




SAPIENZA
UNIVERSITÀ EDITRICE

Work published in open access form
and licensed under Creative Commons
Attribution – NonCommercial
ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)

 © Author(s)
E-ISSN 2724-2943
ISSN 2723-973X

Psychology Hub (2023)
XL, 2, 69-80

Article info

Submitted: 21 October 2022

Accepted: 27 June 2023

DOI: 10.13133/2724-2943/17900

Identity and Symbolic Universes in Voting Behavior. A study of the Italian society

Silvia Andreassi¹, Fulvio Signore², Barbara Cordella¹, Serena De Dominicis³,
Alessandro Gennaro⁴, Salvatore Iuso⁵, Skaiste Kerusauskaite¹, Ankica Kotic⁶, Terri
Mannarini², Matteo Reho¹, Giulia Rocchi¹, Alessia Rochira², Mario Scharfbillig⁷,
Sergio Salvatore^{2*}

¹ *Department of Dynamic, Clinical Psychology and Health Studies, Sapienza University of Rome, Via degli Apuli 1, 00183, Rome, Italy*

² *Department of Human and Social Sciences, University of Salento, Via di Valesio 24, 73100, Lecce, Italy*

³ *Center of Psychology Studies, Via Manifattura Tabacchi 34b, 73100, Lecce, Italy*

⁴ *Department of Human Sciences, Pegaso University, Naples, Italy*

⁵ *Department of Clinical and Experimental Medicine, University of Foggia, Via A. Gramsci 89/91, 71122, Foggia, Italy*

⁶ *Department of Developmental and Social Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Via dei Marsi 78, 00183, Rome, Italy*

⁷ *Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium.*

Abstract

This study analyses the role played by identity motives and cultural worldviews in voting behavior. For this purpose, a representative national sample of Italian (N=3020) respondents completed a questionnaire battery measuring political values, proxies of identity motives (i.e. attitude towards immigrants and perceived identity threat), as well as cultural worldviews (symbolic universes). These variables were used in a model with the voting intention of respondents as outcome variable, political values, identity motives and socio-demographics as direct predictors and symbolic universes as indirect predictors. Consistently with the hypotheses, analyses revealed that the impact of identity motives is higher than that produced by socio-economic motives or political values. Symbolic universes indirectly influence identity motives and, therefore, voting behavior. Results are interpreted in the framework of Semiotic Cultural Psychology Theory.

Keywords: Political values, Identity motives, Cultural psychology, Sensemaking, Semiosis

*Corresponding author.

Sergio Salvatore

Department of Human and Social
Sciences, University of Salento,

Via di Valesio 24, 73100, Lecce, Italy

E-mail: sergio.salvatore@unisalento.it

(S. Salvatore)

Introduction

It has been largely recognized that in current Western democracies political preferences are motivated by cultural worldviews (Veltri et al., 2019), and identity-motivated reasoning (Arieli et al., 2019; Scharfbillig et al., 2021; henceforth: identity motives) more than utility criteria, projects and interests (e.g., Norris & Inglehart, 2018). Nowadays, many citizens do not endorse political forces for their traditional function of representing class-based, socio-economic interests, as mapped by the left-right divide. Rather, to a great extent, citizens give their support to political forces that they perceive to be aligned with their identity motives and cultural worldviews, as expressed by beliefs and attitudes on issues like civil rights, LGBT, abortion, role of the family, religious affiliation, as well as moral rules, behavioral and language codes (Caprara & Vecchione, 2018; Enke, 2020). A sign of this trend is provided by Turnbull-Dugarte, S. J. (2020) who showed that LGBT people tend to support center and left-wing parties. Political preferences are expressed within and shaped by a polarized political landscape. More and more citizens do not endorse political forces because of results to be pursued; instead, they choose what to vote against - e.g., immigrants, EU bureaucracy, ethnic minorities, the cultural and political elite. In other words, people do not use their political choice to manage resources and problems, but to take a position on the in-outgroup divide and, in doing so, whatever us/them distinction is drawn, to express and reinforce the identity fostered by the us/them polarization (Huddy, Bankert, & Davies, 2018; Mannarini & Salvatore, 2020).

These dynamics reflect the momentum that subjectivity has gained in contemporary societies (Cortois & Laermans, 2018, p. 61) and, more specifically, the emotional, affect-laden meaning-making underpinning the way individuals and groups interpret the public sphere (Fortier, 2016; Hochschild, 2016; Salvatore et al., 2018).

Two broad interpretative frameworks have been used to understand this shift towards affect-laden meaning-making in the public sphere. On the one hand, it has been considered a reaction to the socio-economic decline affecting many areas of highly developed Western societies over the last quarter of a century - e.g., deindustrialization, increased inequality, dismantling of welfare services. Broad segments of society have seen their living conditions radically and irremediably worsened and have responded with anxiety, anger, distrust, and desire for revenge - all feelings related to the search for an enemy (Salvatore et al., 2019a). At the same time, the progressive subjecting of national and regional economies to the globalized dynamics has fostered a sense of fatalism, as if the economic conditions were taken-for-granted realities. This has led the focus of politics to be progressively displaced from material to symbolic and social issues, perceived as a domain in which change is seen as possible (Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Kaltwasser & Van Hauwaert, 2020; Noury & Roland, 2020). On the other hand, the relevance of cultural and identity motives has been explained as the effect of the socio-economic progress made in Western societies. People have reached high levels of economic wealth and security and, having satisfied these basic needs, turned to "post-materialist values", having

at the core the subject, its self-expression and self-actualization (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

Both these approaches grasp a piece of the reality, yet they are not enough to explain socio-political phenomena reflecting the momentum gained by cultural worldviews and identity motives (e.g., Mannarini et al., 2020). Above all, these two interpretative frameworks focus on the socio-economic contextual determinants, but they do not help reaching a deep understanding of the role played by cultural and identity factors (Russo, Mannarini, & Salvatore, 2020). Reaching such an understanding is crucial in explaining the heterogeneous impact of cultural and identity motives on Western democracies (e.g., Marie Le Pen did not succeed where Trump did; in general, Scandinavian populism did not reach the level of populism in Mediterranean countries), in forecasting their evolution, and in understanding what policy-making can do to promote positive aspects of identity and to counteract the negatives ones (Cremaschi et al., 2021).

