Interpretazioni di Keynes: logica del probabile, strutture dell'incerto
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3651/10905Keywords:
Keynes, philosophyAbstract
The work concerns the seemingly inexhaustible theme of chance and uncertainty in Keynes’ thought, inspired by the book On Keynes' Method by Anna M. Carabelli. While in the past there was much debate on Keynes the economist and little on Keynes the philosopher, today the situation is almost entirely reversed. Within this new literary "boom" Carabelli's book holds a clearly differentiated thesis that is supported so strongly, that it can not go unnoticed. The precise argument is that Keynes’ method comes from a philosophy of knowledge whose foundations and distinctive features are fully developed in the Treatise on Probability. The examination of this work, the intentions that move it and the results that are affirmed, demonstrate that, in order to become the economist that we know today, Keynes had to get rid of his philosophy of probability. The contrast between these convictions and the main theses supported by Carabelli is the reason for the counter-interpretation of Keynes’ texts presented here.
JEL Codes: E12
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