Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale (Time inconsistency and the independence of central banks)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3651/10850Keywords:
Central banks, Central bank independence, Surprise effect, Time inconsistency theoryAbstract
According to the author, the emphasis authors currently tend to place on the ‘surprise effect’ in order to argue for the independence of central banks is to a large extent unjustified. The main arguments for the independence of a central bank are others: firstly, the opinion that governments are induced to incur excessive expenditures due to reasons highlighted by public choice theorists and, secondly, the idea that inflation arises in connection with social conflict. Additionally, this study makes it clear that the ‘time inconsistency’ theory is far from being a new way of stating old ideas.
JEL: E58
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