Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale
Abstract
According to the author, the emphasis authors currently tend to place on the 'surprise effect' in order to argue for the independence of central banks is to a large extent unjustified. The main arguments for the independence of a cen-tral bank are others: firstly, the opinion that governments are induced to in-cur excessive expenditure due to reasons highlighted by public choice theo-rists and, secondly, the idea that inflation arises in connection with social conflict. Additionally, this study makes it clear that 'time inconsistency' theory is far from being a new way of stating old ideas.
JEL Codes: E58
Keywords:
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