Recently, a model of the relation between cultural worldviews, identity motives and political choice has been developed, based on the Semiotic Cultural Psychology Theory (SCPT; Salvatore, 2018; Valsiner, 2007). SCPT provides a theoretical and methodological framework to model and estimate the impact of the affect-laden dimensions of meaning on the social and individual cognition underpinning political beliefs and behavior. According to the SCPT model, cultural worldviews are hypergeneralized, affect-laden beliefs that work as embodied assumptions concerning the whole self-world relation - i.e., what and who one is, what the world is and how things go/should go. Salvatore and colleagues (2018) called these cultural worldviews *symbolic universes*, in order to highlight the fact that subjects are embedded within them and therefore their feelings, thoughts and actions are shaped by them (for a similar view, see Taylor's [2002] notion of social imaginary). Symbolic universes do not concern discrete objects (e.g., immigration, politics) or a specific domain (e.g., institutional sphere, family relations), but the entire field of the individual's life, taken as a whole. For instance, previous analyses of several European societies (Salvatore et al., 2018) led to the identification of a symbolic universe connoting the world as a jungle, a threatening place. Thus, people identified with this symbolic universe tend to make sense of any event and circumstance as a potential source of damage from which one needs to protect oneself. Symbolic universes are affect-laden because each of them is made up of a network of meanings which are related by reason of their affective valence (e.g., pleasantness, sense of powerfulness), also in the absence of semantic linkage - or even in spite of their semantic conflict (Ciavolino et al., 2017).

Accordingly, symbolic universes ground both personal and social identity (Salvatore et al., 2019b) as well as beliefs and choices concerning the political sphere (Cremaschi et al., 2021).

Two recent studies have provided preliminary evidence of the role of symbolic universes in voting behavior. Veltri and colleagues (2019) showed that the generalized meanings comprising symbolic universes played a major role in the Brexit referendum's leave/remain choice. More specifically, they found that the incidence of these meanings in the 12 UK regions enables those with a higher remain vote to be fully

differentiated from those with a higher leave vote. Mannarini and colleagues (2020) have found that the populist vote at the 2013 Italian national election was driven by a combination of civicness, support for democracy and distrust in institutions, with a pattern of symbolic universes as indirect antecedent.

However, these studies do not provide a comparative analysis of the role played by different types of meanings (i.e., identity motives, symbolic universes, political values) and socio-demographic factors in influencing voting behavior. The present study intends to carry out this task, and to test the SCPT model.

Aim and hypotheses

This study focuses on the Italian electorate and is aimed at analysing the role played by identity motives and cultural worldviews in citizens' voting behavior. More particularly, as a result of the

momentum gained by subjectivity in the political sphere, the impact of identity motives on voting behavior is expected to be high, greater than that of factors that more directly reflect the content of political preferences, namely economic interests and political values. In turn, based on the SCPT, identity motives are expected to be influenced by the generalized cultural worldviews – i.e., symbolic universes – in which they are embedded. Thus, in brief, it is expected that symbolic universes have an indirect effect on voting behavior, via identity motives.

In order to test the model, it has been broken down into the following three hypotheses (cf. Figure 1):

Hypothesis 1: identity motives impact on voting behavior.

Hypothesis 2: the impact of identity motives is higher than that produced by economic motives (as reflected in the socio-economic status) and political values.

Hypothesis 3: symbolic universes influence voting behavior indirectly, through the impact on identity motives.

Fig. 1. Hypotheses tested by the study





Fig. 2. Distribution of study sample by geographical area: number of males (♂), females (♀) and their mean age.



Method

Sample

The study is part of a larger survey (Ethical clearance N. 0000116/2021 by Department of Dynamic and Clinical Psychology and Health Studies, Sapienza University of Rome), based on a representative Italian national sample of 3,020 respondents, stratified by gender ($W=51.3\%$), age (Mean=47.6; SD=14.45; range 18-75), and Italian regions (cf. Figure 2).

Respondents either completed a computer-assisted web interview (CAWI; $N=2,574$, 85.2% of the sample, 18-65-year segments) or were contacted by phone for a computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI; $N=446$, 14% of the sample, 66-75-year segment). Interviews were performed during the last week of April, 2021. As shown by Table 1 our sample proves to have a higher education level than the national population.

Tab. 1. Distribution of study sample by education

Level of education	Study sample		National population*	
	N	%	N	%
primary school	19	1	9992	10
secondary school	361	12	27736	32
high school	1763	58	33401	40
university degree	877	29	14699	18

* source: Italian National Statistics Institute (2021b)

Instruments

Political values. Political values were detected by means of an ad hoc adjusted shortened version of the Core Political Values (CPV; Schwartz, Caprara & Vecchione, 2010). The adjusted CPV (aCPV) was composed of 12 Likert-type items with response format ranging from 1=not at all agree to 5=totally agree, designed to measure 5 core political values: *law and order*, *blind patriotism*, *traditional morality*, *equality*, *free enterprise*, *civic liberties*. Compared to the original version, we selected just two items for each core value. Moreover, we did not select items concerning two core political values: *military intervention* and *accepting immigrants*— the former because we assumed they were not relevant in the Italian political context;

the latter because we considered it dependent on symbolic universes, and already measured by a VOC item (see below). Previous studies (Schwartz et al 2010, 2014) found that all dimensions have sufficient reliability and satisfactory internal consistency (α between 0.74 and 0.85).

