the idea that 'the truth', or 'reality', is something Dorrance will never understand completely, and then only at the end, when it is too late, for his wife has by then died. The implication of non-comprehension is achieved through opacity, namely through flouting the Gricean manner maxim. Lack of understanding will have prevented Dorrance from having fully-satisfying personal relationships. Indeed, such an aim is not one of his objectives in life. This, of course, is a dire implicit comment on the nature of human relationships in the society described, since Dorrance typifies the upper class male in the New York society of which he is a member. Trenham, the protagonist of "The Day of the Funeral", presents the same patriarchal male traits as Dorrance, the same attitudes.

To understand fully what is going on in these two sentences we must delve deeper into the nature of Dorrance's thoughts and the way they are constructed linguistically.

S1 consists of two noun phrases both rankshifted up to the level of verbless clause, both very short. In other words, obligatory grammatical constituents (subject and predicator) have been omitted, (in contrast with the 'standard' expression "There is nothing to worry about"), leaving only the important information, viz. the new information, in Hallidayan terms. Furthermore, the second clause is a 'repetition' of the conceptual content of the first. The violation of the Gricean quantity maxim serves to underscore the importance to the thinker of the conceptual content of the first clause. The head of the first noun phrase, (i.e. the most important constituent of the phrase), is "nothing". It occupies thematic position in the sentence and is further highlighted by being graphologically salient since it is the first lexeme in the entire story. In addition, the postmodifier "of this" is an informationally-empty constituent because of its referential opacity. Hence the only real (viz. new) information conveyed by the noun phrase is "nothing". Starting the story with negativity is, of course, symbolic, ironic, as we have just seen, for Dorrance does not realise he actually has everything to worry about and will not understand this to the end.

Leaving aside the global point of S1 introducing the overriding theme of non-comprehension of the world and remaining at the local level of the text, the question now requiring an answer is why so much emphasis should be placed on “nothing”. To do so one must first have read part of the co-text, (i.e. S6), to establish that the topic being referred to is a terminal illness, (an inference in any case, since S6 also flouts a) the manner maxim, sub-maxim: be perspicuous, and b) the quantity maxim, since insufficient information is provided to be perspicuous), and then apply one’s knowledge of the world regarding people’s reactions to visits to doctors where a terminal illness has been the subject of discussion. (Naturally, in this type of situation an expression such as “[N]othing to worry about” is sufficient to alert the reader to the fact that something could be radically wrong.) Such considerations lead to the inference that the illocutionary force of S1 is that of persuasion (the doctors trying to persuade Dorrance he is not terminally ill) and those of S2 are Dorrance expressing to himself his disbelief in the doctors’ opinion and justifying why he does not give them credence.

Stated differently, we have related the very small amount of information available at this point in the text to our knowledge of the world and produced the most probable interpretation, as Relevance Theorists (Sperber and Wilson 1995) would put it. Co-text will support this interpretation. If we also use empathy, a crucial skill in communication, then we can further hypothesise that expressing disbelief is concurrently camouflage for another illocutionary force, Dorrance’s secret hope that he is not affected by a terminal illness, or that if he is, then it is not of such a virulent type that his end is imminent – secret, because a person in this situation cannot admit openly that his hope goes against the evidence, otherwise he would be forced to accept the negative verdict. Co-text will bear this hypothesis out too.

In conclusion, the story starts off in the protagonist’s head, the fourteen words provided by SS1-2 being sufficient to reveal his deepest thoughts and emotions in a critical life-situation with more than a fair degree of pre-

cision, 'classic' functions of the FDT mode of presentation. Furthermore, use of eFDS embedded in FDT and FDT also serves to create a dramatic beginning arresting the reader's attention. To say that the 'full truth' is revealed only in S6 in no way detracts from this evaluation since the 'missing information' follows shortly, and it is part of the natural process of reading and comprehension that readers revise and expand their hypotheses/interpretations continually as new information is presented to them. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten suppression of information and obscurity are devices employed to create sentences which are designed to trigger curiosity. In addition, as suggested above, delayed comprehension mimics Dorrance's real-life situation where he very slowly uncovers the truth, though not the whole truth, as the story will show. Finally, it enables the readers to 'live through' the same experience themselves, thereby heightening the intensity of their experience.

[3] Paul Dorrance walked away from his writing-table to the window of his high-perched flat. [4] The window looked south, over the crowded towering New York below Wall Street which was the visible center and symbol of his life's work.

Several factors appear to indicate that SS3-4 are written in N mode. Both sentences seem to provide an external, objective account of the world out there and the events occurring in that world, prototypical traits of omniscient third-person narration: the predicator in S3 describes a material process ("walked") and that of S4 ("looked") is used metaphorically to designate a relation process (describing location). Both sentences are grammatically well-formed in contrast to SS1-2. Again in contrast to SS1-2, in SS3-4 reference is transparent: in S3 we are provided with the character's full name, "Paul Dorrance", and the referents for the deictic terms "his" (twice) are fully specified; in S4 the three deictic terms "the" (twice) and "his" are fully specified and the place, "New York" has unique reference. The style has thus changed from informal conversational to formal written.

Given the shared characteristics just described, like SS1-2, SS3-4 also seem to form one unit.

Applying the STP model we thus appear to have moved from the extreme right of the model – deep inside the character’s head (FDT) in SS1-2 – to the extreme left (N) with the narrator in control and performing the prototypical role of omniscient informer in SS3-4. Stated differently, we are not even remotely close to penetrating the character’s thoughts, in traditional narratological terms.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, “walk” is an intransitive verb, hence a non-prototypical material process, since the agent is not acting on the world (and changing it as a result) as happens in a canonical material process such as ‘Joseph robbed the bank’ or ‘Joseph kicked the policeman’, where a goal (or ‘direct object’ in traditional grammatical terms) is present. This gives S3 the air of conveying an aimless or casual, hence non-significant, action, described by one who has no access to the character’s mental processes.

Despite the presence of all these linguistic signals, given Wharton’s subtlety, the hypothesis of SS3-4 embodying ‘canonical’ N mode could not be further from the truth.

We have theorised S2 as expressing the illocutionary forces of fear and ‘disguised’ hope, among others. Sequencing (the Gricean manner maxim, sub-maxim “be orderly”) and knowledge of the world (regarding terminal illnesses) prompt the positing of a cause-effect link between thought (SS1-2) and action (SS3-4). Though walking is a material process described ex-

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<sup>7</sup> Note the further instantiation of parallelism – 2 sentences assigned both to protagonist and to narrator. This feature also helps to account for the unusual phenomenon of inverted commas preceding the beginning of S1 but not following it, and the lack of inverted commas preceding S2 but closing that sentence. They serve to designate a unit – SS1-2, which then serves to parallel the second unit – SS3-4. Mick Short (personal communication) suggested that this is strange, for S1 is speech, hence one would expect inverted commas to open and close that sentence and if S2 is FDT then one would expect a total lack of inverted commas. His suggestion was that this atypical occurrence might be a Whartonian convention, a style marker. More and specific investigation would be required, preferably employing corpus methodology, to verify this hypothesis.



ternally, its function here is to signal mental processes and emotional states. Sitting at a desk in a condition of anxiety and frustration prompted by the doctors' words (inferences drawn from SS1-2) spurs Dorrance to physical action since movement may be hypothesised as constituting an 'instinctual' reaction, that is to say a sort of conditioned reflex or unconscious reaction, which will help in part to relieve his tension (SS3-4). (Less probably, it might represent a conscious action carried out in the hope of alleviating the tension.)

What is of crucial interest here with relation both to Wharton's subject matter – investigating the mind – and to her theorising and its relation to technique, especially to STP theory, is that she cogently demonstrates that a writer may formally pass from inside the character's mind (as is the case with FDT) to external narration by the narrator and yet still be tracking the mind through the character's actions and the relationship of those actions to the 'environment' (context and events).

However, S3 hides even greater complexity, underscoring just how deeply Wharton does delve the workings of the mind. Linguistically, the basic problem to be solved is the (Gricean) relevance of the detail provided. First of all, why should the narrator communicate to the reader that Dorrance was at his writing table – why "writing" table and why "table" at all, for that matter? In addition to the fact that the change from sedentary to movement implies a physical response (physical action providing relief to an emotional state (anxiety, hypothesised above), "writing-table" is the first symbol of Dorrance's high social status, though, again, this cannot be fathomed immediately, just as "window" performs exactly the same, as yet unknowable, function. "High-perched flat" is the third piece of apparently irrelevant information in the sentence and it too performs an identical function. In the first instance it exploits the cognitive metaphor (Kovecses 2010) GOOD IS UP, with the metaphor acting as a (positive) evaluator, hence the most obvious indicator that something important is being signalled below the 'empty' or 'neutral' visible surface of the action described external-

ly. Note that the use of a literal expression such as ‘above Wall Street’ would not carry the implicational force of the metaphor.

