Sindacati, non neutralità della moneta e giochi di politica economica (Unions, Non-neutrality of Money and Policy Games)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3651/9792Parole chiave:
Money, Policy, Trade Unions, UnionAbstract
The main aim of this article is to investigate the sources of money non-neutrality in policy games involving one or more trade unions in simple analytical settings. We show that there are common roots in the non-neutrality results so far obtained in apparently different contexts.
JEL Codes: E52, J51
Keywords: Money, Policy, Trade Unions, Union
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