A Principal Component analysis (oblimin rotation) produced three factors (57,41% of variance explained). Factor 1 (26,40%), was saturated by the items of blind patriotism and traditional morality, the original version's core values, plus one item of law and order (police should have more power to protect citizens) ($\alpha = .739$); factor 2 (22,19% of variance explained) by the equality and civic liberties items ($\alpha = .794$); factor 3 (8,82%) by free enterprise and law and order items except the one (i.e., police should have more power to protect citizens) associated with the first factor ($\alpha = .630$) (cf. Table 2). Accordingly, we have named the first, second and third factor *nationalist conservatism*, *civic egalitarianism* and *authoritarian liberalism* respectively, and used their factorial score in the subsequent analyses. One can note that each of these 3 factorial dimension merges two factorial dimensions of the original scale, obtained from an international sample: nationalist conservatism was saturated by the items of *blind patriotism* and *traditional morality*; civic egalitarianism by the *equality* and *civic liberties* items, authoritarian liberalism by *free enterprise* and *law and order*. It goes beyond the scope of the current work to delve into the difference between the structures of the adjusted and original version. We merely note that it is probably due to the fact that we used only two items for each core political value. However, this does not rule out that the specificity of the Italian context might have played a role.

Identity motives. Identity was estimated by means of two complementary measures.

First, we used a measure of the attitude towards the outgroup as an indirect measure of the valorisation of one's identity. Evidence showing the relation between identity and out-group hostility (Hamidou-Schmidt & Mayer, 2021) supports such a choice. More specifically, we focused on the *negative attitude toward immigrants*. We did so because, in contemporary societies, migration represents the prototype of the outgroup (e.g., Mazzara et al., 2021) and also because the migration

Tab. 2. Principal Component Analysis of adjusted Core Political value. Pattern matrix

Items	Factor loading		
	1	2	3
I would support my country. right or wrong.	.808		
It is unpatriotic to criticize one's own country.	.783		
It is extremely important to defend our traditional religious and moral values.	.696		
Newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.	.607		
The police should have more power so they can protect us better against crime.	.466		
Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.		.821	
If people were treated more equally in this country. we would have fewer problems.		.795	
It is extremely important to respect the freedom of individuals to be and believe whatever they want.		.778	
The most important thing for our country is to defend civil liberties.		.721	
It would be a good idea to privatize all of the public enterprises.			.853
The less government gets involved with business and the economy. the better off this country will be.			.767
It's right for the government to take restrictive measures on civil liberties to guarantee the security of citizens.			.447

Note. The report contains only coefficients > |.4|

issue has been playing a pivotal role in political discourses. The attitude towards migrations was measured by means of a 4-point scale (from 1=fully disagree to 4=fully agree) and four affirmations: “Immigrants have an overall positive impact on the Italian economy”; “They are a burden on our society (health, school, pensions)”; “They take work away from Italians”; “They work in jobs for which it is difficult to find workers willing among Italians”. The Principal Components Analysis proved the one-dimensionality of the scale (57.88% of the total variance; $\alpha = .76$). Accordingly, we used the factorial score as index – the higher the score, the higher the negative attitude towards immigrants, and therefore the stronger the identity motive.

Second, we estimated the perception of *identity threat*, by means of the Eurobarometer survey’s item (European Commission, 2021) - the statement “Currently, my identity is threatened”, evaluated on a 5-point Likert-scale (from 1=fully disagree to 5=fully agree, with 3=intermediate point).

Symbolic universes. They were mapped by means of the short version of the View of Context (VOC) (Ciavolino et al., 2017). The short version of VOC is composed of 29 items having a response format ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree (cf. Table SM1, Supplementary Material). VOC is designed to identify the symbolic universes that are active within the sample, based on the way people represent significant and affective-laden aspects of their contexts of life. More specifically, based on the SCPT framework, the questionnaire aims at detecting the oppositional semantic structures underpinning the ways of making sense of the reality. To this end, items were constructed to facilitate the expression of perceptions/opinions/judgements concerning the microsocial and macrosocial spheres of experience (e.g., an evaluation of the place where the person lives or the level of trustworthiness of the social structures) and in so doing to trigger the activation of generalized meanings. The following spheres are considered: interpersonal bond, institutions, society as a whole, local context, successful social strategies, values, sense of agency and powerfulness. VOC proved to have satisfactory construct (Ciavolino et al., 2017) and criterion (e.g., Cordella et al., 2023; Salvatore et al., 2019b; Veltri et al., 2019) validity.

It is worth highlighting that VOC responses were treated as categorical. This is so because it is assumed that response modalities express affect-laden positions which do not necessarily have linear relations among them. Moreover, by considering them as categorical, no constraints are placed on the way they combine (e.g., in previous studies this enabled positive association to be detected between opposite extreme responses; cf. Salvatore et al., 2018). Consistently with the categorical interpretation of items, responses are analysed by means of a procedure combining Multidimensional Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and Cluster Analysis (CA). First, by means of the Multidimensional Correspondence Analysis (MCA), the categorical variables are transformed into continuous dimensions. Then, a Cluster Analysis (hierarchical classification method) is carried out, using the main factorial dimensions extracted by the MCA as similarity/dissimilarity criteria. Each cluster obtained by the CA detects a profile of VOC responses that characterized a segment of the sample. According to the

SCPT framework, each cluster is interpreted as the marker of a symbolic universe (for details on the methodology, see Keruškaitė et al., 2023; Salvatore et al., 2019c).

The MCA applied to the sample’s responses extracted 6 main factors, which explain 96.07% of the total inertia (according to Benzecri’s “optimistic” formula of revaluation). Factors extracted contributed to more than 10% of the cumulative inertia. These 6 factors were used as classificatory criteria in the following Cluster Analysis, which identified 4 valid clusters and a residual group (8.3%) (Intra-class inertia 0.377; total 0.711 ratio: 0.442). Based on response profiles (cf. Table SM2, Supplementary Material), we interpreted the clusters as follows.

Symbolic Universe 1. Disheartened affiliates (34.5%). The profile is characterized by moderate fatalism, familism, distrust in people, pessimism, conformity, passivity, amorality, adherence to power. For these subjects the world is an object to accept as it is, whose “rules of the game” require passive adherence.

Symbolic Universe 2. Confident engaged (31.0%). These subjects are characterized by rejection of fatalism, amorality and adherence to power and by moderate trust in people, agencies and institutions. The world is something to engage with.

Symbolic Universe 3. Idealizing optimists (11.8%). This segment of respondents is characterized by extreme rejection of fatalism, high trust in people, in institutions, in the future, rejection of conformism and high agency. All positive qualities proposed by the questionnaire are exalted, all negative aspects are totally rejected. For these subjects the world is an object to idealize.

