Central bank independence in another eleven countries
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3643/10553Keywords:
Finland, Austria, Denmark, Laws, regulations and rules, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Spain, Norway, Portugal, New Zealand, LuxembourgAbstract
The rationale for the independence of central banks is the so-called 'Rules versus Discretion' debate, which is described in this article. Central bank independence is considered an effective measure against governments from manipulating policy instruments to spur short-term economic growth and employment. Several, recent indices that purport to measure central bank independence are amalgamated and applied to ten European countries, plus New Zealand. Appendices are included on the central bank laws in the eleven countries.
JEL Codes: E58
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