Banks’ sovereign exposures in Italy: critical reflections between public financial needs and banks’ management equilibrium
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3651/19120Keywords:
banks, public debt, sovereign exposures, sovereign riskAbstract
The paper analyzes changes and composition of sovereign portfolios of major Italian banks, focusing on several aspects: size and impact on balance sheet, geographical distribution, accounting and evaluation criteria adopted. This is carried out through the examination of data covering the period from 2018 to 2024, a time frame marked by events that significantly affected State’s financial needs and banks’ strategic decisions. The data analysis enables new insights and critical considerations on the relationship between banks and sovereigns, while consistently acknowledging the close interconnection between the real economy, public debt and the functioning of the banking system.
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