Symbolic Universe 4. Reactive anomics (14.5%). These respondents express extreme distrust in institutions - but trust in people - extreme fatalism, devaluation of immigrants, adherence to power, conformism, and amorality. For them. the outside world (i.e. the social context beyond the interpersonal linkages) is a persecutory reality void of any meaningful sense.

Voting behavior. It was detected by means of an item asking what party the respondent would vote for should the election be held at that moment. Respondents could choose among parties that obtained the highest electoral support in the last political election (“Movimento 5 Stelle” [5 Star Movement], “Partito Democratico” [Democratic Party], “Lega” [League], “Forza Italia” [Come on, Italy], “Fratelli d’Italia” [Brothers of Italy], Liberi e Uguali (LEU) [“Free and Equal”], “+Europe”); other alternatives were: autonomist/local parties (e.g., “Sudtiroler Volkspartei”), “other Center parties”, “other Left parties”, “other Right parties”; finally, a “no response/don’t know” alternative was included. Responses were then grouped in five groups: 5 Star Movement; Center-left/Left; Center-right/Right; Autonomist/local parties; no response/don’t know.

Socio-demographic data. Finally, participants were asked to respond to a set of questions aimed at collecting information on the respondents’ socio-demographics: gender, age, education level, socio-economic status. For the level of education, respondents were grouped into three categories: primary/secondary, high school diploma, or university studies. For economic status, participants were asked to indicate on a 5-point scale how they consider their economic status in comparison to the average of Italian people (1=much lower; 5=much higher).

Data analysis

Descriptive analyses of measures and their relations were carried out by means of inferential statistics (ANOVA, chi square). Hypotheses 1-3 were checked by means of a non-parametrical statistical modelling technique (Partial Least Squares - Structural Equation Modelling, PLS-SEM; Hair et al., 2017; Hair et al., 2021), with vote intention as outcome, political values, identity motives (negative attitude towards migration, and identity threat) and socio-demographics (age, sex, education, socio-economic status) as direct predictors and symbolic universes as indirect predictors. The symbolic universes “Disheartened affiliates”, Idealizing optimists, and “Reactive anomics” were entered into the model, while the “Confident engaged” was used as reference category. All estimates of the PLS-SEM were validated through 5000 bootstrap resamplings. Given the high statistical power due to the large sample, we adopted the $p < 0.01$ as threshold of significance.

Results

Descriptive statistics

Symbolic universes were not associated with any socio-demographic indicators - i.e., age (ANOVA test not significant) as well as gender, territorial area, education and economic status (Chi square test not significant). It must be highlighted that, given the small size of their extreme categories, in this and subsequent analyses both education and economic status were aggregated into three classes each: primary/secondary school vs. high school vs. degree or higher level of education; lower/much lower than average vs. average vs. higher/much higher than average, respectively.

Table 3 shows the distribution of voting intentions grouped by political areas. More than one third (37.0) did not answer or responded: “don’t know”.

Tab. 3. Voting intention. Distribution of study sample per parties and political alignment

Political alignment	Study sample			
	Party	N	%	%
M5S	M5S	473		15.7
	PD	347	11.5	
center-left/left	LEU	57	1.9	18.7
	other center	49	1.6	
	other left	111	3.7	
center-right/right	Lega	373	12.4	
	Forza Italia	119	3.9	
	Fratelli d'Italia	335	11.1	28.3
	other right	28	0.9	
	autonomist	11		0.4
	no response	1117		37.0

M5S: 5 Star Movement; PD: Partito Democratico; LEU: Liberi e Uguali;

We performed a set of analysis to estimate the socio-demographic and cultural characteristics of the voting intention. Participants that did not express their voting intentions (i.e.,

no response or “don’t know” response; N=1117, 37.0%) were omitted from this analysis; moreover, given their very low size (N=11; 0.4%), participants expressing the intention to vote for autonomist/local parties were not considered either. Voting intention proved to be unrelated to age (ANOVA test: $F[2,1889] = 2.807, p = 0.057$), and associated only weakly with gender ($X^2[2] = 5.972, p < .050$, Contingent coefficient = .06). Voting intention proved to be associated with: a) education ($X^2[6] = 54.837, p < .001$, Contingent coefficient = .168); b) economic status ($X^2[4] = 24.509, p < .001$, Contingent coefficient = .113), c) territorial area ($X^2[8] = 198.603, p < .001$, Contingent coefficient = .308). No relation between voting intention and symbolic universes was found ($X^2[6] = 10.371, p = .110$)

More specifically, the previous analyses detect the following profile of voting intentions (cf. tables 4-7).

- 5 Star Movement voters live prevalently in Southern Italy and the Islands, with low economic status (no characterization as to gender and education)
- Center-left/Left voters are prevalently highly educated (degree or higher) males, living in Central Italy, with middle or high economic status.
- Center-right/Right voters are prevalently middle (high school level) or lower (middle school or lower) people, living in Northern-Eastern and North-Western Italy (no characterization as to gender and education).

Tab. 4. Voting intention. Distribution per gender and political alignment

Political alignment		Gender		Total
		M	F	
5SM	Count	246a	227a	473
	Adjusted residual	-0.9	0.9	
Center-Left	Count	328a	236b	564
	Adjusted residual	2.4	-2.4	
Center-Right	Count	445a	410a	855
	Adjusted residual	-1.4	1.4	
Total	Count	1019	873	1892

$X^2[2] = 5.972. p < .05$. Note. Each subscript letter indicates a subset of gender categories whose column proportions are not significantly different from each other at level $p < .05$.

Tab. 5. Voting intention. Distribution per education and political alignment

Political alignment		Education			Total
		Middle school or lower	High school or lower	Academic degree or higher	
5SM	Count	61a	288a	124a	473
	Adjusted residual	0.2	0.8	-1	
Center-Left	Count	52a	291a	221b	564
	Adjusted residual	-2.9	-4.5	7.1	
Center-Right	Count	126a	544a	185b	855
	Adjusted residual	2.5	3.4	-5.6	
Total	Count	239	1123	530	1892

$X^2[6] = 54.837. p < .001$. Note. Each subscript letter indicates a subset of education categories whose column proportions are not significantly different from each other at level $p < .05$.

