Challenges to the liberal international trading system, GATT and the Uruguay Round
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3643/10661Keywords:
GATT, Uruguay round, TradeAbstract
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was responsible for the normalisation of international trade relations in the post-war period and the tariff liberalisation that ensued, was put under considerable stress in the 1980s and its capacity to continue has now been seriously questions. The work surveys the liberal international trading system, the GATT framework and the latest developments of the Uruguay Round.
JEL: F13
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