S4 provides the remaining information required to confirm the preceding three interpretations, as well as helping to formulate new hypotheses as to the relevance of such information. First of all, the object “window” is reiterated (flouting Gricean quantity). Secondly, “window” occupies important thematic position in the sentence. Thus, despite its redundancy, it is signalled as important information, leaving us with the problem of fathoming its significance. Thirdly, its importance is bolstered by information distribution (Douthwaite 2000): S3-4 could easily have been reduced to one sentence by the use of a relative clause, as in:

[3b] Paul Dorrance walked away from his writing-table to the window of his high-perched flat, which looked south over the crowded towering New York below Wall Street which was the visible center and symbol of his life's work.

Although the syntactic structure would be slightly different, since the relative pronoun “which” would refer to “flat” and not to “window”, the semantic-pragmatic consequences would be so minimal as to not affect the interpretation offered. The important consequence is that distributing the information over two sentences indicates two important ideas are being conveyed by the text and not one. And the theme of the second important idea is “window”.

We are informed that the window “looked south”, again seemingly meaningless information since the reader can have no idea of what “south” conveys semantically or pragmatically, (no prior contextual information having been supplied on this topic), thus violating the Gricean maxim of relation (irrelevant information) and/or of quantity (“south” conveys zero information to the reader). Yet it constitutes the new information in this short clause! Thus the two linguistic mechanisms (irrelevance v new information) appear to contradict each other, leaving readers perplexed.

Following this short main clause comes a long non-finite clause, hence a rankshifted clause, namely a clause signalled by the grammatical system as

standardly conveying information which is less important than that conveyed by a main clause or by a non-rankshifted clause. The length contrasts surprisingly with the brevity of the preceding clause. By contrast, this latter clause is overflowing with information, which we now examine.

Discovering that Dorrance possesses a flat which overlooks “Wall Street” in New York (knowledge of the world) corroborates Dorrance’s elevated socio-economic status. Employing the preposition “over” reiterates “high-perched” inasmuch as it too is a linguistic realisation (or linguistic metaphor – LM) of the cognitive metaphor (CM) GOOD IS UP. Moreover, the preposition occupies first position in the clause. Finally, the preposition is rendered even more graphologically salient by the comma that precedes it and the different length of the two clauses forming S4. Hence the preposition is signalled as conveying extremely important information, an unusual fact in itself, given that a preposition is a function word and not a content word.

Demonstrating the validity of this interpretation is no onerous task: remove the comma and you obtain a perfectly grammatical sentence realised by a single (main) clause. This modification would produce several effects. It would invalidate the violation of the maxims identified above. It would remove “over” from thematic position. Globally, the effects of the comma and the division of the sentence into two clauses hypothesised above would consequently be nullified. Hence, the distribution of the information into two clauses rather than one must have some significance, unless, of course, Wharton is a bad writer.

As just stated, the second clause begins with the CM GOOD IS UP. This CM is reiterated immediately by the use of the adjective “towering” premodifying “New York”. This metaphor also has the connotation of domination, thereby introducing a crucial socio-political theme of the story, indirectly, as is Wharton’s wont.

In the first instance, it implies a positive value judgment with regard to New York itself, for two reasons. Firstly, because the main referent is Wall Street, the center of world finance, (knowledge of the world, as was pointed

out above), and secondly, through the use of two metonyms: the first, “Wall Street”, refers to the Stock Exchange and not to the street, and the second, the premodifier of “New York” – “crowded” - consequently implies that a great deal of financial activity is going on producing wealth and jobs for many people. (Note further that, in contrast to the use made here of the adjective, “crowded” often has negative connotations.) Through the linguistic devices employed and the evaluations they convey, a clear positive, pro-establishment stance is being projected.

This, of course, begs the question as to whose point of view is being presented, an issue I take up three paragraphs below.

The conclusion that may be drawn is that the function of the details provided in SS3-4 is not to provide an external, objective description of a place, the context. Rather, the writer has carefully selected information which enables the reader to identify the social environment in which the speech event is taking place and the evaluation (or ideological stance towards) that environment which is implicit in the description supplied. Stated differently, a link is established between geographical location, objects and social structure. Furthermore, point of view and the ideology implied through the operation of pragmatic principles is reinforced by lexical and syntactic choices.

This interpretation also explains the ‘unusual’ use of the comma in S4 for by dividing the sentence into two, the function of the second part is to ‘explain’ what the first part, (especially “south”), ‘means’. It is obviously not the direction that is important in itself, but what the direction implies, namely the fact that the room in his flat where Dorrance works looks over his place of work, that his flat is very close to his work, and, consequently, that he is a major player in the financial game. (The reader might wish to note that I employed the expression “looks over” and not “overlooks”).

Up to this point, SS3-4 have implicitly been taken at their formal surface value as constituting omniscient narration. However, the preceding discussion should, I hope, have sown many seeds of doubt in the reader’s mind, because both the two positive value judgements implied – the Stock

Exchange as good and Dorrance's work (and hence Dorrance himself) as good - could potentially reflect Dorrance's point of view. This thesis is bolstered by the fact that we have no evidence so far as to the narrator's ideological position.

Strong evidence in favour of the interpretation that S4 is focalised through Dorrance is provided by "below Wall Street which was the visible center and symbol of his life's work". A phrase such as "his life's work" implies a highly emotional, positive value judgement, unless one believes one is an outright failure in life. This positive evaluative stance is greatly reinforced by the terms "center" and "symbol", two culturally-loaded metaphors emitting positive value judgements as used here. Furthermore, the use of two nouns - "center" and "symbol" - may be taken as violating the quantity maxim, since the second noun pragmatically reiterates the meaning expressed by the first noun. Hence importance is increased and consequently the emotional charge conveyed intensified. More significant still is the use of "below" (to indicate domination, Dorrance's domination) and "visible", for both signals, together with Dorrance's walking to the window and looking out "below" (S3) indicate that what is being described is what *Dorrance* sees. Had there been an intradiegetic narrator observing the speech event, he could, for instance, have looked up. What is also implied by the inclusion of "visible" is that Dorrance is looking, that is to say, engaging in mental activity. This is important since it helps account for the fact that "visible" is conceptually redundant, for when one looks out of a window one sees what is "visible" therefrom. Even further evidence is furnished by the use of "looked" as another CM, since the window is personified. Although the "window" is the theme and grammatical subject of S4, as we have seen, it is Dorrance who gets up and goes to the window, it is Dorrance doing the looking out, not the window. (This explains my having drawn the reader's attention above to my use of "look over" rather than "overlook". To reiterate the point: windows do not 'look', viz. perceive. Humans do.) In other words, the linguistic structure conceals the fact revealed by the implication created by sequencing - Dorrance is the focaliser.

This hypothesis is bolstered by the very presence of the lexeme “visible”, for in order to avoid being redundant, it must in some way respect or exploit the Gricean maxim of relevance. This hypothesis may be demonstrated quite simply by applying the elimination test. If we suppress “visible”, then the expression that remains is both semantically and grammatically accurate: “... below Wall Street which was the center and symbol of his life’s work”. However, omission of the adjective renders the expression more distant, veering quite definitely towards external narration. The effect of distance would be increased by suppressing either “center” or “symbol”, for the emotional charge would consequently be diminished. Instead, emotional proximity to the deictic center constitutes further confirmation that the focaliser is Dorrance and what is being conveyed is his own positive evaluation of the work he has done, which in turn substantiates his conservative ideological stance.

Further endorsement is provided by the presence of the comma following “south”, which, as we have seen, could have been omitted. Omitting it would have rendered the sentence external narration, including it, however, seems to mimic Dorrance’s inner train of thought: first he looks out of the window, then he ‘explains’ why he has done so: he has gone to the window to look out over the world that was the driving force of his life. Remove the comma and the revelation of the mental activity prompting the action described is lost.

Given the preceding observations, returning to S3 allows us to refine our previous hypotheses. The “writing desk” may be seen to stand for Dorrance’s battle post from which he conducts his financial wars. In this sense, the further exploitation of the CM GOOD IS UP with the LM “below” bears out the hypothesis of Dorrance’s powerful status through the location of his flat “above”.

Now establishing Dorrance as the focaliser of SS3-4 is not simply a debating point. It has, necessarily, vital consequences. Evaluation is a mental process, so establishing who is doing the evaluating is imperative to interpreting the text. Consequently, and crucially, it enables us to make further

hypotheses about what Dorrance is thinking. Walking to the window I interpreted earlier as a sign of anxiety and frustration. If we now add the symbolic value of the objects, places and Dorrance's actions as interpreted above and the way they are evaluated, then we might hypothesise that anxiety and frustration might not be the only emotions driving Dorrance at that moment. Going to the window and looking down over Wall Street makes him 'review' "his life's work": this could give rise to a feeling that pleasure at his achievements risks being outdone by anger and frustration, or to a feeling of anger at having to abandon his work, or gaining some comfort from 'looking over' his past achievements, and/or to the hope that one day he will be able to return to his work.

