Evidenze empiriche dalla volatilità dei prezzi elettrici durante la crisi energetica californiana. Cattura del regolatore nel caso Enron? (Empirical evidence on energy prices volatility during the Californian energy crisis. Regulator's capture in the Enron case?)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3651_72.285_3Parole chiave:
market manipulation, electric crises, Enron, regulator captureAbstract
Questo lavoro analizza i trade data dei tre hubs principali dei mercati elettrici occidentali USA – SP-15, Palo Verde e Mid-C –, proponendo la costruzione e l’organizzazione di un nuovo dataset completo delle serie temporali giornaliere dei prezzi elettrici per gli anni 2001-2017. Si esaminano le operazioni Enron e le principali regolamentazioni e misure di policy adottate nei mercati finanziari americani prima, durante e dopo la crisi californiana del 2000-2001, attraverso un’analisi normativa e statistica dei prezzi elettrici. Gli obiettivi sono di verificare l’esistenza di una relazione tra volatilità dei prezzi e fenomeni manipolativi, e testare l’efficacia delle politiche regolative applicate. I risultati suggeriscono un ruolo significativo delle operazioni Enron nell’aumento di episodi e dell’intensità della volatilità dei prezzi elettrici in California e avvalorano l’ipotesi di una cattura del regolatore.
This work analyzes the trade data of the three major hubs of the Western US electricity markets – SP-15, Palo Verde, and Mid-C -, proposing the reconstruction and the organization of a new complete dataset of the daily time series of the electricity prices for the years 2001-2017. They are examined Enron operations and the main regulations and policy measures adopted in the American financial markets, before, during, and after the California crisis of 2000-2001, through a normative and a statistical analysis of the electricity prices. The objectives are to verify the existence of a relationship amongst price volatility and manipulative phenomena, and to test the effectiveness of the regulative policies applied. The results suggest a significant role played by Enron operations in the increase of the episodes and intensity of the volatility of the electricity prices in California and validate the hypothesis of a regulator capture.
JEL codes: G01, L94, Q41
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