Monetary policy goals and central bank independence
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3643/10499Keywords:
Decision-making, Models, Decision making, Evaluation, Monetary policyAbstract
During recent years a strong body of academic literature has argued that central bank independence (CBI) is necessary in order to achieve and maintain low inflation. This appears to support the view of central bankers that they should have the autonomy to pursue policy objectives without being pressured by short-term political objectives. The treatment of policy goals and the issue of policymakers' inflationary bias within CBI models are reviewed.
JEL Codes: E52, E58
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