The aim of the article is to analyse which limitatious should there be on the use of Assisted. Reproductive Technologies (ART). We clairn that the "principle of harm" requires that we aie noi justified in banning any harmless medical intervention, nor any harmless "biotechnological practice". The burden of the proof weighs on the opponeuts of the freedom of in order to fustify their denying access to ART, they are duty-bound to detect a harm. On these grounds, we address the question how far people should have the fr eedonz io have control of phenotypic traits of children (features like hair eye and skin colour, generai physique, intelligence or sporting ability) that are susceptible to technological or genetic manipula-tion. We inspect the manz arguments against positive genetic manipulation, and we conclude that there is not good reason not to alloro positive genetic inanipulation of ntorally neutral or morally significane and advantageous characteristics.
