Institutional Constraints and Liquidity Provision in the Eurozone Core and Periphery Before and After Crises:

A Preliminary Comparison of the Eurozone Crisis and the Coronavirus Pandemic


  • Nina Eichacker University of Rhode Island



Liquidity, Eurozone Crisis, Endogenous Money


This paper presents a preliminary comparison of the Eurosystem response to the Global Financial Crisis and Eurozone Crises with the onset of the Coronavirus Pandemic in 2020. It analyzes bank, national central bank (NCB), and government balance sheets to show the effect of ECB decisions to consrain or enable liquidity provision across the Eurozone, particularly along core and peripheral lines. It argues that these dynamics reflect Post-Keynesian theories of endogenous money, and the potential for monetary authorities to structurally influence liquidity preference and provision. As Eurozone governments debate whether to continue these practices, systemic liquidity crises that hurt financial and fiscal activity remain a risk at the time of writing.


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How to Cite

Eichacker, N. (2023). Institutional Constraints and Liquidity Provision in the Eurozone Core and Periphery Before and After Crises: : A Preliminary Comparison of the Eurozone Crisis and the Coronavirus Pandemic. PSL Quarterly Review, 75(303).