Indipendenza della banca centrale, vigilanza bancaria e stabilita monetaria

Authors

  • D. MASCIANDARO

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3651/10979

Keywords:

Central bank independence, banking system, monetary stability

Abstract

The overall conclusion of recent macroeconomic literature is that the existence of an independent central bank, which is responsible for monetary stability and increases monetary controls, in the long-term favours a non-inflationary trend in monetary aggregates, without creating negative repercussions on fiscal and real aggregates. The main limitation of this approach is that it does not examine in-depth the analysis of the interactions between the central bank and the banking system, if not considering the latter a passive transmission box of monetary policy. This paper, starting from a general interpretation of the theoretical results related to the relationship between central bank independence and monetary stability - in terms of objectives and instruments - aims to provide an initial contribution on the subject, in terms of theory and on that of comparative institutional analysis.

  

JEL Codes: E58

 

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Vol. 46 No. 184 (1993)

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