The point may be sealed by realising that the deictic expression "away from his writing-table" violates the Gricean quantity maxim, for it appears to be redundant. At a surface level, it might be interpreted as the narrator filling in the contextual detail for the benefit of the reader, hence bolstering the hypothesis that S3 is pure N mode. However, that explanation does not hold water since the unit performs no transparently relevant function. Stated differently, the expression violates the Gricean maxim of relation. This hypothesis is bolstered above all by the presence of the adverb and preposition "away from". These do not constitute mere external description of what Dorrance is doing. Dorrance is not moving "away from" the narrator or any person in the room; nor does one does normally move away from harmless objects as are tables, (normally). On the contrary, such action implies goal-directed mental activity: in walking "away from" his writing-table, Dorrance is expressing intentionality which in some way involves the writing-table and what it stands for. Hence we return to the previous hypothesis that his frustration and anger at losing his old life (the great financier) make him abandon his "battle station" as symbolised by the writing-table and go to the window to ponder over what he has lost and/or find solace in his past achievements or hope for the future.

After all, Wharton could have written much more simply, 'Paul Dorrance went to the window of his flat'. Note that this seemingly syno-

nymic version also discards the actual physical process of walking. This helps us realise that “walk” too is redundant, since, for some unfathomable reason, people generally go places by walking, rather than by crawling or by walking on their hands. Hence the standard use of the lexical verb ‘go’ in everyday communication, while the use of ‘walk’ would be marked, implying, (depending on context), that one normally goes by bus or taxi.

It is further worth noting that reference is achieved through full name: “Paul Dorrance”. Now we might again hypothesise that since the story opens *in medias res*, this is how the writer/narrator introduces her protagonist. Hence S3 constitutes pure narration. But again, this thesis can be countered by noting the formality of the mode of reference, a formality which is in line with the rest of S3 and with S4. One of the functions performed by formality in communication is to indicate high status. Since there are various other markers of high status in the co-text SS3-4, then this seems at least equally plausibly to be the function of this formal mode of reference (though both functions may, of course, be relevant).

Hence, the crucial general point that I am trying to make in this paper and which emerges with great force from the analysis of SS3-4 is that despite the sentences seemingly being written in N mode, where canonically the omniscient author is supposed to be in control and conveying his knowledge and sometimes also his viewpoint, their ideational content and linguistic construction can, in some cases, actually enable us to penetrate the character’s mind and hypothesise the latter’s thoughts and emotions.

This goes well beyond affirming that the sentence, paragraph or whatever the unit may be is focalised through a given character. It means unveiling what is behind the “*half-aware stirring of thought and sensation, the automatic reactions to every passing impression ... when it [the mind] records with meaningless precision a series of disconnected impressions*”, identifying those half-aware thoughts and emotions, giving precise meaning to what appear disconnected snippets of information about the external world because they appear to be irrelevant. This, of course, is indeed the case if one identifies the precise details as conveying cause-effect.



This further explains why the writer has switched from FDT in SS 1-2 to N focalised through the character in SS-3-4. Through analysis, the reader recovers the melting pot and turmoil of thoughts and emotions which the character is at very best only half-aware of, because he does not clearly understand, or perhaps want to understand. Thus, Dorrance's getting up from the chair, wishing to leave behind his table, (metaphorically speaking), and going to the window are all actions implying thoughts and emotions such as those identified above, but which Dorrance *does not realise, or only dimly realises, he is experiencing*. Inchoateness, lack of precise verbalisation, is conveyed by N mode focalised through the character.

The second crucial, but specific, point we have established is that Dorrance has a high social status, a positive opinion of himself, and is politically conservative. And this is done by implicature, not by the direct expression of objective truth on the part of the narrator.

This brings us to the final point that still needs explaining: "high-perched flat" (S3). Now we have seen that the LM "high-perched" embodies a CM implying high status. However, collocating the adjective "perched" with "flat" could imply criticism rather than approval. A perch is generally found in a bird cage, and a bird cage connotes imprisonment, or limited freedom. Furthermore, it is a somewhat informal expression appearing in two sentences which are formal. Hence there is a clash in styles, an unusual phenomenon *per se*. In conclusion, the two linguistic features we have just identified would seem to indicate the presence of a voice that is not Dorrance's.

This seeming confusion or ambiguity of focalisation can be solved quite easily and convincingly by positing the operation of the Bakhtinian dual voice. SS1-2 constitute Dorrance's thought. SS3-4- constitute narration focalised through Dorrance, but with the concurrent operation of the narrator's critical voice through the ambiguity or multifunctionality of certain linguistic items such as "high-perched". This technical feature is a characteristic of Wharton's writing and is one of the typical modes by which she expresses criticism of her subject. We may now tackle S5.

[5] He drew a great breath of relief - for under his surface incredulity a secret reassurance was slowly beginning to unfold.

S5 continues our analysis of action conveying mental activity.

The sentence is divided into two parts, a dash again signalling the dividing line.

Applying the Semino-Short model yields the formal analysis that the first part is written in N mode since it provides an external description of an action (“drew ... breath”). However, this surface analysis may be refined in two ways. Firstly, applying Halliday’s taxonomy of process types (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004) produces the result that the lexical verb reports a behavioural act (‘breathe’).<sup>8</sup> Secondly, since the illocutionary force of the entire idiomatic expression “drew a great breath of relief” (defined by the MacMillan online dictionary as “to stop worrying because something bad is no longer likely to happen”<sup>9</sup>) conveys an emotional state, “relief”, which is the cause of the said behavioural act, then this clause could also be classified as NI.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Although ‘action’ prototypically refers to material process (having both agent and goal), behavioural processes also classify as actions, though no goal is present in the participant structure and the world is not affected by the process, as it normally is in the standard material process.

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/breathe-a-sigh-of-relief>

<sup>10</sup> In the Semino and Short model (2004: 46) narration of internal states (NI) consists of “all those cases where the narrator reports a character’s cognitive and emotional experiences without presenting any specific thoughts. The examples they provide by way of illustration are: “For a moment she didn’t know where she was” and “I hurried to her room, and was immediately filled with alarm” (ibid 46). They further specify “By our definition, NI does not include reports of characters’ perceptions, whether those stimuli are internal (“She felt a pain in her stomach”) or external (“She felt the softness of his hair”). Examples such as these were coded as narration” (ibid: 46).

Significantly, we again find Wharton employing action to reveal emotion, for what Dorrance is thinking can be reconstructed in words, for instance, 'Thank heaven the doctors are right and I am not suffering from a terminal disease', as the subsequent clause will bear out.

In addition to signifying an emotional state, conveying the illocutionary force of relief provides feedback on the hypothesis advanced above that Dorrance had moved away from the table to combat his anger and frustration by finding solace in his past economic achievements.

This interpretation is endorsed by the second part of the sentence, (that following the dash), whose function it is to explain why Dorrance felt relieved.

Since the explanation concerns Dorrance's emotional and cognitive state ("secret reassurance"), then this second part of S5 is written in NI mode, both formally and functionally. SS1-2 had expressed Dorrance's disbelief at the doctors' assurance that he would survive. On the other hand his desire to live prompts him to believe that the doctors were literally right (viz. honest) and not simply trying to calm him down by proffering a false but reassuring diagnosis. Accepting the doctors' 'official' or verbalised 'verdict' which is the reverse of the diagnosis Dorrance believes the doctors actually did make but did not reveal to him, (i.e. that he was terminally ill), leads to Dorrance "slowly" convincing himself that the 'official' verdict is indeed true. This consideration prompts the reflection that the hypothesis

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However, as Semino and Short themselves acknowledge, "it is possible to find cases where formally, a particular sentence (or sentence part) could belong to more than one category" (ibid 11), the classic case being the sentence whose formal features fit both N and FIS/FIT. Furthermore, as already stated in section 1.2, Semino and Short also point out that interpretation depends in the first instance on co-text and context, and not on the features of the STP model.

In my own view, I would contend that an utterance such as 'She was sad' could well be the omniscient narrator reporting something – in this case an emotional state – or NI, since it is an emotion, an internal state, that is being presented. Given my preceding argument, then, in formal terms, the first clause of U5 may be interpreted as N or as NI or as a mix of the two modes.

advanced earlier that Dorrance moving to the window also ‘secretly’ embodies his hope that he will return to work is true, thus ‘justifying’ Dorrance’s opting to believe the doctors were really convinced he was not seriously ill.

Again, an analysis of the technical aspects of the writing will reveal that much more is at work than first meets the eye. As stated above, the first clause initially seems to be formally presented in N mode. However, the evaluative adjective “great” underscores the intensity of the emotion conveyed by the physical act. This intensity is important for in turn it underscores the clash between the two positions brought to light in the subsequent clause – the character both doubting the doctors’ ‘official’ diagnosis that Dorrance is not suffering from a terminal illness and ardently wishing not to doubt that diagnosis.

The clash itself is conveyed by another mental process (“unfold”), one in which the CM exploited is another of the major CMs in our culture, LIFE IS A JOURNEY (Kovecses 2010). What the deployment of this CM implies is that the CM is performing an ideological function (Douthwaite 2009/2011; 2011), namely, a value judgment is being issued through the use of that specific CM, thus conveying someone’s opinion on the matter: progress is being made. Progress in our culture standardly carries a positive evaluation. Since the extradiegetic narrator is not involved in the events and no reason has been provided by the text as to why the narrator should take a positive view of what is happening in the character’s mind at that particular moment, and since, instead, the development is, logically speaking, positive for the character himself, then the hypothesis is confirmed that this unit constitutes NI of Dorrance’s inner life.

