Private goals and monetary policy: inflation and resignations from the Federal Reserve Board
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3643/10500Keywords:
Analysis, Compensation and benefits, United States. Federal Reserve Board, Monetary policy, BankersAbstract
The nature of and need to understand economic regulation are discussed. The paper presents further evidence on the relationship between monetary policy and the personal costs and benefits of inflation to central bankers. It is found that resignations from the Federal Reserve Board have been connected to significantly substantial deteriorations in Board salaries in relation to private sector incomes caused by above-average inflation. This is especially true of members whose job backgrounds and ages have allowed easiest access to substantial private incomes.
JEL Codes: E52
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