Benefici, problemi e prospettive dell’integrazione monetaria in Europa (Benefits, issues and future of monetary integration in Europe)


  • Carlo Panico
  • Francesco Purificato
  • Elvira Sapienza


Parole chiave:

Economic and Monetary Union, Euro, Monetary Policy


Questo articolo discute l'integrazione monetaria europea, ricordando i benefici e i costi dell'euro per gli Stati membri. Esamina le politiche adottate sulla scia della crisi finanziaria e discute le sfide associate. Viene fornita una prospettiva sulla possibile progettazione a lungo termine della politica monetaria, principalmente in termini di processi di coordinamento dell'UE.


This article discusses European monetary integration, recalling the benefits and the costs of the euro for the Member States. It reviews the policies adopted in the wake of the financial crisis and discusses the associated challenges. An outlook on the possible long-term design of monetary policy is provided, mainly in terms of EU coordination processes. 

 JEL codes: E42, E44, G01

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