Central banks and information provided to the private sector
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3643/9829Keywords:
InformationAbstract
This paper examines the information provided to the private sector by central banks. By using the principal component analysis, we investigated the variance of the procedural rules followed by nine major central banks about informationtreatments. We investigate problems related to the information coming from the central banks by focusing on the quantity and quality perspectives and highlight the methodological complexity of the investigation. We find that a synthetic quantitative index of transparency is not enough to represent the phenomenon since it can result misleading in understanding the behavior of institutionally different central banks associated with the same index values.
JEL Codes: D82, E52, E58
References
ANDERSON, T.W. (1963), "Asymptotic theory for principal components analysis", Annals of Mathematical Statistics, vol. 34, pp. 468-88.
BARRO, R.J. and D. GORDON (1983), "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy", Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 12, pp. 101-21.
BERGER, H., J. DE HAAN and S. EIJFFINGER (2001), "Central bank independence: an update of theory and evidence", Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 15, pp. 3-40.
BERNANKE, B.S., T. LAUBACH, F.S. MISHKIN and A.S. POSEN (1999), Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
BLINDER, A., C. GOODHART, P. HILDEBRAND, D. LIPTON and C. WYPLOSZ (2001), How Do Central Banks Talk?, Geneva Report on World Economy 3, ICMB.
CANZONERI, M.B. (1985), "Monetary policy games and the role of private information", American Economic Review, vol. 75, pp. 1056-70.
CICCARONE, G., G. DI BARTOLOMEO and E. MARCHETTI (2004), "Budget policy, conservativeness and the optimal degree of central bank transparency", University of Rome La Sapienza, mimeo.
CUKIERMAN, A. (2002), "Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and what difference does it make?", The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, vol. 84, pp. 15-35.
CUKIERMAN, A. and F. LIPPI (1999), "Central bank independence, centralisation of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment: theory and some evidence", European Economic Review, vol. 43, pp. 1395-434.
DEMERTZIZ, M. and A. HUGHES-HALLET (2003), "Central bank transparency in theory and practice", paper presented at the EcoMod conference, July, Istanbul.
DUNTEMAN, G.H. (1989), "Principal component analysis", Sage University Paper, series on Quantitative Applications in Social Science, 07-069, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications.
EIJFFINGER, S.C.W. and P.M. GERAATS (2002), "How transparent are central banks?", CEPR Discussion Paper, no. 3188.
FAUST, J. and L. SVENSSON (2001), "Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobserved goals", International Economic Review, vol. 42, pp. 369-97.
FAUST, J. and L. SVENSSON (2002), "The equilibrium degree of transparency and control in monetary policy", Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 34, pp. 520-39.
FAVERO, C., X. FREIXAS, T. PERSSON and C. WYPLOSZ (2000), "One money, many countries. Monitoring the European Central Bank", CEPR Report, no. 2, London.
FRY, M., D. JULIUS, L. MAHADEVA, S. ROGER and G. STERNE (2000), "Key issues in the choice of monetary policy framework", in L. Mahadeva and G. Sterne eds, Monetary Policy Frameworks in a Global Context, Routledge, London, pp. 1-216.
GERAATS, P.M. (2003), "Central bank transparency", The Economic Journal, vol. 112, pp. 532-65.
GREESNPAN, A. (2001), "Alan Greenspan: transparency in monetary policy", remarks (via videoconference) by Mr Alan Greenspan at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Policy Conference, St. Louis, 11 October, BIS Review, vol. 83, pp. 1-2.
GRÜNER, H.P. (2002), "How much should central bank talk? A new argument", Economics Letters, vol. 77, pp. 195-98.
GUZZO, V. and A. VELASCO (1999), "The case for a populist central banker", European Economic Review, vol. 43, pp. 1317-44.
GYLFASON, T. and A. LINDBECK (1994), "The interaction of monetary policy and wages", Public Choice, vol. 79, pp. 33-46.
HUGHES-HALLETT, A. and N. VIEGI (2001), "Credibility, transparency and asymmetric information in monetary policy", CEPR Discussion Paper, no. 2671.
LAWLER, P. (2001), "Monetary policy, central bank objectives and social welfare with strategic wage setting", Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 53, pp. 94-113.
LEBART, L., A. MORINEAU and M. PIRON (1995), Statistique exploratoire multidimesionelle, Paris, Dunod.
NOY-MEIR, I. (1973), "Data transformation in ecological ordination. I: Some advantage of non-centering", Journal of Ecology, vol. 61, pp. 329-41.
OKAMOTO, M. (1997), "Four techniques of principal component analysis", Journal of the Japanese Statistical Society, vol. 2, pp. 63-69.
POSEN, A.S. (1997), "Monetary transparency in a time of change", statement at the National Association of Business Economists Annual Meeting, September 17.
ROGOFF, K. (1985), "The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 100, pp. 1169-89.
TYLER, D.E. (1981), "Asymptotic inference for eigenvectors", Annals of Statistics, vol. 9, pp. 725-36.
WALSH, C. (2003), "Accountability, transparency, and inflation targeting", Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 35, pp. 829-49.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
