Verso una procedura fallimentare per il debito sovrano e maggiore disciplina nei finanziamenti del Fondo Monetario Internazionale. Una valutazione di mezza via

Autori

  • Curzio Giannini

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3651/9808

Parole chiave:

Debt, IMF, Lending

Abstract

The paper reviews the area of the international financial architecture relating to sovereign crisis resolution. It is argued that shifting part of the burden of crisis resolution onto creditors may encourage debtor countries to take early action to counter an unsustainable debt path. Collective action clauses, the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, and ceilings on IMF loans, are all necessary components of a new and better crisis resolution framework.

 

 

JEL Codes: F32, F34, F33, O19

Keywords: Debt, IMF, Lending

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Pubblicato

2012-04-23

Fascicolo

V. 56 N. 222 (2003)

Sezione

Articoli

Licenza

Licenza Creative Commons 

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