Inflation, distortionary taxation and the design of monetary policy: the role of social cohesion
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3643/10589Keywords:
Public Finance Activities, Fiscal Policy, Models, Economic aspects, Inflation, Monetary policyAbstract
The relationship between central banks and inflation is considered in order to disprove existing studies which state that distortions and inflationary bias occur in the real world. While much attention has been given to the issue in existing studies, no attempt has been made to examine effects of any third factors. Results reveal that inflation is significantly affected by distortionary taxation and that social cohesion leads to price stability in the post Bretton Woods period.
JEL Codes: E52, G28
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