Tab. 6. Voting intention. Distribution per economic status and political alignment

Political alignment		economic status			Total
		low	middle	high	
5SM	Count	154a	282b	37b	473
	Adjusted residual	3	-0.8	-2.9	
Center-Left	Count	118a	366b	80b	564
	Adjusted residual	-4	2.1	2.4	
Center-Right	Count	243a	511a	101a	855
	Adjusted residual	1.1	-1.2	0.4	
Total	Count	515	1159	218	1892

$X^2[4] = 24.509$. $p < .001$. Note. Each subscript letter indicates a subset of economic status categories whose column proportions are not significantly different from each other at level $p < .05$.

Tab. 7. Voting intention. Distribution per territorial area and political alignment

Political alignment		Territorial area					Total
		Center	Islands	North-East	North-West	South	
5SM	Count	74a	81b	47a	72a	199b	473
	Adjusted residual	-3.1	5	-5.6	-6.4	11.1	
Center-Left	Count	135a	50a	102a	156a	121a	564
	Adjusted residual	2.3	-1.8	-0.4	0.7	-1.2	
Center-Right	Count	182a. b	75b. c	203d	274a. d	121c	855
	Adjusted residual	0.6	-2.7	5.2	4.9	-8.6	
Total	Count	391	206	352	502	441	1892

$X^2[8] = 198.603$. $p < .001$. Note. Each subscript letter indicates a subset of territorial area categories whose column proportions are not significantly different from each other at level $p < .05$.

Hypotheses tests

The test of the hypotheses by means of the PLS-SEM model produced the following output (cf. Figure 3; cf. Table SM3, Supplementary Material).

Hypothesis 1 (identity motives impact on voting behavior), and hypothesis 2 (the impact of identity motives is higher than that produced by economic motives and political values).

The following direct antecedents of voting behavior proved to be significant (cf. Figure 3a).

- intention to vote for 5 Stars movement was predicted by age (coefficient: -0.09, $t = 3.783$, $p < .001$);
- intention to vote for center-right/right parties was predicted by socio-economic status (coefficient: 0.07, $t = 2.905$, $p = .004$), and negative attitude towards immigrants (coefficient: 0.35, $t = 10.148$, $p < .001$).
- intention to vote for center-left/left parties was predicted by nationalist conservatism (coefficient: -.13, $t = 4.348$, $p < .001$), authoritarian liberalism (coefficient: -0.07, $t = 3.133$, $p = .002$), and negative attitude towards immigrants (coefficient: -0.24, $t = 6.412$, $p < .001$).

Hypothesis 3 (symbolic universes influence voting behavior via identity motives).

First, no significant relation between Symbolic Universes and vote intention was found. Second, symbolic universes proved to be antecedents of both identity motives and political values (cf. Figure 3a). More specifically:

- disheartened affiliates predicted negative attitude towards immigrants (coefficient: 0.39, $t = 10.094$, $p = .002$), identity threat (coefficient: 0.33, $t = 8.108$, $p < .001$); authoritarian liberalism (coefficient: 0.26, $t = 6.081$, $p < .001$), civic egalitarianism (coefficient: -0.21, $t = 4.865$, $p < .001$), and nationalist conservatism (coefficient: 0.14, $t = 3.409$, $p = .001$);
- idealizing optimists predicted authoritarian liberalism (coefficient: -0.35, $t = 5.314$, $p < .001$), civic egalitarianism (coefficient: 0.31, $t = 5.300$, $p < .001$), negative attitude towards immigrants (coefficient: -0.30, $t = 4.662$, $p < .001$), identity threat (coefficient: -0.26, $t = 4.152$, $p < .001$), and nationalist conservatism (coefficient: -0.19, $t = 2.704$, $p = .007$);
- reactive anomics predicted negative attitude towards immigrants (coefficient: 0.71, $t = 11.047$, $p < .001$), identity threat (coefficient: 0.53, $t = 8.416$, $p < .001$), authoritarian liberalism (coefficient: 0.25, $t = 4.030$, $p = .001$) and nationalist conservatism (coefficient: 0.21, $t = 3.324$, $p = .001$).


Third, symbolic universes proved to have indirect effects on voting intention (cf. Figure 3b).

- Disheartened affiliates impacted on the intention to vote: (I) center-right/right parties, via negative attitude towards immigrants (coefficient: 0.14, $t = 7.085$, $p < .001$); (II) center-left/left parties, via negative attitude towards immigrants (coefficient: -0.10, $t = 5.275$, $p < .001$), authoritarian liberalism (coefficient: -0.02, $t = 2.767$, $p = .006$), nationalist conservatism (coefficient: -0.02, $t = 2.616$, $p = .009$),
- Idealizing optimists impacted on the intention to vote (I) center-right/right parties, via negative attitude towards immigrants (coefficient: -0.11, $t = 4.207$, $p < .001$); (II) center-left/left parties, via negative attitude towards immigrants (coefficient: 0.07, $t = 3.789$, $p < .001$), authoritarian liberalism (coefficient: 0.03, $t = 2.699$, $p = .007$).
- Reactive anomics impacted on the intention to vote (I) center-right/right parties, via negative attitude towards immigrants (coefficient: 0.25, $t = 7.355$, $p < .001$); (II) center-left/left parties, via negative attitude towards immigrants (coefficient: -0.17, $t = 5.321$, $p < .001$)

Discussion and conclusion

The present work aimed at shedding light on the role played by identity motives and cultural worldviews (i.e., symbolic universes) in voting behavior. More particularly, the study tested a mediational model having the symbolic universes impacting on voting behaviour via identity motives. This mediational model was tested in terms of three hypotheses drawn from it: identity motives impact on voting behavior

Fig. 3. General PLS-SEM model of the antecedents of voting intention. 3a. Direct effects. 3b. Indirect effects.



(HP1), the impact of identity motives is higher than that produced by economic motives and political values (HP2); symbolic universes influence voting behavior indirectly, via identity motives (HP3).

Findings of the Structural Equation Model were consistent with the three hypotheses, though only partially.