Applying an analogous mode of reasoning together with Gricean orderliness, the first modaliser (the intensifier “great”) could also be hypothesised as being focalised through the character. Further evidence strengthening this interpretation comes from the code: S5 adopts the same linguistic device – breaking the sentence into two parts by means of a graphological device, in this case the hyphen, as in SS1-2, which constitute Dorrance’s

FIT. The effect which the division produces is again one of creating more the impression of conversation/thought than of external description, of proximity to the deictic center (or the referent, depending on one's interpretation), more than one of distance, distance standardly being the effect created by detached, omniscient, extradiegetic narration. The first part of S5 also parallels S3 – external actions are employed to designate mental phenomena. Given these parallelisms, then if in S3 the focaliser is Dorrance, then by the same token, the focaliser of S5 is Dorrance. All these considerations reinforce the intuition that the utterance is not “pure” narration but NI.

However, as stated above, a case may be argued for the narrator being the consciousness: the evaluative adjective “great” might also, and equally cogently, be hypothesised as signalling the narrator simply describing what he sees or knows from his privileged position of omniscience. Indeed, lexemes such as “surface”, “incredulity”, “secret”, “reassurance” and “slowly” in the second part of the sentence might appear to be attributable to external, narratorial description. Indeed, the second clause in S5 seems to correspond more to external commentary than to an internal voice.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that on the Semino-Short STP sliding scale, NI is the first entry point into the character's consciousness, hence at least under the control of the narrator as much, if not more, than under the control of the character.

Consequently, the narrator and the character himself might concurrently be conveying the character's emotional state. In other terms, in S5 dual focalisation appears to be at work.

What, however, is of central interest in this paper is that despite the N/NI modes being dominant in this utterance, the reader is still scrutinising, or better, penetrating the character's mind with great efficacy. An examination of the lexemes flagged above will bear this point out.

First of all, we find another exemplification of an orientational metaphor, “*under his surface incredulity*”. The CM GOOD IS UP (or TRUTH IS UP) is here inverted – truth is positively evaluated in our society, (at least official-

ly), and here the truth lies “under” the surface. Secondly, linguistic terminology such as “surface structure” and “deep structure”, harking back to Freudian theorising, with the unconscious below the conscious concealing the truth from the conscious self, reiterates the orientational metaphor. “Incredulity” is a mental state, and the falsity of this mental state is implied precisely by the negativity implicit in the deployment of the two orientational metaphors. Thirdly, we turn to “a secret reassurance”. “Reassurance” refers not to the speech act of verbally confirming a state of affairs to another, (eg. “I will help you” or “There is nothing seriously the matter with you”), but Dorrance’s emotional condition of taking comfort in believing that the state of affairs asserted by the “eminent doctors” that he is not ill to be true. Conventionally, ‘secrecy’ signifies not revealing the truth to others. Here, it implies the non-conventional meaning of hiding the truth from oneself, again a mental operation and not a physical one. Thus the first set of metaphors refers to Dorrance’s disbelief in what the doctors had told him, the second set to his desire to believe what the doctors had told him. The final set of metaphors (“slowly” and “unfold”) exploiting the CM LIFE IS A JOURNEY, with the adverb “slowly” deploying physical movement to convey mental change, describes the graduality of the process of self-convincing. Stated differently, describing behavioural acts, the use of metaphors, of lexis (verbs, nouns) denoting or implying mental states, of graphological devices signalling interruptions typifying speech all indicate the probing of the mind from outside the mind and just inside the mind (to use the sliding scale metaphor), yet akin to what happens in the use of FIT and FDT, when the reader is positioned, to all effects and purposes, deep within the character’s mind and can observe the character’s mental and emotional processes directly and unobstructedly.

Two central conclusions with regard to S5 are of interest to the major line of enquiry.

First, while on the one hand, the character is evaluating his position positively, the narrator is subterraneously criticising the character for doing this, because the evidence has not changed, the situation has not changed,

nothing has happened that brings novelty, yet Dorrance has changed his mind.

Second, NI mode, (together with N mode on this occasion), is again associated with vagueness of thought. Such vagueness has two functions.

On a general level, it exemplifies the reproduction of the inchoateness of thought and sensation, the “half-aware stirring”, the “passing impression”, to requote Wharton’s analysis of the stream of consciousness technique, behind which, however, lie precise, identifiable concepts and emotions, which the character, however, is unable to verbalise, to develop completely, to perceive clearly or, alternatively, does not wish to acknowledge clearly.

Thus one major conclusion, stemming from a comparison of S5 with SS1-2 and with SS3-4, is that FDT is employed to convey thoughts that Dorrance has more or less consciously verbalised and is aware of, while N and NI modes represent thoughts and emotions which Dorrance has not verbalised, is unaware of, or does not wish to comprehend.

This thesis is cogently supported by Wharton’s deployment of “secret” in the noun phrase “a secret reassurance” which I explicated earlier as “Thank heaven the doctors are right and I am not suffering from a terminal disease”. This adjective quite clearly implies Dorrance does not wish to openly acknowledge what he is thinking/feeling.

On a specific level, it suggests the struggle between what Dorrance believed initially and what he wishes to believe and which is gaining the upper hand for reasons which are obscure to Dorrance, though not to the reader, who can and does produce the explicatures offered above. And the battle is turning towards Dorrance’s ‘secretly’ desired result, which emerges in the subsequent utterance.

[6] The two eminent physicians he had just seen had told him he would be all right again in a few months; that his dark fears were delusions; that all he needed was to get away from work till he had recovered his balance of body and brain (my emphasis)

With “had told him ...”, S6 seems to move to speech. The utterance is realised in three parts, the end of the first two parts being signalled by a semi-colon. The first part appears to be written a) in indirect speech (IS) (“had told him”), b) reported by the narrator, that is to say, there appear to be no deviations from the standard. In theory, then, the remaining two parts should also be the narrator’s IS since both clauses begin with the conjunction “that”, indicating ellipsis, i.e. the implicit reiteration of “had told him”, i.e. of the reporting clause.

This interpretation is contradicted by the occurrence of two very strange linguistic phenomena. The first and most important is the use of the semi-colons in *lieu* of commas. The function of the semi-colons is divisive rather than conjunctive, as would have been the case had commas been employed. By indicating discontinuity, dissimilarity, the semi-colons thus belie the sentence has the formal unity that the syntax would appear to bestow upon it. Specifically, they deny the implicit reiteration of the reporting clause. Consequently, the second and third parts of the U cannot be taken as actually constituting IS. The final two parts thus become FIS, Dorrance’s FIS.

Not quite. Before explaining why not two paragraphs below, another point must be made to conclude this part of the argument.

This interpretation of the two-fold division of S6 is supported by the second strange phenomenon: the conjunction “that” appears in the second and third parts, (as if a reporting clause were indeed present in the unit, thus contradicting the function performed by the semi-colons, hence the marked strangeness of the phenomenon), but not in the first part. This confirms that parts two and three have something in common which make them different from part one of the sentence.

Further consideration should lead to the realisation that S6 is similar to S1, namely it is actually Dorrance thinking to himself. Consequently S6 is actually presented in FIT, since there is no introductory reporting clause



(‘he thought/remembered that the two eminent physicians ...’) customarily heralding IT, thanks to the two foregrounding<sup>11</sup> devices identified above.

This hypothesis finds support in the presence of the evaluative adjective “eminent”. Again the point of view is Dorrance’s and again it uncovers his unrevealed thought processes: if the physicians are eminent, then their judgment should be reliable. However, SS1-2 has already expressed Dorrance’s disbelief of their words, hence the value judgment emitted by the evaluative adjective turns out to be sarcastic, negative.

Yet again the matter is not quite so simple, since the division of the sentence into two parts – the first clause v. the second and third clauses – has still to be accounted for.

The ultimate explanation begins with the realisation that embedded in Dorrance’s thought is the IS identified above. Thus, S6 is presented in FIT but has three clauses embedded in it: the first clause constitutes eIS (embedded Indirect Speech) and the following two clauses constitute eFIS (embedded Free Indirect Speech).

Having identified STP modes, we must now account for their use, namely for the change in presentation mode from S5 to S6 (namely, the move rightwards along the STP cline from NI to FIT, with FIT indicating far greater proximity to the character’s mind) and the internal variation in S6 from eIS to eFIS. A series of linguistic features help us provide the answer.

One important difference between the two parts of the sentence is in emotional tone. Whereas the reported clause of part 1 is emotionally (relatively) flat, (“he would be all right”), signalling two professionals almost dispassionately reporting facts to an adult male, the second and third clauses are decidedly stronger on the emotional front. Indeed they employ met-

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<sup>11</sup> On foregrounding, which I employ as deviation, in the Russian Formalist sense, and not simply as emphasising a unit, see Douthwaite (2000).

aphors to convey that intensity strengthened by concentrated alliteration - pointedly so in the long third part where the most important information (“balance”, “body”, “brain”) is highlighted through a) alliteration, b) the proximity of the three nouns, c) the multiple realisation of the noun phrase postmodifying the preposition “of”, with the head noun “”brain” occupying perceptually salient end focus position. The cumulative effect of these foregrounded features is to draw readers’ attention to the strength of the emotion with the ultimate goal of baring the mental processes from within rather than from flat narrative report without. Thus, “dark” fears returns us to the CM GOOD IS UP, for dark in our culture is associated with hell, which is down below. “Delusions” refer to mental processes, and these, culturally speaking once again, are generally referred to as being ‘below the surface’, thus insinuating the previous orientational metaphor yet again. Not by chance alliteration associates “delusions” with “dark”, resonating the effect of the CM onto the cognitive state. “Balance” is a positive spatial image schema (Kovecses 2010: 40) pointing to a value which is held to be crucial in our society, hence one which is intended to persuade Dorrance of the importance of the advice the doctors are giving him, (for “balance” is to be “recovered”).

