The political economy of the protection in Italy: some empirical evidence
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3643/10774Keywords:
Political economy, Italy, protection, demand side, tariffs, subsidiesAbstract
Only recently has the political economy of protection become the subject of systemic analysis. Neoclassical and modern trade economists have long failed to address the economic and political reality of protection from the stand-point of the process of choice. The present article adopts a specification that emphasises the demand side of the market and tests it empirically, with clear recognition of its limitations. Protection is addressed in its two basic dimensions: the rate of tariff protection afforded at the EC level, and the rate of subsidy assistance afforded at the national level.
JEL: F13
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