Le autorità indipendenti nel settore bancario. (Indipendent authorities in the banking sector)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3651/12642Keywords:
Autorità indipendenti, Accountability, Sistema bancarioAbstract
Negli ultimi anni la diffusione delle autorità indipendenti ha rappresentato un importante tratto distintivo dell’evoluzione istituzionale di gran parte dei paesi. La corrispondente delega di poteri è stata giustificata con la necessaria autonomia dal potere politico ed economico, nell’ipotesi che le autorità indipendenti siano la risposta istituzionale più efficace per perseguire gli interessi pubblici. Questa impostazione si basa su tre principali presupposti la cui validità è storicamente e geograficamente determinata. Il lavoro esamina le autorità indipendenti del settore bancario e finanziario, spiegandone l’evoluzione e i profili di autonomia e di accountability. I cambiamenti della regolamentazione e del ruolo delle autorità vengono messi in relazione agli sviluppi internazionali e alla loro continua trasformazione, anche alla luce delle ricorrenti crisi finanziarie. Infine il lavoro si interroga su quale debba essere l’assetto istituzionale ottimale in termini di divisione/integrazione delle responsabilità di vigilanza in ambito bancario/finanziario.
In recent years, the diffusion of independent authorities has been an important distinguishing feature of the institutional evolution of most countries. The corresponding delegation of powers has been justified with the necessary autonomy from political and economic power, on the assumption that independent authorities are the most effective institutional response to pursue public interests. This approach is based on three main assumptions whose validity is historically and geographically determined. The work examines the independent authorities of the banking and financial sector, explaining their evolution and the profiles of autonomy and accountability. Changes in regulation and the role of the authorities are linked to international developments and their continuous transformation, also in light of the recurrent financial crises. Finally, the work wonders on what should be the optimal institutional structure in terms of division / integration of supervisory responsibilities in the banking / financial sector.
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