The emotional tone, (communicated by the appropriate intonation pattern), I would suggest, actually conveys the illocutionary force of criticism – in part two Dorrance is expressing disbelief in their diagnosis and perhaps even pouring scorn on the two medics for what he believes is a slapdash attitude on their part, dismissing his case lightly because they are not the ones suffering.

In sum, STP in S6 may be viewed as performing two major functions. On the local level of illocutionary force, the first part of S6 provides the two doctors’ considered opinion, hence it is embedded IS, while the second part provides their opinion overridden by Dorrance’s critical voice, hence embedded FIS conveying concurrently what the doctors said and Dorrance’s *immediate* reaction to what they said as he reflects on their

words, as already established by SS1-2, a hypothesis reinforced by the sarcastic deployment of “eminent” identified above.

More importantly, on the general theoretical level, the preceding line of argument adds weight to my interpretation that FIT and FDT are employed to convey thoughts and emotions Dorrance is more or less aware of and able to verbalise, while N and NI present inchoate thoughts and emotions which Dorrance is incapable of verbalising or does not wish to verbalise. The deployment of “eminent” is a perfect illustration of this point.

[7] Dorrance had smiled acquiescence and muttered inwardly: 'Infernal humbugs; as if I didn't know how I felt!'; // yet hardly a quarter of an hour later their words had woven magic passes about him, and with a timid avidity he had surrendered to the sense of returning life (major sub-divisions indicated by //)

Surface simplicity is again belied by the linguistic workings of S7. Yet another sentence is divided into two parts, the boundary between the two being set yet again by a semi-colon.

The first part is in its turn divided into two sub-components. The first clause of part one of S7 (“Dorrance had smiled acquiescence”) appears to be in N mode, since it moves us outside Dorrance’s mind to provide an external report of his behaviour. As is standard with Wharton, the picture is more complex.

A smile is a behavioural process in Hallidayan terms. Two types of messages are implied by this specific instantiation of that process type. First, the presence of the noun “acquiescence” functioning as direct object indicates that the smile is actually intended to convey an explicit speech act directed to the other two participants in the speech event since the illocutionary force of the smile is to express tacit agreement with what the doctors have just said. Hence, the clause may be classified as a variant of a Narrator’s Report of Speech Act (NRSA), a variant since the act is communicated not but by a verbal signal by a non-verbal signal, the smile.

Second, the smile implies mental activity. In addition to conveying the speech act of acquiescing, it embodies a mental state and an emotional

state: the cognitive process of deciding to acquiesce and the emotion lying behind the negative attitude implied by the noun “acquiescence”, since the lexeme generally connotes constraint of some sort, a hypothesis which is instantly confirmed by the second clause of S7. These two cognitive and emotive states thus indicate NI. The clause is thus partially parallel to the first clause of S5, the difference being that S5 is non-communicative, since Dorrance is simply thinking to himself, while in the first clause of S7 Dorrance is communicating with the two doctors (while concurrently ‘speaking to himself’). Stated differently, an apparently simple clause of four words is actually quite complex, communicatively speaking. In this case, the two modes of STP both constitute suppression, for Dorrance is not ‘telling the truth’: formally, externally, he expresses agreement, secretly, he disagrees.

Since the second part of this first unit of S7 (“and muttered inwardly: ‘Infernal humbugs; as if I didn't know how I felt!’”) is conjoined by the coordinating conjunction “and”, one might reasonably expect an analogous operation – NRSA + NI. Instead, the lexical verb “muttered” indicates a verbal process, thus creating the distinct impression that we are in the presence of direct or indirect speech, while the adverb phrase “inwardly” instantly modifies this initial interpretation to suggest that the finite clause “muttered inwardly” is a metaphor for thought, with the lexical verb concurrently performing the function of expressing a negative value judgment.

The clause “muttered inwardly” thus constitutes a reporting clause and primes readers for the subsequent two reported clauses, “‘infernal humbugs; as if ... felt!’”, which are presented in inverted commas. The first of these two clauses expresses grave criticism of the doctors, the second confirms the validity of that criticism by explaining/justifying the criticism. Both clauses are therefore expressed in Direct Thought (DT) mode. DT performs three functions. First it attests to the intensity of the emotion felt by the character. Second it proves the veracity of the judgement giving rise to that emotion: a) it contradicts the ‘formal’ answer of “acquiescence” Dorrance had provided the two doctors with through his ‘acquiescent

smile' in the first clause of the sentence, b)it consequently confirms the 'inner contradiction' insinuated by deployment of the noun "acquiescence", namely Dorrance smiling to publicly indicate agreement while mentally disagreeing. Finally, and crucially, it testifies to Dorrance's full awareness of what he is thinking.

One crucial textual function of the first part of S7 is, therefore, to confirm the interpretation offered of the second part of S6, that of criticism of the doctors. This interpretation was based on the emotional intensity of the language. S7 now provides conceptual content which validates the hypothesis that was advanced for S6.

The second part of S7, (beginning with "yet"), is also in two parts (parallelism with the first part of the sentence). The first part of this second unit ends with the comma, yet another non-standard use of punctuation since the word that follows is the coordinating conjunction "and" followed by a finite clause. The function of the comma is therefore divisive rather than additive.

The expression "their words had woven magic passes about him" exploits the CM LIFE IS A JOURNEY by suggesting mountain passes, alternative routes to cross a mountain, i.e. reach a destination/goal. The two subsequent Metaphorical Linguistic Expressions (MLEs) "surrendered" (CM LIFE IS WAR) and "the sense of returning life" (again the CM LIFE IS A JOURNEY) confirm that Dorrance has been seeking ways to avoid accepting the doctor's initial diagnosis that he was seriously ill. This second part thus conveys Dorrance's cognitive process of self-persuasion and may consequently be classified as NI since it does not provide the specific content of this thoughts.

Again, complexity is a hallmark, for while reporting Dorrance's internal state (NI), the author also makes his critical voice felt through two types of evaluative acts (N). Firstly, on the global level, the illocutionary force of this second part of the sentence is to point out a contradiction (rather than simply a change of opinion, since, as was stated earlier, no new evidence has been gathered, hence Dorrance has no scientific or objective reasons

for changing his mind). Secondly, specific evaluative expressions indicate the narrator's critical position towards Dorrance, starting with contrastive "yet" in focal clause-initial position, rendered graphologically salient by the semi-colon which precedes it, announcing both the change in STP mode and the change in stance that the change in STP mode conveys. (One might note, in passing, just how much work punctuation, and especially semi-colons, do in this text.) The conjunction is immediately intensified by the evaluative adverb "hardly". The latter adverb alerts readers to the exploitation of the Gricean maxim of relation, since "a quarter of an hour" implies the further evaluation that so very little time had passed since the doctors had spoken to Dorrance "yet" without new evidence Dorrance had managed to convince himself that his criticism of the doctors' judgement was indeed justified. Thus, one of the illocutionary forces of the clause – expressing surprise at Dorrance's unfounded conviction – constitutes a further evaluative mechanism denoting narratorial standpoint. The use of the adjective "magic" (yet another CM: LIFE IS MAGIC) premodifying the MLE "passes" makes fun of Dorrance while passing sentence on his 'illogical' behaviour, since "magic" does not belong to the sphere of science, but clearly invokes the domain of (folk)belief, of the contrast between appearance and reality, classifying Dorrance's thinking as belonging more to the domain of fantasy.

Indeed, the difference between appearance and reality, and of comprehending reality, is one of the crucial themes of the story, which will emerge with great ironic force at the end of the narrative when Dorrance comes to realise he had completely misjudged the nature of the relationship between himself and the woman he had married: summarily put, where he had believed he had been manipulating her to his own ends, he finally realises the opposite was true. Since demonstrating this would require an extended explanation, readers are warmly invited to read this brilliant story to discover just how little Dorrance comprehended and how this is a result in great part of his (patriarchal) cultural identity, which he never, even for one second, dreams of questioning.

On the theoretical level, the combination of N and NI in the first part of this second section of S7 again serves to indicate the inchoateness of Dorrance's thoughts, thereby deliberately, (even if not fully consciously), concealing reality from himself.

We now proceed to the final clause of the second part of the sentence, which is also in NI since it too construes a mental process ("he had surrendered to the sense of returning life") and two emotional states ("with a timid avidity"). This second part of the clause also underscores the narrator's presence through the continued use of strong irony.