- A) Partially confirming hypothesis 1, one indirect measure of identity motives - negative attitude towards immigrants - proved to predict the voting intention; more specifically, this measure predicted the intention to vote for right/center-right parties (positively) and left/center-left parties (negatively). However, differently from what we expected, we did not find a relation between identity threat and voting intention. Further studies will have to clarify whether/to what extent this finding reflects an actual state of affairs or is a consequence of the weakness of the measures adopted - which consisted of a one-item self-report score.
- B) Consistently with hypothesis 2, the two largest effects detected by the model were those of the negative attitudes towards immigrants - i.e., the positive effect on voting for right/center-right parties and the negative effect on left/center-left parties. The other 5 significant effects proved to be smaller: they were obtained by 2 out of 4 socio-demographic variables (socio-economic status and age), and the three political values. Of note, all effects of the political values were negative - nationalist conservatism and authoritarian liberalism predicted the left/center left vote negatively while civic egalitarianism predicted the right/center-right vote negatively. In brief, consistently with the view of the contemporary voting behavior as "against" rather than "pro" (Huddy, Bankert, & Davies, 2018), endorsing a certain political value seems to foster the decision to distance oneself from the political alignment seen as being unrepresentative of one's own political position, rather than motivating one to choose the political alignment more consistent with it.
- C) The findings are also consistent with hypothesis 3, though only partially. Symbolic universes proved to affect voting intention via identity motives. More specifically (contrasted with the positive worldview of the Confident engaged symbolic universes, assumed as reference category) we found that the Disheartened affiliates and Reactive anomics symbolic universes have a positive effect on the vote for right/center-right parties and a negative effect on the left/center-left parties, due to their capacity to foster negative attitudes towards immigrants. Conversely, the symbolic universe that reflects a highly positive - idealized - connotation of the world - Idealizing optimists - has a negative effect on the vote for right/center-right parties and a positive effect on the left/center-left parties, due to its capacity to foster low negative attitudes towards immigrants. However, it must be noted that 3 symbolic universes' indirect effects mediated by political values were found too. These indirect effects were not predicted by Hypothesis 3; however they were not in contradiction with it. A) Disheartened affiliates proved to have a negative indirect effect on the left/center-left vote via its positive impact on nationalist conservatism and authoritarian liberalism (in turn both affecting negatively the vote for

left/center-left vote); B) Reactive anomics proved to have a negative indirect effect on the left/center-left vote via its positive impact on authoritarian liberalism.

Taken as a whole, the picture that emerges from these analyses is that right/center-right parties have as one major driving force the identity motive - as reflected by the negative attitude towards immigrants - while the electoral preference for left/center-left parties seems to be fostered by the low level of this negative attitude. Among the two mainstream political polarities, the electoral preference for the 5 Star Movement emerges as a transversal choice, lacking any specific characterization in terms of symbolic universes, identity motive, and/or political value. Additionally, the relation of the 5 Star Movement with low socio-economic status shown by descriptive analyses disappears once the latter is embedded in the whole network of association estimated by the SEM model. By contrast, the negative relation between age and the 5 Star Movement emerges. These results concerning the 5 Star Movement are not surprising - they are fully consistent with the conceptualization of populism (the 5 Star Movement is largely considered a populist force; cf. Mannarini et al., 2020a,b; Pirro, 2018) as a thin ideology (Mudde, 2004), namely a discourse focused on an overarching interpretation of society in terms of the dichotomous divide between good-people and bad-élite, that - according to the contingencies- borrows from both left- and right-wing ideologies, themes and discourse to substantiate its political support. Accordingly, the absence of characterization of the 5 Star Movement (but by the age) can be interpreted as the manifestation of the thinness of the populist discourse, which enables this political force to be endorsed transversally, by voters having political and identity profiles that otherwise could be associated with both left and right orientations. By the way, the transversality of the 5 Star Movement is witnessed by the policy of alliances it implemented in recent years - after the electoral success at the 2018 Italian election, first (2018-2019) it led a government with a far-right sovereigntist party (Lega) and then (2019-2021), under the same Prime Minister, a government with left and center-left parties (Democratic Party and "Liberi e uguali").

A second important element emerging from the study is the role played by symbolic universes - i.e., generalized cultural worldviews - in channelling voting behavior. Consistently with the way they have been theorized (Salvatore et al., 2018, 2019c) and with previous analyses of Italian voting behavior (Mannarini et al., 2020), symbolic universes affect voting behavior indirectly, via their capacity to activate/disactivate identity motives (more specifically, identity motives concerning negative attitudes towards migrants) and political value. This finding confirms the Semiotic Cultural Psychology Theory's view of identity motives as embedded within and fostered by generalized worldviews (Cremaschi et al., 2021). It is worth adding that the impact of symbolic universes on political values, though not foreseen by the hypotheses tested by the model, it is consistent with the Semiotic Cultural Psychology Theory's framework - indeed, the political values are beliefs that can be viewed as embedded within the generalized system of meaning making up the cultural worldview (Salvatore et al., 2019). Thus, it is not surprising that the latter proved to affect the former.

Another relevant element that emerges from the analyses is the fading away of anchorages of political preferences for the left-wing political alignment. Not only do class-based interests prove to have no impact on voting intention, even in the way they can be reflected in the socio-economic status, but also the political cultures that have traditionally fostered left-wing political discourse - the endorsement of human, social and civic rights, as expressed by the civic egalitarianism core political value - seem to have lost their capacity to bolster support for left-wing parties. What seems to remain to motivate the left-wing electorate is an aversive approach - namely, the rejection of the identity-based right-wing discourse as well as authoritarian liberalism and nationalist conservatism political values - prompted by a positive generalized worldview (the one expressed by the Idealist optimists and Confident engaged symbolic universes [the latter once contrasted to Disheartened affiliates]). In brief, we are proposing to interpret the findings concerning the voting intention for left and center left parties as indicative of an aversive attitude -i.e. the electorate of left/center left parties is motivated by contrasting values and identity motives considered incompatible with the positive generalized worldview they endorse. Having said that, it must be recognized that such a conclusion needs to be considered conjectural. This is so because the present study did not consider other possible determinants of the left-wing vote. Thus, further studies will have to clarify to what extent the political preference for center-left/left-wing parties is to be considered an aversive reaction to the momentum gained by the right-wing-related identity motives – and/or by further forms of identity motives that are more consistent with left-wing political cultures.

