Financial Market Regulation in Germany - Capital Requirements of Financial Institutions

Authors

  • Daniel Karl Detzer Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3643/12468

Keywords:

Banking Regulation, Capital Adequacy, Risk Models, Germany

Abstract

This paper examines banks’ capital adequacy regulation in Germany. It reviews the capital requirement regulation in Germany from a historical perspective, and identifies general trends. Such analysis allows pointing out some severe problems associated with the current approaches to capital requirement regulation. Among the recent trends is the gradual softening of the eligibility criteria for regulatory equity, and the reliance on internal risk models for the determination of risk weights. While the former trend has been reversed after the crisis, the latter is still pursued. The problems inherent in using internal risk models to determine capital requirements are discussed in relation to changes due to the introduction of Basel II.5 and Basel III. 

JEL codes: G18, G28, N24

 

Author Biography

Daniel Karl Detzer, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE)

Daniel Detzer currently works as research associate in the project “Financialisation, Economy, Society, and Sustainable Development” and as a lecturer at the Berlin School of Economics and Law (BSEL). He obtained his master’s degree in international economics in 2011 from the BSEL.

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Published

2015-04-08

How to Cite

Detzer, D. K. (2015). Financial Market Regulation in Germany - Capital Requirements of Financial Institutions. PSL Quarterly Review, 68(272). https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3643/12468

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