Leaving aside the comma and the coordinating conjunction "and" commented on above, the first brilliant touch is the unusual collocation "timid avidity", an oxymoron, which again depicts 'hiding' – Dorrance desperately wants to live but does not wish to admit this to himself. NI mode is again employed to delve into the mind in a way which is similar to the way N mode is deployed in this story. Here, quite clearly, and quite understandably, Dorrance is somewhat averse to admitting the truth to himself: he has no new evidence so no basis on which to justify his change of mind. The distancing effect (of desire from reality) makes NI mode eminently suitable to this purpose.

The expression "timid avidity" also conveys a touch of childishness, one of Dorrance's personality traits, one which gives rise to his unrestrained egotism, another important implicit comment on Dorrance's personality (and, ultimately, his male stance towards the world). Hence, NI mode teamed up with N mode is again appropriate to the realisation of this function of implicit narratorial negative comment on what is being described as well as Dorrance's unwillingness to face reality.

"Surrendered" is deeply ironic, for this lexeme too brings to light the contradiction between Dorrance believing the doctors have condemned him and his intense desire to live, since the verb implies resistance to a force which is stronger and so overwhelms the resister. It too performs the same operation as "timid", for both lexemes indicate a subterranean, slowly-developing emergence of his new conviction, a position which is rein-

forced by the anthropomorphising metaphor “returning”, indicating a process which is evolving and which is therefore not complete. Again, ‘almost’ external narration is employed to plumb the depths of the mind and the use of NI indicates Dorrance’s partial state of awareness, since he tries to conceal the truth from himself.

Alliteration - “s” and “r” - is again present to make the reader ponder over the deeper implications of the lexical choices. At a higher level of generalisation, “surrendered” also mimics Dorrance’s socially-determined male stance, for he pretends to bow down to the wishes of others (the woman who wants to marry him) as a ploy to hide/justify his real behaviour, which is manipulative. This may be glimpsed in the contradiction between syntax and semantics: while the process construes Dorrance as conscious agent acting upon the world, the literal meaning of the lexical verb presents Dorrance as patient, viz. victim of the world.

This discussion enables us to complete the analysis of the first part of S7. Earlier in the discussion of S7, I wrote “the veracity of the judgement giving rise to that emotion”. We are now in a position to refine that analysis. It is not so much that Dorrance is telling the truth, (as attested by the fact that the words “Infernal humbugs; as if I didn't know how I felt!” constitute DT, hence we are directly observing Dorrance’s thought), as Dorrance believes that he is telling (or better thinking) the truth at the moment he thinks it. The second clause in DT, “as if I didn't know how I felt!” performs the illocutionary force of motivating, hence justifying, Dorrance’s criticism of the medics, an indirect validation of the fact that he believes in the veracity of his thoughts. However, since Dorrance is thinking to himself, there is no actual need for him to explain/justify himself to the world. Consequently, the thought must have some other origin. The answer, naturally, returns us to his train of thought, his battle between wishing to accept what Dorrance believes is the doctors’ unstated verdict that he is seriously ill and rejecting that in favour of their ‘official’ opinion that he is not ill. Stated differently, we return to the fundamental cognitive operation Dorrance is carrying out in this opening paragraph: that of con-



vincing himself that what he secretly desires is the 'true' answer, whether it be true or not being of no importance whatsoever to the outcome of his 'debate', since he *wants* to believe he will live.

## 2.2. Part B: Sentences 8-12

[8] 'By George, I do feel better,' he muttered, and swung about to his desk, remembering he had not breakfasted. [9] The first time in months that he had remembered that! [10] He touched the bell at his elbow, and with a half-apologetic smile told his servant that ... well, yes ... the doctors said he ought to eat more .... [11] Perhaps he'd have an egg or two with his coffee ... yes, with bacon .... [12] He chafed with impatience till the tray was brought.

SS 8-12 attest a sudden and radical change in STP deployment, warranting the hypothesis advanced at the beginning of the close reading section that SS8-12 may be considered as a sub-section in themselves, their global communicative function being to bear witness to the fact that Dorrance has indeed completed the operation of self-persuasion successfully and to introduce the consequences of this acceptance (basically, revealing how Dorrance sees himself).

S8 is in three parts. The first part ends with a comma following "muttered". The second part begins with the conjunction "and" and ends with the second and final comma in the sentence.

The repetition of the lexical verb "muttered" creates parallelism with S7, with the omission of the adverb "inwardly", present in S7, signalling a change of STP mode from thought to speech, Direct Speech (DS) to be precise, though Dorrance is, of course, talking to himself.

The second part – "and swung about to his desk" – is clearly narrative report.

The final part begins with "remembering". The lexical verb signals that this clause is presented as IT.

Yet again a graphological ‘mistake’ is committed - the comma preceding the conjunction “and” - to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that something important is happening, as we shall now see.

Significantly, S8 is the first sentence to be realised in direct speech (and not ‘mental speech’, despite it being close to mental speech since at this point Dorrance is still talking to himself). It begins with an emphatic oath, “By George”, expressing pleasant surprise at suddenly feeling better, in contrast to the negativity expressed by “Infernal humbugs” in S7, thereby underlining the passage from one mental condition to another. The positive emotion expressed through the intonational pattern with which the conventional implicature is uttered is inferable from the oath of the initial, reporting clause: “By George”.

Surprise is in itself an ironic comment, since Dorrance has been doing his damndest to convince himself that what is not true is true; furthermore, the previous sentence has informed us that he “had surrendered to the sense of returning life”. Yet again Dorrance is suppressing his manipulating himself from himself. Further irony for those who read on is provided by the fact that Dorrance will learn at the end of the story that the doctors were in fact telling him the truth – he was indeed not seriously ill!

The conceptual content of the second clause (“I do feel better”) together with emphatic “do” underscore the irony of the preceding exclamation. The illocutionary force of this clause is to consciously and explicitly confirm what the doctors had told him, (namely, that he would get better), the irony residing in the fact that it has taken Dorrance only 15 minutes to recover from what he believed was a terminal illness. The irony is further reinforced by the fact that he is not conscious of the fact, or does not wish to admit the fact, that he has been persuading himself.

This latter hypothesis finds support in the use of the lexical verb “muttered” betokening a low voice and a negative evaluation, thereby conveying Dorrance’s unwillingness to acknowledge the fact explicitly. This also helps explain why a comma precedes the conjunction “and” which introduces the second part of the sentence. The comma, like the majority of the previous

uses of the semi-colon, indicates divisiveness and not conjunction, since now comes the lexical verb “swung”, an action which is vigorous as well as plainly visible, hence the very opposite of “timid” which characterised Dorrance’s behaviour in the previous sentence, thus signifying a return to normality, to an active life. The two positive pragmatic functions performed by the lexical verb “swung” thus belie the two negative pragmatic functions realised by the preceding lexical verb “muttered”, thereby confirming the fact that Dorrance is concealing the truth from himself.

A third linguistic device provides further support for this interpretation: the energetic lexical verb “swung” is coupled with the action of returning to his desk (Gricean manner – be orderly, implying a cause-effect relationship) – the opposite to his state of worry described in S3 when he performed the reverse action of abandoning his desk, the difference in significance of the action being underscored by the difference in lexeme employed to identify the referent: “writing-table” in S3 and “desk” in S8 with its wider codified functions compared to the noun deployed in S3.<sup>12</sup> This analysis also confirms the symbolic value of the object as his station of command, hypothesised earlier. We may now proceed to the third part of S8.

The clause “swung about to his desk” performs the function main clause, and is followed by a non-finite clause, “remembering he had not eaten his breakfast”, which consequently performs the function subordinate clause to the preceding main clause, confirming the three part structure of S8. Significantly, what is syntactically presented as less important information is far from being such: prototypically, one’s appetite returning after an illness is an excellent sign of recovery (knowledge of the world).

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<sup>12</sup> Collins Dictionary gives a “writing table” as a place where one writes, (<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/writing-table>) while a “desk” is defined as a place where one sits to write or to work (<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/desk>).

If to syntactic importance we add a) Gricean sequencing and b) the fact that the comma following “desk” is, theoretically speaking, redundant since the two clauses should actually form a single unit (‘and swung about to his desk remembering he had not breakfasted’), then the memory seems an afterthought, a late realisation, again underscoring Dorrance hiding reality from himself, and therefore constituting a further instantiation of irony on the part of the subterranean voice of the narrator. Furthermore, “remembering” is a cognitive process and the nature of what is remembered – food – is indicative of Dorrance’s (infantile?) priorities. For it should be noted that it is not the perception of hunger that the language brings to the fore, but the cognitive process of remembering, which, in one sense, removes the immediacy of the physical stimulus, thus placing the onus again on Dorrance’s ‘fuzzy’ construction of reality.

Hence, STP may again be seen as performing a highlighting function. The first part of S8 in DS constitutes the climax, the (ironic) epiphany in which Dorrance (almost unwillingly) admits he is not going to die. It is followed by N in which an action again discloses a clearly identifiable cognitive and emotional state. Again N is employed to indicate that the mental and emotional states are clear to the reader but not to the character. The sentence closes in IT in which the narrator evaluates negatively, thus continuing the analysis of the meanderings of Dorrance’s mind as Dorrance concurrently acknowledges and negates reality.

[9] The first time in months that he had remembered that!