Before concluding, some limitations of the study must be recognized. First, it needs to be highlighted that non-responders - about a third of the sample - were excluded from the analyses. Thus, findings cannot be generalized to the whole population but must be considered limited to the segment of population expressing a voting intention. The measures of identity motives adopted represent a second limitation of the study. Measures of socio-economic status were only indirect proxy (education) or based on self-report evaluation, potentially subject to social and cognitive bias. Again, the attitude towards immigrants as a proxy of identity motive is both theoretically and empirically justifiable and provides some advantages compared to direct self-report measures. However, it raises not unimportant problems. Indeed, the attitude towards immigrants might reflect other factors too (e.g., concerns about the economic impact of migration). Moreover, certain identity motives (e.g., religious identity) may not be associated – or even associated positively - with negative attitudes towards immigrants. Also the measure of identity threat may raise some concern, due to its one-item self-report format. Limitations in the measures of identity adopted weakens the interpretation of results. Indeed the impact of the negative attitude toward immigrants could reflect – at least partially – the role played by factors other than identity motives.

A further word of caution is in order. Indeed, the results of the study tell a story of what happened only a few months ago; yet the socio-political and institutional turmoil generated by the pandemic could have radically moved on from it. Follow-ups are

therefore required to understand better how much of the picture outlined above is the expression of major medium-term socio-cultural and political processes and how much is instead related to contingent phenomena. These follow-ups will also enable the limitations of the current study to be addressed as well as a more fine-grained analysis of the moderator role of territorial characteristics - e.g., local distribution of social capital.

Funding

This work was supported by the Trust of the grant RG120172B95A8209 (Bando Ateneo 2020 - Grandi Progetti), Sapienza University of Rome.

Conflicts of interest

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Ethics approval

The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of Dynamic, Clinical Psychology and Health Studies of “Sapienza” University of Rome (No. 0000116/2021).

Authors Contribution

Conceptualization, SA, TM and SS; Formal analysis, FS, AG, MR, and SS; Methodology, AG, and SS; Supervision, SA, TM, MS and SS; Visualization, SDD, SK and GR; Writing—original draft, SA, BC, AG and SS; Writing—review & editing, SA, BC, AG, SI, AK, AR and MS. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Supplementary materials

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://osf.io/7br9v/>

References

- Arieli, S., Amit, A., & Mentser, S. (2019). Identity-motivated reasoning: Biased judgments regarding political leaders and their actions. *Cognition*, 188, 64-73. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.12.009>
- Caprara, G. V., & Vecchione, M. (2018). On the left and right ideological divide: Historical accounts and contemporary perspectives. *Political Psychology*, 39, 49-83. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12476>
- Ciavolino, E., Redd, R., Evrinomy, A., Falcone, M., Fini, V., Kadianaki, I., ... & Salvatore, S. (2017). Views of Context. An instrument for the analysis of the cultural milieu. A first validation study. *Electronic Journal of Applied Statistical Analysis*, 10(2), 599-628. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1285/i20705948v10n2p599>
- Cordella, B., Signore, F., Andreassi, S., De Dominicis, S., Genaro, A., Iuso, S., Mannarini, T., Kerusauskaite, S., Kosc, A., Reho, M., Rochira, A., Rocchi, G., Salvatore, S. (2023). How socio-institutional contexts and cultural worldviews relate to

