Indipendenza delle banche centrali in dodici paesi industrializzati
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3651/10966Keywords:
Central bank independenceAbstract
There has recently been worldwide interest in the question of greater monetary policy autonomy for central banks. According to the December 1991 Treaty on European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), for example, the European Central Bank is supposed to assume practically unlimited responsibility for monetary policy. The authors set in context the issue of central bank independence and compare different indices of central bank independence.
JEL Codes: E52, E58
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