S9 confirms and emphasises the propositional content of the final clause of S8, (as well as the global illocutionary force of S8), by reiterating the concept and expanding it with extra information. Significantly, S9 is presented in FIT mode to convey the emotional intensity of the experience, hence the great importance of the topic to Dorrance. Such importance is underscored both by the exclamation mark and by the fact that the sentence is ill-formed – it is actually realised by a verbless clause since missing are subject

and predicator, as in: 'it was the first time in months that he had remembered that!' The informationally 'empty constituents', (a dummy subject and a copula which convey virtually no information), have been suppressed and "The first time" occupies emphatic thematic position in the sentence. Now, one might correctly argue that if for months one has been off one's food, then the return of one's appetite does indeed indicate that one is on the road to full recovery, thus reiterating the propositional content of the final clause of S8 in order to underscore its importance.

Two theoretical conclusions may be drawn from the preceding analysis. First, FIT guarantees the faithfulness of the conceptual content. That is to say, Dorrance is fully conscious of the conceptual content of his thought processes and can verbalise that content with great precision, and, more importantly, he believes what he is thinking to be true. This does not mean to say that what he thinks is true does indeed correspond to reality. As we have repeatedly seen, this is far from being the case. Second, reiteration of the same conceptual content necessarily implies reiteration of the infantile concern expressed by Dorrance. Stated differently, despite the fact that the sentence is presented as FIT, the subterranean critical voice of the narrator is also present as Dorrance reveals the 'true' nature of his character

[10] He touched the bell at his elbow, // and with a half-apologetic smile told his servant that // ... well, yes ... the doctors said he ought to eat more .... (sub-divisions indicated by //)

S10 is divided into three parts. Again a comma graphologically marks the end of the first part of the sentence, with the second part again beginning with the conjunction "and" (parallel to S8). Indeed, it is interesting to note that only three sentences out of twelve – S3, S9 and the final sentence in the paragraph – are not divided into two, three or four parts using graphological devices as one linguistic mechanism with which to signal the division. I would suggest that this is another device employed on occasion to indicate the operation of a double voice.

The first part of S10 is pure narration. Alliteration is present as a warning bell that more is happening than appears on the linguistic surface. The clause flouts both the maxims of manner, for its meaning is not clear, (avoid obscurity), and relevance, for it is not transparent why the writer thinks the reader should be interested in the exact location of the bell - to be precise, what the relevance of the prepositional phrase “at his elbow” is. To help elucidation, it should be noted that this prepositional phrase suggests parallelism with the expression “away from his writing table” in S3.

Let us take manner first. Indeed, it is only the further application of the Gricean manner maxim— on this occasion the sub-maxim “be orderly” – that helps to clarify the meaning of the clause. Taken together with the sentence that precedes it and the sentence that follows it, Dorrance is clearly ringing the bell in order to summon his servant to order breakfast. An action and N mode are again employed to convey mental activity: identifying a physical need, planning the solution to satisfying that need and executing the plan by summoning his servant in order to issue an order. Note also the exploitation of the quantity maxim: Dorrance imparting an order is not explicitly stated in the text, it is inferred from the information provided, a crucial point taken up 11 paragraphs below (at: “Structuring the discourse in this way ...”).

Turning to relevance, the location of the bell may be interpreted as a signal of power, (power being a major theme in this text). The bell is placed in a convenient position for Dorrance to be able to summon his servants the second he requires them, without having to make any effort to do so, such as getting up and going to another part of the room. Naturally, the bell is located within easy access of his desk!

This interpretation is supported by unusual lexical use, another linguistic device Wharton exploits constantly to create implicatures and implications. One generally ‘presses’ a bell. ‘Touching’ signifies using far less pressure than ‘pressing’, with the possible consequence that one could readily touch a bell without making it ring. Dorrance is again hiding. By touching the bell, one imagines a brief, perhaps soft, ring. This implies that the mas-

ter is not manifesting his desires - i.e. his orders - in an open, heavy-handed fashion. Action has again indicated intentionality.

What should be noted therefore is writer mimicking the indirectness of Dorrance's behaviour: the order is deliberately suppressed (hidden) (yet again). More, fundamentally, Dorrance is presenting the Self he wishes the world to see.

This hypothesis explains several of the linguistic features characterising the second and third parts of S10 (starting at the conjunction "and") and S11.

[10] He touched the bell at his elbow, // and with a half-apologetic smile told his servant that // ... well, yes ... the doctors said he ought to eat more ... [11] Perhaps he'd have an egg or two with his coffee ... yes, with bacon ....

First of all we have the reiteration of the smile. In S7 the smile acted to hide Dorrance's dissent from the doctors' opinion, in S10 it serves to hide, (in linguistic terminology, to soften), the order imparted.

The clause moves formally into IS ("told his servant that"), only to change yet again in the third part, this time into FIS, for two major reasons. First, the suspension points signal interruptions in Dorrance's flow of speech. Hence, parallel to S6, the reporting clause no longer governs this new clause, which thus becomes independent. Second, the language becomes emphatically conversational, as shown by constant interruptions (and consequent failure to complete clauses) and by the use of fillers ("well, yes", their deployment underscored by the comma and by the expression flouting the manner maxim, with "yes" repeated in S11).

Interruptions and fillers indicate hesitancy, uncertainty, insecurity, as did the noun phrase "avid timidity" (S7). This thesis is bolstered by yet another contradiction in Dorrance's behaviour. On the one hand Dorrance oozes timidity, on the other hand the verbal process "told" is incisive, for the softening operation could have continued quite simply through the use of the alternative lexical verb 'said'. Again, the subterranean dual voice seems to be at work. Moreover, as the story proceeds we see that Dorrance is at no

lack for words, Hence timidity is not a stable character trait but a local feature with a local function in this specific context, namely Dorrance is again projecting the image of a weak Self to hide his 'real' Self.

This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the "smile" is "half-apologetic". The character trait is further confirmed by Dorrance 'hiding' the order he imparts through the extreme indirectness of "the doctors said he ought to eat more", not only showing the tentativeness of his behaviour, but also ascribing agency, hence responsibility, not to himself, but to the doctors!

Dividing the order up into three parts, the first being the indirect issuing of the order as we have just seen, the second being the actual content of the order ("an egg or two with his coffee" – note again the imprecision signalled by "an ... or two"), the third being an addition to the order after yet another hesitation ("yes, with bacon"), where the "yes" can be hypothesised as constituting an answer to the question "would you like some bacon, too, sir?" asked by the servant, performs the same function of projecting an image of a weak person.

One crucial novelty that emerges here is that structuring the discourse in this way shows that the servant has been silenced – not only does the servant not speak (being a "subaltern", to borrow Gramsci's expression), but his presence is not even acknowledged. Zero Gricean quantity equals zero importance. Exploitation of the subaltern is confirmed by another subtle strategy, deploying indirectness yet again, this time constraining the servant to make the suggestion, since the servant will know what the master normally has for breakfast, (though note that we infer this from our reconstruction of the conversation, for, as just stated, the subaltern does not speak).

This, as the various other instantiations of suppression already encountered in the brief space of 251 words, indicates two general features of Dorrance's character, his dominance and his reticence to admit this fact, key features that heavily influence the types of interpersonal relationships he has, or rather their negativity.



Indeed, reticence is the other side of the coin to another character trait. By flouting quantity and manner (not saying everything, explicitly), Dorrance again wishes to give the impression that he is undecided and that it is the world acting upon him, and not vice-versa. Tentativeness is reinforced by the use of modalisers: the modal auxiliary “ought to” and the adverb “perhaps”. The Janus-face also emerges from items which are dual by their nature: “half-apologetic”. Such lack of forcefulness sits ill with a Wall Street wizard. And that this is so is corroborated by the last sentence, with its passage to NI mode:

... [12] He chafed with impatience till the tray was brought.

The strong explicit evaluator “chafed” intensified by a second strong evaluator “with impatience” brings out a quality which again questions Dorrance’s adult mental status. More importantly, it lays bare Dorrance’s duplicity, for ‘chafing’, (a mental and emotional condition), constitutes a strong contradiction to the extremely tentative behaviour efficaciously portrayed in the preceding two sentences. In keeping with the deployment of STP modes in this extract, S12 is in NI mode since it ironically reveals the truth, that is to say, Dorrance does not realise the deep meaning of his behaviour.

### *3. Conclusion*

Like the modernists who came after her, Edith Wharton is interested in uncovering the complex workings of the mind, in dismantling it piece by piece. She is also intent on showing how cognitive content and cognitive complexity are related to social structure. Stated differently, Wharton devotes her efforts to realising King Lear’s ‘edict’, (and recognisable as one of Shakespeare’s global aims too): “Then let them anatomize Regan. See what breeds about her heart” (Act III, sc. 6).

Identifying consciousness and the linguistic means by which this is projected in Wharton's writing and the effects these two domains produce is thus the crux to interpreting her work.

Wharton achieves the task with great subtlety, both with regard to the content and the workings of the mind and with regard to the intricate linguistic means she deploys to convey the complexity of those workings. This may be seen not only in the wealth of linguistic mechanisms she deploys, but also in the linguistic depths she goes to and in the scrupulous patterning in the pairing of device-meaning she strives for and achieves.