- COVID-19 acceptance rates: A representative study in Italy. *Social Science and Medicine*. (320) 115671. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2023.115671>.
- Cortois, L., & Laermans, R. (2018). Rethinking individualization: The basic script and the three variants of institutionalized individualism. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 21(1), 60-78. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431017698474>
- Cremaschi, M., Fioretti, C., Mannarini, T., & Salvatore, S. (2021). *Culture and Policy-Making*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71967-8>
- Enke, B. (2020). Moral values and voting. *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(10), 3679-3729. <https://doi.org/10.1086/708857>
- European Commission. (2021). Eurobarometer 93.1 (2020). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7649 Data file Version 1.2.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13746>
- Fortier, A. M. (2016). Afterword: acts of affective citizenship? Possibilities and limitations (2017). *Citizenship Studies* 20(8), 1038-1044. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2016.1229190>
- Guriev, S., Papaioannou, E. (2020). The Political Economy of Populism. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3542052> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3542052>
- Hair, J. F., Hult, G. T. M., Ringle, C. M., Sarstedt, M., & Thiele, K. O. (2017). Mirror, mirror on the wall: a comparative evaluation of composite-based structural equation modeling methods. *Journal of the academy of marketing science*, 45(5), 616-632. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-017-0517-x>
- Hair, J. F., Hult, T. M., Ringle, C. M., Sarstedt, M., Danks, N. P., & Ray, S. (2021). *Partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) using R—A workbook*. Springer Nature. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80519-7>
- Hochschild, A. R. (2016). The ecstatic edge of politics: Sociology and Donald Trump. *Contemporary Sociology*, 45(6), 683-689. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094306116671947>
- Hamidou-Schmidt, H. and Mayer, S.J. (2021), The Relation Between Social Identities and Outgroup Hostility Among German Immigrant-Origin Citizens. *Political Psychology*, 42: 311-331. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12700>
- Huddy, L., Bankert, A., & Davies, C. (2018). Expressive versus instrumental partisanship in multiparty European systems. *Political Psychology*, 39, 173-199. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12482>
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511790881 PMid:11120488
- ISTAT [Italian National Institute of Statistics] (2021a). *Popolazione residente per età, sesso e stato civile al 1/1/2021 [Population living in Italy, by age, gender and marital status]* [database] Retrieved on March 4, 2022 from <https://demo.istat.it/popres/index.php?anno=2021&lingua=ita>
- ISTAT [Italian National Institute of Statistics] (2021b). *Popolazione per titolo di studio e regioni [Population living in Italy, by education and Regions]* [report] Retrieved on March 4, 2022 from <http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?QueryId=55981#>
- Kaltwasser, C. R., & Van Hauwaert, S. M. (2020). The populist citizen: Empirical evidence from Europe and Latin America. *European Political Science Review*, 12(1), 1-18. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773919000262>
- Kerušauskaitė, S., Reho, M., & Mannarini, T. (2023). A Tool to Analyze the Cultural Milieu: View of Context (VOC). In S. Salvatore, T. Mannarini, G. A. Veltri (Eds). *Methods and Instruments in the Study of Meaning-Making* (pp. 127-153). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
- Mannarini, T., & Salvatore, S. (2020). The politicization of otherness and the privatization of the enemy: Cultural hindrances and assets for active citizenship. *Human Affairs*, 30(1), 86-95. <https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2020-0008>
- Mannarini, T., Salvatore S., Veltri, G. A. (2020a). Identity, Otherness, and Psycho-Cultural Dynamics. In T. Mannarini, G. A. Veltri, & Salvatore, S. (Eds). *Media and Social Representations of Otherness. Psycho-Social-Cultural Implications* (pp. 1-16). Cham (Switzerland): Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36099-3_1
- Mannarini, T., Rochira, A., Ciavolino, E., Russo, F., Salvatore, S. (2020b). The demand for populism. A psycho-cultural based analysis of the desire for non mainstream political representation. *Psychology hub*, 37 (2), 31-39. <https://doi.org/10.13133/2724-2943/17161>
- Mazzara, B. M., Avdi, E., Kadianaki, I., Koutri, I., Lancia, F., Mannarini, T., ... & Salvatore, S. (2021). The representation of immigration. A retrospective newspaper analysis. *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 19(4), 436-455. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2020.1836299>
- Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. *Government and opposition*, 39(4), 541-563. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x>
- Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. F. (2018). Understanding Brexit: Cultural resentment versus economic grievances. *Paper for presentation at the Panel on 'Populism in Advanced Capitalist Democracies', Thursday, 30, 4-00*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3222901> <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3231896>
- Noury, A., & Roland, G. (2020). Identity politics and populism in Europe. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 23, 421-439. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-033542>
- Pirro, A. L. (2018). The polyvalent populism of the 5 Star Movement. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 26(4), 443-458. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2018.1519484>
- Russo, F., Mannarini, T., & Salvatore, S. (2020). From the manifestations of culture to the underlying sensemaking process. The contribution of semiotic cultural psychology theory to the interpretation of socio-political scenario. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 50(3), 301-320. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12235>
- Salvatore, S. (2018). Cultural Psychology as the Science of Sensemaking: A Semiotic-cultural Framework for Psychology. In A. Rosa & J. Valsiner (Eds). *The Cambridge Handbook of Sociocultural Psychology, 2nd Edition* (pp 35-48). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Salvatore, S., Fini, V., Mannarini, T., Veltri, G. A., Avdi, E., Battaglia, F., ... & Re. Cri. Re. Consortium. (2018). Symbolic universes between present and future of Europe. First results of the map of European societies' cultural milieu. *PloS one*, 13(1), e0189885. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0189885>

- Salvatore, S., Mannarini, T., Avdi, E., Battaglia, F., Cremaschi, M., Fini, V., ... & Veltri, G. A. (2019a). Globalization, demand of sense and enemization of the other: A psychocultural analysis of European societies' sociopolitical crisis. *Culture & Psychology*, 25(3), 345-374. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X18779056>
- Salvatore, S., Avdi, E., Battaglia, F., Bernal-Marcos, M., Buhaġar, L. J., Ciavolino, E., Fini, V., Kadianaki, I., Kullasepp, K., Mannarini, T., Matsopoulos, A., Mossi, P. G., Rochira, A., Sammut, G., Santaripa, A., Veltri, G. A. (2019b). Distribution and Characteristics of Symbolic Universes Over the European Societies. In S. Salvatore, V. Fini, T. Mannarini, J. Valsiner, G. A. Veltri, (Eds.), *Symbolic Universes in Time of (Post) Crisis. Crisis. The Future of European Societies* (pp. 135-170). Cham (Switzerland): Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19497-0_4
- Salvatore, S., Valsiner, J., Veltri, G. A. (2019c). The Theoretical and Methodological Framework. Semiotic Cultural Psychology, Symbolic Universes and Lines of Semiotic Forces. In S. Salvatore, V. Fini, T. Mannarini, J. Valsiner, G. A. Veltri, (Eds.), *Symbolic Universes in Time of (Post)Crisis. The Future of European Societies* (pp. 25-49). Cham (Switzerland): Springer https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19497-0_2
- Schwartz, S.H., Caprara, G.V., & Vecchione, M. (2010), Basic Personal Values, Core Political Values, and Voting: A Longitudinal Analysis. *Political Psychology*, 31: 421- 452. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00764.x>
- Schwartz, S. H., Caprara, G. V., Vecchione, M., Bain, P., Bianchi, G., Caprara, M. G., ... & Zaleski, Z. (2014). Basic personal values underlie and give coherence to political values: A cross national study in 15 countries. *Political Behavior*, 36(4), 899-930. <https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1007/s11109-013-9255-z>
- Scharfbillig, M, Smillie, L. Mair, D, Sienkiewicz, M, Keimer, J., Pinho Dos Santos, R., Vinagreiro Alves, H., Vecchione E., Scheunermann, L. (2021). *Values and Identities - a policymakers' guide*. EUR 30800 EN. Luxemburg: Publication Office of the European Union. ISBN 978-92-76-40966-2. <https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC126150>
- Taylor, C. (2002) Modern social imaginaries. *Public Culture*, 14 (1): 91–124. <https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-14-1-91>
- Turnbull-Dugarte, S. J. (2020). The European lavender vote: Sexuality, ideology and vote choice in Western Europe. i, 59(3), 517-537. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12366>
- Valsiner, J. (2007). *Culture in minds and societies: Foundations of cultural psychology*. SAGE Publications India. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316662229.003>
- Veltri, G. A., Redd, R., Mannarini, T., & Salvatore, S. (2019). The identity of Brexit: A cultural psychology analysis. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, 29(1), 18-31. <https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2378>