As stated in the introductory section, STP is perhaps the most important linguistic mechanism Wharton employs to convey point of view. It is indubitably deployed in extremely complex ways, creating multiple meanings and enabling the reader to recover mental and emotional states and processes not made explicit by the language itself. We may now attempt to identify a high-level strategy in her deployment of STP forms.

We should first recall that the first section is essentially thought, with Dorrance 'reporting' what was said in his conversation with the two doctors and reflecting over that conversation, his reflections constituting a series of associations the doctors' words give rise to. The second part, instead, sees Dorrance in interaction with others, hence speaking, and projecting the image of the Self which he wishes the world to identify him by and treat him by.

In SS1-2 FDS embedded in FDT indicates thoughts whose nature and origin can be (relatively) easily inferred and identified with some precision because the protagonist can and perhaps does, formulate them semi-consciously, or is aware of them. STP mode also serves to produce a dramatic beginning arresting the reader's attention and arousing his curiosity.

In contrast SS3-4 move to N focalised through the protagonist and describe actions and states of affairs an analysis of which, like the use of FDT, leads to the identification of the mental and emotional states that motivate the action and the description of the states of affairs, but which the protagonist is unaware of or only dimly aware of. He does not think consciously

of them or attempt to bring them to his conscious. Contrariwise, he feels some stimulus or force deep inside him - a stimulus which he cannot identify or which he does not stop to try to identify, but which drives him to action, standing up and going to the window. His dim awareness is signalled by seemingly irrelevant information such as "away from his writing-table".

Instead, it is precisely such information - which Wharton describes in her theoretical treatment as *every half-aware stirring of thought and sensation, the automatic reactions to every passing impression ... a series of disconnected impressions ... record[ed] with meaningless precision*" referring to the mental processes and mental experiences of the character and which the character fails to understand or only partially understands - which enables the reader (acting the role of the observing psychoanalyst, so to speak), to make sense of the character's experience by identifying with a fair degree of accuracy the character's succession of thoughts and emotions as well as the causes of such cognitive and emotive states. N focalised through the character thus signals the character's 'distance' from his own cognitive and emotive states, his non-comprehension.

With S5 Wharton moves into the character's mind, though on the outer fringes, so to speak, since she deploys NI. Movement (change of STP mode) and position on the STP axis (just beginning to penetrate the mind) mimic Dorrance beginning the process of convincing himself the doctor's diagnosis is correct. The lack of linguistically-specific thought (the Semino-Short criterion for NI) also indicates that Dorrance is not yet prepared to envisage the prospect in a totally conscious manner. He refrains from this because he does not wish to run the risk of reaching the end of the mental argument and finding he has to admit he was wrong. Inchoateness of thought is fear 'speaking'.

S5 concurrently represents N mode, for the subterranean critical voice of the narrator seeps through, questioning the validity of those thoughts that the character is aware or semi-aware of.

S6 moves into IS and then FIS embedded in FDT. Here Dorrance is repeating the doctors' words, hence their opinions, then debating the value

of those opinions. Thus FIS embedded in FDT symbolises full awareness of what is going through his mind.

S7 moves into NI and NRSA. While Dorrance continues his criticism of the doctors, the two STP modes show that although he is conscious of what he is thinking, he does not realise the real significance of those thoughts and the type of behaviour they represent, (the unconscious and involuntary message he gives to the world). The second part of S7 is presented in DT. Here Dorrance confirms much more explicitly what was only implicit in part one. The use of DT signals greater commitment to what he is saying (greater faithfulness in Semino-Short terms). However, Dorrance's voice is undercut by the critical voice of the narrator, demonstrating that Dorrance does not fully understand reality around him. The use of DT, (together with other symbolising devices, naturally), thus represents both faithfulness and awareness, while concurrently embodying limited awareness. The third and fourth parts of S7 move into NI and N. here the critical voice of the narrator definitively undermines the validity of Dorrance's own interpretation of the world. Here, (as in other parts of the text), CM has a major role to play in destroying Dorrance's faith in his own interpretative powers.

The second section of the text (SS8.12) moves into speech. The final section is in DS since it shows the protagonist has regained his comfortable position of certitude following the crisis caused by the doctors' diagnosis. He has therefore re-donned his 'old' patriarchal identity which he presents to the world through talking to others. His speech acts and non-verbal behaviour serve not only to demonstrate to others (and the reader) that he has regained his confidence but also to convince himself that this is indeed so. His speech thus reflects what is real to him about himself while actually hiding from himself the reality he does not wish to admit about himself and his ideological position and removing the challenge that the announcement of his illness had created to his ideology.

It is precisely because Dorrance's words and deeds are "overt", i.e. they are intended to communicate certain specific, identifiable things to other

participants in the speech event, and therefore present both the reality that he wishes to present to the world (viz. the conceptual content of his utterances), but also the Self Dorrance wishes to present, (hence his character, his social self and the identity he wishes to project of himself, together with the results he wishes to achieve, that the reader gets so angry. The reader has already discovered that Dorrance is a social sham, to put the matter ever so politely and avoid the violence Dorrance perpetrates on others in and through his relationships with those others.

The use of DS is therefore not a guarantee of the faithfulness of Dorrance's words, but a guarantee of Dorrance's commitment to the faithfulness of those words embodying the Self he wishes to present to others. Stated differently, those words are true in the sense that Dorrance actually believes that the concepts those words convey are true. However, they are concurrently false, for they do not reflect reality.

Proof lies in several areas. Two significant areas are: a) the contradictions between what Dorrance says and our knowledge of the world; b) the use of N, eg in the first part of S10 and in S12, and the presence of the critical voice of the narrator as an almost constant undercurrent.

We now turn to theoretical considerations. First of all, N mode and the actions they report have been seen to be highly effective means of identifying 'faithfully' cognitive and emotive states. Second, this observation leads to the more general observation that Wharton deploys STP in a way which is radically different from the general effect identified by the Leech-Short-Semino sliding scale (see section 1.6). Modes of STP presentation do not reflect the degree of focalisation through the character as measured by the said sliding scale and hence the faithfulness of the conceptual content transmitted by the utterance conveyed in that specific mode as much as the degree of awareness and honesty of the character. Thus forms such as NI, NRSA, DS do not progressively reflect greater penetration of the character's mind in order to be able to examine it more carefully, but constitute indications of inchoateness and/or self-deception, while FIT and FDT tend to indicate that the character is more conscious of the import of his words,

deeds and thoughts. Deployment of STP modes thus enables the reader to comprehend better and judge better the words that are proffered and Dorrance's character.

Communication is characterised by reduction in explicitness. The verbal signal contains a very small amount of information obliging the brain to reconstruct the meaning by adding the missing information and linking the various parts up into a coherent whole through a process of inferencing. Any act of perception is an act of interpretation.

In this sense, Wharton provides very little information. We see only the tip of the iceberg. STP modes together with the plethora of other linguistic devices Wharton employs show how a small amount of the smallest details, the most distant associations, and the seemingly irrelevant flow of thoughts and sensations are the key to revealing personality.

The brilliant result is that being with Wharton is like being on the Freudian couch – you are being forced to investigate what you are trying to hide – which is what we all do – for “human kind cannot bear very much reality”, as Eliot aptly put it (*Burnt Norton*). What is ‘worse’, like the psychoanalyst, Wharton does not allow you to hide.

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**John Douthwaite** is Professor of English Linguistics at the University of Genoa. He formerly directed the Language Centre at the University of Cagliari. His research interests include stylistics, postcolonial studies, crime studies, literary studies and literary theory, cognitive metaphor, linguistics, sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, language acquisition and teaching. His recent publications include: *Towards a Linguistic Theory of Foregrounding* (Edizioni dell'Orso 2000); with Katie Wales, editorship of *Textus, Vol XXIII (2010) No. 1. Issue entitled: "Stylistics and Co. (unlimited) - The range, methods and applications of stylistics"*; "Conceptual Metaphor and Communication: An Austinian and Gricean Analysis of Brian Clark's *Whose Life Is It Anyway?*", in M Fludernik (ed.), *Beyond Cognitive Metaphor Theory: Perspectives on Literary Metaphor*, London, Routledge, pp. 137-157. 2011; "Pragmatic Patterning in the Deployment of Conceptual Metaphor and Communication", in C. Marcato - V. Orioles (a cura di), *Studi plurilingui e interlinguistici in ricordo di Roberto Gusmani*, "Plurilinguismo. Contatti di lingue e culture" 16 (2011), pp. 82-117; *The social function of the detective fiction of the Golden Age*", in *Lingua e Diritto. La Lingua della Legge, la Legge nella Lingua*, Publifarum, n. 18, ISSN 1824-7482; url: [http://publifarum.farum.it/ezine\\_articles.php?id=264](http://publifarum.farum.it/ezine_articles.php?id=264); "Not Just Like that, or The Art of the Word in Pirandello's Musical *Just Like That*", in *A Lignano per studiare Pirandello*, Vincenzo Orioles (ed.), Pesaro, Metatauro, 2013, pp. 69-133; "Cognitive Metaphor in "A Little Cloud", in *Essays in Honour of Carla Vaglio*, Edizioni dell'Orso, Alessandria, 2015, pp. 279-310